RETHINKING POPPER

DESCRIPTION

Karl Popper is best known for declaring a total ban on induction. He claimed to discredit induction both as a logical operation and a psychological fact in the acquisition of knowledge. Moreover, he argued that justification - a faithful companion of induction - is incompatible with reason, and demanded that philosophy frees reason from its justificationist baggage. He also stressed the ideological dangers of justification, namely its association with dogmatism and, on the political level, with the suppression of criticism by authoritarian, totalitarian forms of power.
The uncompromising severity of Popper's anti-inductivism provoked criticism from many quarters. Despite the diversity of this criticism, two main lines of criticism stand out especially in the philosophy of science. Popper is blamed for (a) internal inconsistencies insofar as his methodology relies on implicit and unrecognized elements of induction and for (b) paralyzing rationalism insofar as rationality demands justification of some sort. Over the years, most Popper's critics reached the conclusion that critical rationalism is not a viable epistemological or methodological stance; of those who still see some philosophical potential in critical rationalism, most advocated a modified, softer version (either combining falsificationism with induction or suggesting some non-inductive form of justification or justified belief), and only a tiny minority continue to campaign for the recognition of the originality of Popper's radical anti-inductivist and anti-justificationst stance. In the case of Popper's political philosophy, the situation is more complex, and Popper enjoys high popularity especially in the countries that still strive to install democratic systems. However, the question arises whether Popper has anything relevant to say within the framework of functioning and open - yet imperfect - societies that today spread over almost the entire Euro-Atlantic region.
But is critical rationalism not being underestimated? Does the overwhelming negative judgment - targeting mainly Popper's philosophy of science - not overlook its philosophical subtlety? Should one not be careful of not reducing philosophical evaluation to criticism of 'technicalities' alone? Take the example of Kant: from the 'technical' point of view, his philosophy suffers from inherent contradictions. As Hegel already clearly showed, the epistemology based on the autonomy of the subject ends up being locked within the boundaries of subjectivity, leading to a fatal dichotomy between mind and reality, the world 'an sich'. And Kant's formal ethics, based on universal moral norms, does not provide any guidance for specific moral actions. The help from God - the Lawgiver contradicts Kant's original demand for the ethical autonomy of the subject. Yet, despite these and other grave inconsistencies, few would deny that Kant's philosophy is one of the greatest achievements in the history of philosophy.
Clearly, the value of particular philosophical conceptions becomes established as a result of subtle weighing of the original philosophical vision against its inherent shortcomings and limitations. The aim of this conference is to consider afresh the critical rationalism of Karl Popper and to encourage a re-assessment of the relevance of Popper's ideas to the contemporary philosophical disputes. Is critical rationalism a matter of the past, a closed chapter in a rather limited area of the philosophy of science? Or does it offer a provocative defence of rationalism, humanism and democracy in a time when these values are being undermined? Has the critical literature not dismissed Popper's philosophy too hastily?
There are several areas in which critical rationalism might show its capacity to address today's readers. In the logical disguise of the critique of induction, a non-foundationist model of reason emerges that breaks free from any form of justificationism. Turning away from the classical rationalism, Popper's philosophical effort resonates with the late existentialist and postmodern strategies of condemning the foundationalist metaphysical tradition constitutive of the Western philosophy. The so-called legitimation crisis, stressing the inability of reason to legitimate its own supremacy, has a parallel in the justification crisis addressed by Popper. Yet for Popper, this crisis does not herald the collapse of the age of reason but its new - true and justification-free - beginning. Preserving the authority of reason, Popper can insist on the importance of normative methodology, a position that is currently in retreat in the contemporary philosophy of science; echoing the legitimation crisis brought up by postmodernism, methodology seems too insecure to interfere with the expert scientific games. The conception of the growth of knowledge, seen as the highest form of evolution and realized by human species due to its unique critical verbal capacity, sheds new light on evolutionary biology. The relevance of Popper's political philosophy in today's global world is worth examining. For Popper, social and economic planning is incompatible with freedom; but is it really so? George Soros - who gave the idea of open society world-wide publicity - now considers a need for planning within democratic and market-oriented societies. Popper's belief that open society is - due to its tolerance to otherness - vulnerable to the totalitarian dangers becomes a matter of great urgency in today's world. How can we clearly identify the enemies of open society and to what extent do we have the right to practice the (military) intolerance of intolerance? Are these enemies only external or are there seeds of authoritarianism in the processes of the federalization of the EU, or in the processes of the spread of global markets?
These suggestions do not limit the range of topics to be discussed at the conference but are merely intended to give some idea of the range of issues on which a reconsideration of Popper's philosophical legacy might bear. Opposing arguments are welcome - the organizers would like to encourage a confrontation of different ideas. What we do not invite, however, are out-of-context one-sided and many times repeated criticisms that, as we hinted with the example of Kant, do not automatically discredit the value of any philosophy. Negative verdicts on critical rationalism as a tenable and inspirational philosophy should, however, provide arguments showing why certain specific criticisms are as lethal as they claim to be, or why they should deny Popper the right to the highest level of philosophical acclaim.