
Contents

Acknowledgments	xiii
Introduction: Cognitive Models of Science	xv
<i>Ronald N. Giere</i>	
1. Models from Cognitive Psychology	xvii
2. Models from Artificial Intelligence	xxiii
3. Models from Neuroscience	xxv
4. Between Logic and Sociology	xxv
5. Critique and Replies	xxvii

PART I

MODELS FROM COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY

How Do Scientists Think?	
Capturing the Dynamics of Conceptual Change in Science	3
<i>Nancy J. Nersessian</i>	
The Scene	3
The Question	3
The Problem	3
The Path to Solution	4
1. What Is "Cognitive-Historical" Analysis?	4
2. What Would a Cognitive Theory of Conceptual Change in Science Look Like?	7
2.1. <i>Background</i>	7
2.2. <i>Outline of a Cognitive Theory of Conceptual Change</i>	9
3. Abstraction Techniques and Conceptual Change	13
3.1. <i>Analogical and Imagistic Reasoning</i>	13
3.2. <i>Thought Experiments and Limiting Case Analysis</i>	25
3.3. <i>Summary: Abstraction Techniques and Conceptual Change</i>	34
4. Wider Implications	35
4.1. <i>Implications for Philosophy of Science</i>	35
4.2. <i>Implications for History of Science</i>	36

4.3. <i>Implications for Psychology</i>	38	
4.4. <i>Implications for Science Education</i>	39	
5. Return To Galloway		40
The Scene		40
The Problem		41
The Procedural Turn; or, Why Do Thought Experiments Work?		45
<i>David Gooding</i>		
1. Introduction		45
2. Exemplary Science		46
3. Recovering Reconstruction		48
3.1. <i>Reticularity and Reasoning</i>	49	
3.2. <i>Generation, Discovery, and Justification</i>	51	
3.3. <i>Recognizing Reconstruction</i>	52	
4. The Procedural Turn		52
4.1. <i>Cognitive Regress</i>	53	
4.2. <i>Discovery Paths</i>	54	
5. Representing Experimental Paths		57
5.1. <i>Representing Objects</i>	57	
5.2. <i>Representing Agency</i>	60	
5.3. <i>Resources</i>	60	
6. Experimental Reasoning		62
7. Comparing Narratives		64
7.1. <i>Ontological Ambivalence</i>	65	
7.2. <i>Thought Experiments</i>	69	
8. Why Do Thought Experiments Work?		70
Serial and Parallel Processing in Scientific Discovery		77
<i>Ryan D. Tweney</i>		
1. Serial and Parallel Processing		77
2. A Specific Case		80
3. ECHO in the Dark		83
4. Some Moral Lessons		86
The Origin and Evolution of Everyday Concepts		89
<i>Susan Carey</i>		
1. Local Incommensurability		92
1.1. <i>Mismatch of Referential Potential</i>	92	
1.2. <i>Beyond Reference</i>	93	
1.3. <i>Conceptual Differentiation</i>	95	
1.4. <i>Summary</i>	98	
2. Five Reasons to Doubt Incommensurability between Children and Adults		98

2.1. <i>Adults and Young Children Communicate</i>	99
2.2. <i>Developmental Psychologists Must Express Children's Beliefs in the Adult Language; Otherwise, How Is the Study of Cognitive Development Possible?</i>	99
2.3. <i>Where Is the Body?</i>	100
2.4. <i>How Would Incommensurability Arise? Empiricist Version</i>	101
2.5. <i>How Would Incommensurability Arise? Nativist Version</i>	101
3. The Evidence	102
4. Weight, Density, Matter, Material Kind	103
4.1. <i>Undifferentiated Concept: Weight/Density</i>	103
4.2. <i>How an Undifferentiated Weight/Density Concept Functions</i>	106
4.3. <i>The Material/Immaterial Distinction</i>	107
4.4. <i>The Child's Material/Immaterial Distinction</i>	109
4.5. <i>Weight and Materiality, Continued</i>	114
4.6. <i>Occupation of Space by Physical Objects</i>	115
4.7. <i>A Digression: An Undifferentiated Air/Nothing Concept</i>	116
4.8. <i>Interim Conclusions: The Material/Immaterial Distinction</i>	117
4.9. <i>Taking Up Space: Matter's Homogeneity</i>	117
4.10. <i>Mathematical Prerequisites</i>	122
5. Conclusions	122
5.1. <i>Origins of Concepts</i>	125

**Conceptual Change within and across Ontological Categories:
Examples from Learning and Discovery in Science** 129
Michelene T. H. Chi

1. Introduction	129
1.1. <i>The Nature of Ontological Categories</i>	130
1.2. <i>Assertions of the Theory</i>	133
2. Conceptual Change across Ontological Categories	138
2.1. <i>Learning Science Concepts</i>	139
2.2. <i>Processes of Radical Conceptual Change</i>	141
2.3. <i>Discovering Science Concepts</i>	144
2.4. <i>Similarity between Medieval Theories and Naive Conceptions: What Constitutes a "Theory"?</i>	156
2.5. <i>Evidence of Radical Conceptual Change</i>	161
2.6. <i>Fostering Radical Conceptual Change in the Context of Instruction</i>	164
3. Conceptual Change within an Ontological Category	167
3.1. <i>Revision of Part-Whole Relations</i>	168
3.2. <i>Formation of New Superordinate or Subordinate Categories</i>	171
3.3. <i>Reclassification of Existing Categories</i>	172
3.4. <i>Spreading Associations in Insight Problems</i>	174
3.5. <i>Direct Reassignment within Ontological Categories</i>	176
3.6. <i>A Caveat</i>	177
4. Conclusion	178

Information, Observation, and Measurement from the Viewpoint of a Cognitive Philosophy of Science	187
<i>Richard E. Grandy</i>	
1. Scales of Measurement and Information	190
2. Observation, Measurement, and Information	192
3. Observation: From Sensations to Sentences	193
3.1. <i>Communitywide Stimulus Meaning</i>	194
3.2. <i>Why Communitywide?</i>	197
3.3. <i>Reliability</i>	198
3.4. <i>Awareness of Observationality</i>	200
4. Kinds of Theoreticity	202
5. A Program and a Conjecture	204
Foundationalism Naturalized	207
<i>C. Wade Savage</i>	
1. Foundationalist Theories of Conscious Knowledge	209
2. A Foundationalist Theory of Conscious and Unconscious Knowledge	214
3. The Knowing Organism as an Association	224
4. Final Remarks	228
PART II	
MODELS FROM ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE	
The Airplane and the Logic of Invention	239
<i>Gary Bradshaw</i>	
1. Introduction	239
2. Why Did the Wright Brothers Invent the Airplane?	241
3. Conclusions	249
Strategies for Anomaly Resolution	251
<i>Lindley Darden</i>	
1. Introduction	251
2. Anomalies and Scientific Reasoning	252
3. Previous Work on Anomalies	254
4. Strategies for Anomaly Resolution	256
4.1. <i>Confirm Anomalous Data or Problem</i>	257
4.2. <i>Localize the Anomaly</i>	258
4.3. <i>Resolve the Anomaly</i>	258
4.4. <i>Assess the Hypotheses to Resolve the Anomaly</i>	261
4.5. <i>Unresolved Anomalies</i>	262
5. Representation and Implementation of Anomaly Resolution in Genetics	263
5.1. <i>Representation of a Scientific Theory</i>	263

5.2. *Anomaly Resolution: Localization* 266
 5.3. *Extensions to the Current Implementation* 269
 6. Conclusion 270

Copernicus, Ptolemy, and Explanatory Coherence 274
Greg Nowak and Paul Thagard

1. Explanatory Coherence 274
 2. Ptolemy and Copernicus 278
 3. Ptolemy: Evidence and Hypotheses 279
 4. Copernicus: Hypotheses and Explanations 287
 5. Running Echo 291
 6. Is Echo Necessary? 299
 7. Conclusion 300
 Appendix: Input to Echo for Simulation of Copernicus vs. Ptolemy 302
Appendix A: Evidence Propositions 302
Appendix B: Hypotheses in the Ptolemy-Copernicus Simulation 304
*Appendix C: Explanations and Contradictions
 in the Ptolemy-Copernicus Simulation* 308

**Understanding Scientific Controversies from
 a Computational Perspective: The Case of Latent Learning 310**
Eric G. Freedman

1. Latent-learning Study 312
 2. Explanatory Coherence by Harmony Optimization 315
 3. Results 319
 4. Discussion 329
*Appendix: Inputs to ECHO.2 for the Simulation
 of the Latent-learning Controversy* 333

**PART III
 MODELS FROM NEUROSCIENCE**

**A Deeper Unity:
 Some Feyerabendian Themes in Neurocomputational Form 341**
Paul M. Churchland

1. Introduction 341
 2. Neural Nets: An Elementary Account 343
 3. Epistemological Issues in Neurocomputational Guise 353
 3.1. *On the Theory Ladenness of All Perception* 354
 3.2. *On Displacing Folk Psychology* 355
 3.3. *On Incommensurable Alternatives* 357
 3.4. *On Proliferating Theories* 358
 3.5. *On Proliferating Methodologies* 360
 4. Conclusion 362

**PART IV
BETWEEN LOGIC AND SOCIOLOGY**

Answers to Philosophical and Sociological Uses of Psychology in Science Studies: A Behavioral Psychology of Science	367
<i>Arthur C. Houts and C. Keith Haddock</i>	
1. The General Problem and the Psychologism Objection	368
1.1. <i>Philosophical Usages of Psychologism</i>	369
1.2. <i>Summary and Conclusions about Philosophical Objections</i>	374
1.3. <i>Sociological Usages of Psychologism</i>	376
1.4. <i>Summary and Conclusions about Sociological Objections</i>	382
2. Epistemology from the Standpoint of Radical Behaviorism	384
2.1. <i>Radical Behaviorism Is Not Logical Behaviorism or Methodological Behaviorism</i>	384
2.2. <i>An Answer to Subjectivist Psychology: Behavioral Analysis of Private Experience</i>	388
2.3. <i>An Answer to Logical A Priorism: The Analysis of Rule-governed Behavior</i>	390
2.4. <i>An Answer to "Cognitive Processes": Verbal Behavior Is Social Behavior</i>	393
3. Summary and Conclusions	395
Simulating Social Epistemology: Experimental and Computational Approaches	400
<i>Michael E. Gorman</i>	
1. Two Types of Validity	401
2. Two Types of Experimental Research	402
2.1. <i>Experiments Using Abstract Tasks</i>	402
2.2. <i>Experiments Using Scientific Problems</i>	407
3. Computational Simulation: An Alternate Approach	408
3.1. <i>Artificial Epistemology</i>	409
3.2. <i>Comparing Experimental and Computational Simulations</i>	411
3.3. <i>Do Computational Simulations Refute SSK?</i>	412
4. Experimental Social Epistemology: Toward a Research Program	414
4.1. <i>Experimental Simulations of Error</i>	414
4.2. <i>Minority Influence</i>	415
4.3. <i>Knowledge Transmission</i>	417
4.4. <i>Simulating a Scientific Controversy</i>	419
5. Conclusions	423

Epistemology Radically Naturalized: Recovering the Normative, the Experimental, and the Social	427
<i>Steve Fuller</i>	
1. The Scope of Social Epistemology	427
2. Naturalizing Knowledge and Cognition: Momentum Lost and Regained	428
3. Churchland and the Limits of Radical Naturalism	431
4. The Limited Naturalism of Experimental Psychology	436
5. The Limits of Naturalism in Analytic Epistemology	441
6. The Limited Naturalism of Ethnomethodology	445
7. Towards an Experimental Constructivist Sociology of Science	448

**PART V
CRITIQUE AND REPLIES**

CRITIQUE

Invasion of the Mind Snatchers	465
<i>Clark Glymour</i>	

REPLIES TO GLYMOUR

Reconceiving Cognition	475
<i>Paul M. Churchland</i>	
What the Cognitive Study of Science Is Not	481
<i>Ronald N. Giere</i>	
Computing Coherence	485
<i>Paul Thagard</i>	
Contributors	489
Index of Authors	493
Index of Subjects	501