Contents

Acknowledgments	xi
Prologue	xv
CHAPTER ONE: The Maze and the Masses	1
1. The Maze and the Masses	3
2. On the Meaning of Democracy	10
3. The Domain of Democratic Reason and	
the Circumstances of Politics	13
4. Democratic Reason as Collective Intelligence	
of the People	17
5. Overview of the Book	23
CHAPTER Two: Democracy as the Rule	
of the Dumb Many?	27
1. The Antidemocratic Prejudice in Contemporary	
Democratic Theory	29
2. What's Wrong with the People?	31
CHAPTER THREE: A Selective Genealogy of the Epistemic	
Argument for Democracy	53
1. The Myth of Protagoras: Universal Political Wisdom	55
2. Aristotle's Feast: The More, the Wiser	59
3. Machiavelli: Vox Populi, Vox Dei	64
4. Spinoza: The Rational Majority	67
5. Rousseau: The General Will Is Always Right	69
6. Condorcet: Large Numbers and Smart Majorities	70
7. John Stuart Mill: Epistemic Democrat	
or Epistemic Liberal?	75
8. Dewey: Democracy and Social Intelligence	82
9. Hayek: The Distributed Knowledge of Society	85
CHAPTER FOUR: First Mechanism of Democratic Reason:	
Inclusive Deliberation	89
1. Deliberation: The Force of the Better Argument	90
2. Deliberation as Problem Solving: Why More	
Cognitive Diversity Is Smarter	97
3. Why More-Inclusive Deliberating Groups Are Smarter	104

viii • Contents

4. Representation	105
5. Election versus Random Selection	108
CHAPTER FIVE: Epistemic Failures of Deliberation	118
	120
1. General Problems and Classical Solutions	120
2. A Reply from Psychology: The Argumentative	123
Theory of Reasoning Conclusion	143
CHAPTER SIX: Second Mechanism of Democratic Reason:	
Majority Rule	145
1. The Condorcet Jury Theorem	147
2. The Miracle of Aggregation	156
3. Models of Cognitive Diversity	160
Appendix 1: The Law of Large Numbers in the Condorcet	
Jury Theorem	166
Appendix 2: The Logic of Cognitive Diversity	
in Judgment Aggregation	169
Appendix 3: Information Markets and Democracy	173
CHAPTER SEVEN: Epistemic Failures of Majority Rule:	
Real and Imagined	185
1. Politics of Judgment versus Politics of Interest and	
the Irrelevance of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem	185
2. The Problem of Informational Free Riding	193
3. The Problem of Voters' Systematic Biases	
and Their "Rational Irrationality"	195
Conclusion	206
CHAPTER EIGHT: Political Cognitivism: A Defense	208
1. Political Decision Making as Imperfect	
Procedural Justice	210
2. Political Cognitivism: Weak versus Strong	213
3. The Three Sides of Political Questions	213
4. Political Cognitivism: Culturalist versus Absolutist	217
5. Implications for the Epistemic Argument	
for Democracy	219
6. Status of the Standard: Postulate or	
Empirical Benchmark?	219
7. The Antiauthoritarian Objection	223
Conclusion	23

Contents	• IX
CONCLUSION: Democracy as a Gamble Worth Taking	232
1. Summary	232
2. Preconditions of Democratic Reason	233
3. Limits of the Metaphor of the Maze	234
4. Empirical Segue to the Theoretical Epistemic Claim	238
5. The Wisdom of the Past Many and Democracy	
as a Learning Process	239
6. Reason and Rationality	241
Bibliography	243
Index	265