

Contents

Preface	xii
Introduction	xiii
1 Arguing about Classical Logic	1
1.1 Logical Theories	1
1.1.1 The Bearers of Logical Properties	2
1.1.2 Total and Partial Logical Theories	3
1.1.3 The Shape of a Logical Theory	4
1.2 Classical and Intuitionistic Logic	6
1.2.1 The Formal Syntactic Part	6
1.2.2 A Model-Theoretic Logical Theory	8
1.2.3 Two Derivational Logical Theories	10
1.2.4 The Transformational Part	13
1.2.5 Logically Valid Rules	16
1.3 Arguing Against a Logical Theory	19
1.3.1 Types of Sentences of the Language of \mathcal{T}	19
1.3.2 Four Ways of Arguing Against a Logical Theory	21
1.4 Relevance	24
1.4.1 Conditionality, Implication, and Validity	25
1.4.2 Relevantism and Classical Mathematics	27
1.5 Empty Singular Terms	29
1.5.1 Theories of Free Logic	30
1.5.2 Free Logic and Non-Standard Classical Logic	31
2 A Purely Verbal Dispute?	35
2.1 Mathematical Languages	36
2.1.1 Natural Mathematical Languages	36
2.1.2 Formal Mathematical Languages	38
2.2 Logical Vocabulary	39
2.2.1 Inclusive Monism and the Burden of Proof	41
2.2.2 Meta-Linguistic Uniqueness Results	42
2.2.3 Rule-Based Uniqueness Results	46
2.2.4 Philosophical Consequences of Uniqueness	51
2.3 Mathematical Vocabulary	57
2.3.1 Theories About Numbers	58
2.3.2 Theories About Sets of Numbers	63

2.3.3	Theories About Sequences of Numbers	66
2.3.4	Second-Order Theories	68
2.4	The Simplicity of Understanding	72
2.4.1	An Argument Against Shared Understanding	73
2.4.2	A Causal Theory of Understanding	75
2.4.3	Low Requirements for Understanding	77
3	Counterexamples to Classical Logic	81
3.1	A Mathematical Conflict	82
3.1.1	The Uniformity Principle (UP)	82
3.1.2	The Continuity Principle (CP)	84
3.2	Justifications of UP and CP	86
3.2.1	A Justification of UP	87
3.2.2	A Justification of CP	96
3.3	Weak Counterexamples	100
3.3.1	What are Weak Counterexamples?	101
3.3.2	Establishing Weak Counterexamples	103
3.4	A Logical Basis of Mathematics?	106
3.4.1	Brouwerian Mathematics	107
3.4.2	The Normativity of Logic and Mathematics	109
3.4.3	Prawitz' Account of Correct Inferences	114
4	The Manifestation Argument	121
4.1	A Sketch of the Manifestation Argument	122
4.1.1	A Basic Version of the Argument	123
4.1.2	Three Variants of the Argument	126
4.2	Truth Conditional Semantics	131
4.2.1	Preliminaries	132
4.2.2	A Problem for Truth Conditional Semantics	133
4.2.3	Truth-Theory	134
4.2.4	The Semantic Significance of Theories of Truth	138
4.2.5	Refined Truth-Theory	139
4.3	Understanding and Knowledge	142
4.3.1	Ideal Understanding	142
4.3.2	Understanding and Knowledge of Truth Conditions	146
4.4	Understanding and Use	149
4.4.1	Dummettian Accounts of Understanding	150
4.4.2	Kinds of Manifesting Behaviour	154
4.4.3	Descriptions of Manifesting Behaviour	155
4.4.4	Manifestability of Knowledge of Truth Conditions	156
4.5	The Simplicity of Manifestability	160
4.5.1	Compositional Manifestation	161
4.5.2	Manifestation and Epistemic Constraints	167
5	Proof-Theoretic Arguments	174
5.1	Proof-Theoretic Preliminaries	175
5.1.1	General Proof-Theoretic Concepts	175

5.1.2	Calculi of Natural Deduction	179
5.1.3	Schemata for Rules and Standard Calculi	183
5.2	Accounts of Meaning and Logical Frameworks	186
5.2.1	The General Form of Proof-Theoretic Arguments	186
5.2.2	Permissible Logical Frameworks	190
5.3	Tennant's Proof-Theoretic Argument	195
5.3.1	Separability, Purity, Simplicity, and Directness	196
5.3.2	Failure and Improvement	202
5.4	Harmony	206
5.4.1	The Idea of Dummett's Proof-Theoretic Argument	206
5.4.2	Introduction and Elimination Rules	209
5.4.3	The Relation of Harmony	213
5.5	Dummett's Proof-Theoretic Argument	218
5.5.1	The Fundamental Idea of Dummett's Argument	220
5.5.2	The First Version of Dummett's Argument	224
5.5.3	The Second Version of Dummett's Argument	226
5.6	Against Dummett's Proof-Theoretic Argument	229
5.6.1	Reflection and Conjugation	229
5.6.2	Classical Logic and Non-Circular Classical Rules	236
6	Conclusion	240
A	Appendix to Chapter 2	244
A.1	Arithmetical Uniqueness	244
A.2	Set-Theoretic Uniqueness	253
A.3	Function-Theoretic Uniqueness	255
Bibliography		257
Index		268