

Contents

<i>List of illustrations</i>	x
<i>Preface</i>	xi
<i>Acknowledgements</i>	xiii
1 Introductory survey of the interpretations: some historical background	1
<i>Introductory survey of the interpretations</i>	<i>1</i>
<i>Origins and development of probability theory (c. 1650 to c. 1800): mathematics</i>	<i>3</i>
<i>Origins and development of probability theory (c. 1650 to c. 1800): practical applications and philosophy</i>	<i>8</i>
2 The classical theory	14
<i>Universal determinism and Laplace's demon</i>	<i>14</i>
<i>Equally possible cases</i>	<i>17</i>
<i>Janus-faced probability</i>	<i>18</i>
<i>Why was probability theory not developed in the Ancient World?</i>	<i>22</i>
3 The logical theory	25
<i>Cambridge in the Edwardian era</i>	<i>25</i>
<i>Probability as a logical relation</i>	<i>29</i>
<i>Measurable and non-measurable probabilities: the Principle of Indifference</i>	<i>33</i>
<i>Paradoxes of the Principle of Indifference</i>	<i>37</i>
<i>Possible solutions to the paradoxes</i>	<i>42</i>
4 The subjective theory	50
<i>Ramsey's criticisms of Keynes</i>	<i>52</i>

	<i>Subjective foundations for mathematical probability: the Ramsey–De Finetti theorem</i>	53
	<i>A comparison of the axiom system given here with the Kolmogorov axioms</i>	65
	<i>Apparently objective probabilities in the subjective theory: exchangeability</i>	69
	<i>The relation between independence and exchangeability</i>	75
	<i>Criticism of De Finetti's exchangeability reduction</i>	77
	<i>Some objections to Bayesianism</i>	83
	<i>De Finetti's route to subjective probability</i>	85
5	The frequency theory	88
	<i>Probability theory as a science</i>	88
	<i>The empirical laws of probability</i>	92
	<i>The limiting frequency definition of probability</i>	96
	<i>The problem of randomness</i>	105
	<i>The relation between Von Mises' axioms and the Kolmogorov axioms</i>	109
6	The propensity theory: (I) general survey	113
	<i>Popper's introduction of the propensity theory</i>	114
	<i>Can there be objective probabilities of single events?</i>	119
	<i>Classification of propensity theories</i>	125
	<i>The propensity theories of Miller, the later Popper and Fetzer</i>	126
	<i>Propensity and causality: Humphreys' paradox</i>	129
7	The propensity theory: (II) development of a particular version	137
	<i>Criticisms of operationalism: a non-operationalist theory of conceptual innovation in the natural sciences</i>	138
	<i>A falsifying rule for probability statements</i>	145
	<i>Derivation of the empirical laws of probability</i>	150
	<i>The Kolmogorov axioms and the propensity theory</i>	160
8	Intersubjective probability and pluralist views of probability	169
	<i>Intersubjective probability</i>	169
	<i>The spectrum from subjective to objective</i>	175
	<i>Pluralist views of probability</i>	180

9 An example of pluralism: differences between the natural and social sciences	187
<i>General arguments for interpreting probabilities in economics as epistemological rather than objective</i>	188
<i>Soros on the difference between the natural and social sciences</i>	195
<i>Operationalism is appropriate for the social sciences, but not for the natural sciences</i>	200
<i>Notes</i>	206
<i>References</i>	212
<i>Index</i>	218