Rational Decisions

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Contents

Preface			**ix**
1	**Revealed Preference**		**1**
	1.1	Rationality?	1
	1.2	Modeling a Decision Problem	2
	1.3	Reason Is the Slave of the Passions	3
	1.4	Lessons from Aesop	5
	1.5	Revealed Preference	7
	1.6	Rationality and Evolution	12
	1.7	Utility	14
	1.8	Challenging Transitivity	17
	1.9	Causal Utility Fallacy	19
	1.10	Positive and Normative	22
2	**Game Theory**		**25**
	2.1	Introduction	25
	2.2	What Is a Game?	25
	2.3	Paradox of Rationality?	26
	2.4	Newcomb's Problem	30
	2.5	Extensive Form of a Game	31
3	**Risk**		**35**
	3.1	Risk and Uncertainty	35
	3.2	Von Neumann and Morgenstern	36
	3.3	The St Petersburg Paradox	37
	3.4	Expected Utility Theory	39
	3.5	Paradoxes from A to Z	43
	3.6	Utility Scales	46
	3.7	Attitudes to Risk	50
	3.8	Unbounded Utility?	55
	3.9	Positive Applications?	58
4	**Utilitarianism**		**60**
	4.1	Revealed Preference in Social Choice	60
	4.2	Traditional Approaches to Utilitarianism	63
	4.3	Intensity of Preference	66
	4.4	Interpersonal Comparison of Utility	67

5 Classical Probability **75**
5.1 Origins 75
5.2 Measurable Sets 75
5.3 Kolmogorov's Axioms 79
5.4 Probability on the Natural Numbers 82
5.5 Conditional Probability 83
5.6 Upper and Lower Probabilities 88

6 Frequency **94**
6.1 Interpreting Classical Probability 94
6.2 Randomizing Devices 96
6.3 Richard von Mises 100
6.4 Refining von Mises' Theory 104
6.5 Totally Muddling Boxes 113

7 Bayesian Decision Theory **116**
7.1 Subjective Probability 116
7.2 Savage's Theory 117
7.3 Dutch Books 123
7.4 Bayesian Updating 126
7.5 Constructing Priors 129
7.6 Bayesian Reasoning in Games 134

8 Epistemology **137**
8.1 Knowledge 137
8.2 Bayesian Epistemology 137
8.3 Information Sets 139
8.4 Knowledge in a Large World 145
8.5 Revealed Knowledge? 149

9 Large Worlds **154**
9.1 Complete Ignorance 154
9.2 Extending Bayesian Decision Theory 163
9.3 Muddled Strategies in Game Theory 169
9.4 Conclusion 174

10 Mathematical Notes **175**
10.1 Compatible Preferences 175
10.2 Hausdorff's Paradox of the Sphere 177
10.3 Conditioning on Zero-Probability Events 177
10.4 Applying the Hahn–Banach Theorem 179
10.5 Muddling Boxes 180
10.6 Solving a Functional Equation 181
10.7 Additivity 182
10.8 Muddled Equilibria in Game Theory 182

References **189**

Index **197**