

The Rational Mind

Scott Sturgeon

OXFORD
UNIVERSITY PRESS

Contents

1. Guided Tour	1
1.1 Structuring the Project	1
1.2 Starting Assumptions	3
1.3 Synopsis of Part I: Formal and Informal Epistemology	9
1.4 Synopsis of Part II: Coarse- and Fine-grained Attitudes	11

Part I. Formal and Informal Epistemology

2. The Bayesian Model (Probabilism)	19
2.1 Preview	19
2.2 The Bayesian Theory of States	19
2.3 The Partition Principle and the Ball Game	25
2.4 The Ball Game	29
2.5 Conditional Credence	45
2.6 The Marble Game	48
2.7 The Bayesian Transition Theory: Jeffrey's Rule	53
2.8 A Matching Psychology: Creda	58
3. The Bayesian Theory of States: Critical Discussion	61
3.1 Preview	61
3.2 Contra Bayesian States: One Type of Fine-grained Attitude?	61
3.3 Contra Bayesian Conditional Credence	75
3.4 Generalizing Bayesian States I: Intervals and Midpoints	82
3.5 Generalizing Bayesian States II: Intervals and Tertiary Attitudes	87
3.6 Generalizing Bayesian States III: Representors	91
4. The Bayesian Transition Theory: Critical Discussion	101
4.1 Preview	101
4.2 Bayesian Transition: Inference or What?	101
4.3 Conditional and Indicative Credence	107
4.4 Rigidity and Conditionality in the Bayesian Model	111
4.5 Conditionality and Restricted Vision	116
4.6 Conditionality and Bayesian Kinematics	124
4.7 The Nozick–Harman Point, <i>Modus Ponens</i> , and Supposition	129
4.8 Restricted-Vision Conditionality and Bayesian Kinematics	142
5. The Belief Model (AGM)	155
5.1 Preview	155
5.2 The Belief Model's Theory of States	155
5.3 The Belief Model's Transition Theory	158
5.4 Further Claims About Rational Transition	163
5.5 Contraction	165

5.6 Postulates	173
5.7 Linking States and Transitions: Conditional Belief	175
5.8 A Matching Psychology: Bella	177
6. Critical Discussion of the Belief Model	180
6.1 Preview	180
6.2 States in the Belief Model: Only One Coarse-Grained Attitude?	180
6.3 Coarse-Grained Attitudes	183
6.4 The Belief Model's Transition Theory	189
7. Conditional Commitment and the Ramsey Test	197
7.1 Linking Theory and Conditional Commitment	197
7.2 The Issue	198
7.3 The Coarse-Grained Bombshell	199
7.4 The Fine-Grained Bombshell	200
7.5 Diagnosing Gärdenfor's Bombshell	202
7.6 Diagnosing Lewis' Bombshell	206
7.7 The Rumpus	209
7.8 Conditionals and Lewis' Bombshell	210

Part II. Coarse- and Fine-Grained Attitudes

8. Puzzling about Epistemic Attitudes	221
8.1 Two Questions about Epistemic Attitudes	221
8.2 A Puzzle in Three Easy Pieces: the Lottery and the Preface	222
8.3 A Troika of Extreme Reactions	226
8.4 Critical Discussion	228
9. Belief-First Epistemology	233
9.1 Two Strategies	233
9.2 Credence as Update-Disposition	234
9.3 Credence-as-Belief	235
9.4 A Dilemma	248
9.5 The Marching-in-Step Problem	252
10. Credence-First Epistemology: Strengths and Challenges	255
10.1 The Basic Picture	255
10.2 The Strengths of Credal-Based Lockeanism	256
10.3 Answerable Challenges for Credal-Based Lockeanism	260
10.4 Deeper Challenges for Credal-Based Lockeanism	268
11. Force-based Attitudes	272
11.1 Building Epistemic Attitudes	272
11.2 Cognitive Force	273
11.3 Picturing Force-Based Confidence	276
11.4 Modelling Force-Based Confidence	279
11.5 Force-Based Lockeanism	282

12. Force-Based Confidence at Work	288
12.1 Preview	288
12.2 Thick Confidence and Representors: Pesky Dilation	288
12.3 Force-Based Confidence and Rational Kinematics	298
12.4 Force-Based Confidence and Evidence	308
12.5 Force-Based Confidence and Content-Based Accuracy	313
13. Inference and Rationality	321
13.1 Preview	321
13.2 Rational Shift-in-View: a Space of Theories	321
13.3 Rational Steps	328
13.4 Inference and the Basing Relation	330
13.5 A Puzzle about Shift-in-View: Visual Update and Inference	336
13.6 A Deeper Puzzle: Inference and Confidence	340
13.7 Inference, Causation, and Confidence-Grounded Belief	342
13.8 Rational Architecture	346
13.9 Rational Shift-in-View	353
<i>Bibliography</i>	357
<i>Index</i>	363