Commentary on Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics*

St. Thomas Aquinas

A translation of Aquinas's Commentary and of the Latin text of Aristotle, with introduction and supplementary commentary by Richard Berquist

> Preface by Ralph McInerny

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Contents

Dedication	1X
Acknowledgments	x
Preface by Ralph McInerny	xi
Introduction	xiii
Note on the Translation	xxix
Aquinas's Division of the Text of the Posterior Analytics	xxxi

AQUINAS'S COMMENTARY ON THE POSTERIOR ANALYTICS

Prooemium

BOOK I

1

THE NEED FOR DEMONSTRATION

I.1	Dependence of Learning on Pre-existent Knowledge	4
I.2	The Pre-existent Knowledge Required for Demonstration	6
I.3	How the Conclusion Is Foreknown	11

THE DEFINITION OF THE WHY-DEMONSTRATION

I.4	Definition of the Why-Demonstration	15
I.5	Immediate Principles: Axioms and Suppositions	23
I.6	Principles Better Known than the Conclusion	27
I.7	Immediate Principles Not Demonstrable	30
I.8	Impossibility of Circular Demonstration	33

THE PREMISES OF THE WHY-DEMONSTRATION

I.9	Meaning of "Predicated of All"	39
I.10	The Modes of Per Se	42
I.11	The Commensurately Universal	47
I.12	Errors regarding the Commensurately Universal	50
I.13	Principles of Demonstration as Necessary	57

I.14	Principles of Demonstration as Per Se	64
I.15	Demonstrations Not from Extrinsic Principles	67
	Demonstrations and Definitions as Eternal	72
I.17	Demonstrations Not from Common Principles	76
I.18	Principles and Non-principles—Common and Proper	
	Principles	80
I.19	Distinctions among Common Principles	85
I.20	Use of Common Principles	89
I.21	Questions and Arguments Proper to Each Science	94
I.22	Deceptions Proper to Each Science—Deceptions Not	
	Found in the Sciences	97
	THE PREMISES OF THE FACT-DEMONSTRATION	
123	Fact-Demonstrations from Effect to Cause	104
	Fact-Demonstrations from Remote Cause	108
	Fact-Demonstrations in the Subalternated Sciences	111
	THE FORM OF THE DEMONSTRATION	
I.26	Superiority of the First Figure-Immediate Negative	
	Propositions	115
	FALSITY AND IGNORANCE IN THE DEMONSTRATIVE SCIENCES	
I.27	False Syllogisms Opposed to True Immediate	
	Negative Propositions	120
I.28	False Syllogisms Opposed to True Immediate	
	Affirmative Propositions	126
I.29	False Syllogisms Opposed to True Mediate Propositions	131
	Sense Knowledge Required for Demonstration.	137
	THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF DEMONSTRATIONS PROCEEDING INFINITELY	
I.31	Questions about Whether Demonstrations	
	Come to an End	140
I.32	Construction and an international and a second s	
_	Ouestions Reduced to the Ouestion About	
	Questions Reduced to the Question About Affirmative Demonstrations	146
I.33	Affirmative Demonstrations	146
I.33		146 152

	The Logical Proof that Demonstrations Come to an End	158
1.33	The Analytic Proof that Demonstrations Come to an End	165
I.36	Corollaries of the Proofs that Demonstrations Come to an End	170
	COMPARISON OF DEMONSTRATIONS	
	Arguments for the Superiority of Particular Demonstrations	178
	Universal Demonstrations Superior to Particular Demonstrations Affirmative Demonstrations Superior to Negative	184
	Demonstrations	189
I.40	Negative Demonstrations Superior to Demonstrations to the Impossible	194
	COMPARISON OF SCIENCES TO EACH OTHER AND TO OTHER FORMS OF KNOWLEDGE	
	Certitude of Sciences—Unity and Diversity of Sciences	198
I.42	Science in Relation to Chance Events and to Sense Knowledge	206
I.43	Principles Not the Same for All Sciences	212
	Science and Opinion—Quickness of Mind	220
	BOOK II	
	THE MIDDLE TERM: DEFINITION AND CAUSE	
II.1	The Four Questions and Their Relation to the Middle Term	229
OPP	OSING ARGUMENTS ON THE RELATION OF DEFINIT AND WHAT A THING IS TO DEMONSTRATION	ION
II.2 II.3	Definition and Demonstration Not of the Same Thing Impossibility of Proving What a Thing Is by	238
	Convertible Terms	244
II.4	Impossibility of Proving What a Thing Is by Divisions	249
II.5	Impossibility of Proving What a Thing Is by Supposition	254

II.6 Impossibility of Knowing What a Thing Is by Demonstration or by Definition	259
HOW DEFINITION AND WHAT A THING IS ARE RELATED TO DEMONSTRATION	
II.7 Showing What a Thing Is by Logical Syllogism and by Demonstration	264
II.8 Different Kinds of Definition in Relation to Demonstration	271
DEMONSTRATION AND THE CAUSES	
II.9 Demonstrations through the Four CausesII.10 Demonstrations When Cause and Effect Are	277
Simultaneous or Not Simultaneous II.11 Continuity in Demonstrations from	285
Non-simultaneous Causes	291
II.12 Demonstrations for Circular Processes and for Things Which Come to Be for the Most Part	296
SEARCHING FOR DEFINITIONS	
II.13 Predicates Signifying What a Thing IsII.14 Seeking Definitions by the Method of DivisionII.15 Replies to Objections—Rules for the Method of DivisionII.16 Seeking Definitions by the Method of Similarities	300 305 310 315
SEARCHING FOR CAUSES	
II.17 Seeking the Cause of Common CharacteristicsII.18 How Cause and Effect Are Not Always ConvertibleII.19 How One Effect Can Have More than One Cause	319 323 328
THE FIRST PRINCIPLES	
II.20 How the First Principles Come to Be Known	335
Translator's Commentary	343
References	471
Index	473