Commentary on Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics*

St. Thomas Aquinas

A translation of Aquinas's Commentary and of the Latin text of Aristotle, with introduction and supplementary commentary by Richard Berquist

Preface by Ralph McInerny

DUMB OX BOOKS
Notre Dame, Indiana
2007
Contents

Dedication ix
Acknowledgments x
Preface by Ralph McInerny xi
Introduction xiii
Note on the Translation xxix
Aquinas's Division of the Text of the Posterior Analytics xxxi

AQUINAS'S COMMENTARY ON THE POSTERIOR ANALYTICS

Prooemium 1

BOOK I

THE NEED FOR DEMONSTRATION

I.1 Dependence of Learning on Pre-existent Knowledge 4
I.2 The Pre-existent Knowledge Required for Demonstration 6
I.3 How the Conclusion Is Foreknown 11

THE DEFINITION OF THE WHY-DEMONSTRATION

I.4 Definition of the Why-Demonstration 15
I.5 Immediate Principles: Axioms and Suppositions 23
I.6 Principles Better Known than the Conclusion 27
I.7 Immediate Principles Not Demonstrable 30
I.8 Impossibility of Circular Demonstration 33

THE PREMISES OF THE WHY-DEMONSTRATION

I.9 Meaning of "Predicated of All" 39
I.10 The Modes of Per Se 42
I.11 The Commensurately Universal 47
I.12 Errors regarding the Commensurately Universal 50
I.13 Principles of Demonstration as Necessary 57
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I.14 Principles of Demonstration as Per Se</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.15 Demonstrations Not from Extrinsic Principles</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.16 Demonstrations and Definitions as Eternal</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.17 Demonstrations Not from Common Principles</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.18 Principles and Non-principles—Common and Proper Principles</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.19 Distinctions among Common Principles</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.20 Use of Common Principles</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.21 Questions and Arguments Proper to Each Science</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.22 Deceptions Proper to Each Science—Deceptions Not Found in the Sciences</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>THE PREMISES OF THE FACT-DEMONSTRATION</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.23 Fact-Demonstrations from Effect to Cause</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.24 Fact-Demonstrations from Remote Cause</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.25 Fact-Demonstrations in the Subalternated Sciences</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>THE FORM OF THE DEMONSTRATION</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.26 Superiority of the First Figure—Immediate Negative Propositions</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FALSITY AND IGNORANCE IN THE DEMONSTRATIVE SCIENCES</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.27 False Syllogisms Opposed to True Immediate Negative Propositions</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.28 False Syllogisms Opposed to True Immediate Affirmative Propositions</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.29 False Syllogisms Opposed to True Mediate Propositions</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.30 Sense Knowledge Required for Demonstration.</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF DEMONSTRATIONS PROCEEDING INFINITELY</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.31 Questions about Whether Demonstrations Come to an End</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.32 Questions Reduced to the Question About Affirmative Demonstrations</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.33 Presuppositions for the Logical Proof that Demonstrations Come to an End</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
I.34 The Logical Proof that Demonstrations Come to an End 158
I.35 The Analytic Proof that Demonstrations Come to an End 165
I.36 Corollaries of the Proofs that Demonstrations Come to an End 170

COMPARISON OF DEMONSTRATIONS

I.37 Arguments for the Superiority of Particular Demonstrations 178
I.38 Universal Demonstrations Superior to Particular Demonstrations 184
I.39 Affirmative Demonstrations Superior to Negative Demonstrations 189
I.40 Negative Demonstrations Superior to Demonstrations to the Impossible 194

COMPARISON OF SCIENCES TO EACH OTHER AND TO OTHER FORMS OF KNOWLEDGE

I.41 Certitude of Sciences—Unity and Diversity of Sciences 198
I.42 Science in Relation to Chance Events and to Sense Knowledge 206
I.43 Principles Not the Same for All Sciences 212
I.44 Science and Opinion—Quickness of Mind 220

BOOK II

THE MIDDLE TERM: DEFINITION AND CAUSE

II.1 The Four Questions and Their Relation to the Middle Term 229

OPPOSING ARGUMENTS ON THE RELATION OF DEFINITION AND WHAT A THING IS TO DEMONSTRATION

II.2 Definition and Demonstration Not of the Same Thing 238
II.3 Impossibility of Proving What a Thing Is by Convertible Terms 244
II.4 Impossibility of Proving What a Thing Is by Divisions 249
II.5 Impossibility of Proving What a Thing Is by Supposition 254
II.6 Impossibility of Knowing What a Thing Is by 
Demonstration or by Definition 259

HOW DEFINITION AND WHAT A THING IS ARE 
RELATED TO DEMONSTRATION

II.7 Showing What a Thing Is by Logical Syllogism and by 
Demonstration 264
II.8 Different Kinds of Definition in Relation to 
Demonstration 271

DEMONSTRATION AND THE CAUSES

II.9 Demonstrations through the Four Causes 277
II.10 Demonstrations When Cause and Effect Are 
Simultaneous or Not Simultaneous 285
II.11 Continuity in Demonstrations from 
Non-simultaneous Causes 291
II.12 Demonstrations for Circular Processes and 
for Things Which Come to Be for the Most Part 296

SEARCHING FOR DEFINITIONS

II.13 Predicates Signifying What a Thing Is 300
II.14 Seeking Definitions by the Method of Division 305
II.15 Replies to Objections—Rules for the Method of Division 310
II.16 Seeking Definitions by the Method of Similarities 315

SEARCHING FOR CAUSES

II.17 Seeking the Cause of Common Characteristics 319
II.18 How Cause and Effect Are Not Always Convertible 323
II.19 How One Effect Can Have More than One Cause 328

THE FIRST PRINCIPLES

II.20 How the First Principles Come to Be Known 335
Translator’s Commentary 343
References 471
Index 473