Getting Causes from Powers

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CONTENTS

ist of Figures	XV
Passing Powers Around	I
1.1 Causes and powers	I
1.2 Causal primitivism	7
1.3 Millian causes	II
1.4 Particular and general causal claims	13
1.5 The attack on causation	15
Modelling Causes as Vectors	19
2.1 The neuron and the vector	19
2.2 Neuron diagrams	20
	23
· ·	27
2.5 What the vector model explains: standard cases	30
2.6 Mutual manifestation and single powers	34
2.7 Realism about component powers	38
2.8 Multi-dimensional cases	44
2.9 'All things are vectors'	45
Against Necessity	47
3.1 Explaining the familiar by the obscure	47
3.2 'There is a necessary connexion to be taken into	
consideration'	48
3.3 The case for causal necessitarianism	50
3.4 Interference and prevention	53
3.5 Antecedent strengthening	56
3.6 Other anti-necessitarians	58
3.7 Is addition just subtraction in disguise?	60
3.8 What if there is no interferer?	63
3.9 Shouldn't we just include more?	64
	 Passing Powers Around I.I Causes and powers I.2 Causal primitivism I.3 Millian causes I.4 Particular and general causal claims I.5 The attack on causation Modelling Causes as Vectors 2.1 The neuron and the vector 2.2 Neuron diagrams 2.3 The vector and the quality space 2.4 Composition of causes and vector addition 2.5 What the vector model explains: standard cases 2.6 Mutual manifestation and single powers 2.7 Realism about component powers 2.8 Multi-dimensional cases 2.9 'All things are vectors' Against Necessity 3.1 Explaining the familiar by the obscure 3.2 'There is a necessary connexion to be taken into consideration' 3.3 The case for causal necessitarianism 3.4 Interference and prevention 3.5 Antecedent strengthening 3.6 Other anti-necessitarians 3.7 Is addition just subtraction in disguise? 3.8 What if there is no interferer?

.

	3.10 Can we exclude all interferers? 3.11 How can there be causal production without	67
	necessitation?	70
	3.12 What if determinism is true?	, s 74
	3.13 Probabilistic causation and multi-directional powers	77
	3.14 The new necessitarianism	81
	3.15 Causal necessitarianism jettisoned	84
4.	Reductionism, Holism and Emergence	86
	4.1 The composition of causes	86
	4.2 Alleged problem cases for the vector model	88
	4.3 Some possible replies	92
	4.4 What type of emergence do we have when	
	powers collide?	103
	4.5 Emergent powers	104
5.	Simultaneity	106
	5.1 The causal relation	106
	5.2 Temporal priority	107
	5.3 Problems with temporal priority	108
	5.4 Simultaneity of cause and effect	113
	5.5 Objections to simultaneous causation	115
	5.6 A sweet solution	121
6.	Explanation, Absences and Counterfactuals	130
	6.1 Epistemology and metaphysics	130
	6.2 Explanation	131
	6.3 Prediction	135
	6.4 Models	136
	6.5 Anti-deductivism	137
	6.6 Inductive inference	140
	6.7 Causation by absence	143
	6.8 Causal counterfactuals	148
7.	The Logic of Causation	156
	7.1 Relating cause to effect	156
	7.2 Distinguishing causal claims	157
	7.3 Some causal and non-causal claims	159
	7.4 Hypothetical versus categorical	163

Contents	xiii
7.5 Prevention, induction and <i>ceteris paribus</i> clauses	165
7.6 Transitivity	167
7.7 Context-sensitivity	174
8. Primitive Modality	175
8.1 Something in between	175
8.2 Dispositions and necessity	176
8.3 What if everything is necessary?	178
8.4 Dispositions and possibility	179
8.5 Dispositionality as natural possibility	181
8.6 Dispositionality and normativity	183
8.7 Dispositionality and intentionality	185
8.8 Intentionality and normativity are dispositional notions	186
8.9 Dispositionality as a selection function	189
8.10 The conditional analysis	190
8.11 Dispositionality is the most basic modality	193
9. Perceiving Causes	195
9.1 Primitive but empirically grounded	195
9.2 Causal judgements and perceptions	196
9.3 Where can we find the causal connection?	198
9.4 Bodily perception	201
9.5 Constant conjunction between willing and acting?	203
9.6 A reunificationist account of agency	204
9.7 The sense of proprioception	207
9.8 Perception and the dispositional modality	209
9.9 Dispositional modality is the best known	212
10. A Biologically Disposed Theory of Causation	214
10.1 A reflective equilibrium	214
10.2 Why not physics?	215
10.3 The central features of causal dispositionalism	218
10.4 Powers in biological explanation	219
10.5 Complexity, polygeny and pleiotropy	22 I
10.6 Context-sensitivity, plasticity and flexibility	224
10.7 Thresholds in biology	226
10.8 Emergence, holism and non-linearity	229
10.9 Simultaneity	232

10.10 Defeasible prediction	233
10.11 Dispositional modality	234
10.12 Causation and science	235
Conclusion of This Book	236
Bibliography	238
Index	249