

Husserl's Legacy

*Phenomenology, Metaphysics,
and Transcendental Philosophy*

Dan Zahavi

OXFORD
UNIVERSITY PRESS

Table of contents

<i>Preface</i>	vii
Introduction	1
1. Introspection and reflection	6
1.1 Methodological worries	6
1.2 The scope of reflection	18
2. Metaphysical neutrality	30
2.1 Metaphysics in <i>Logische Untersuchungen</i>	32
2.2 Realism—idealism	33
2.3 Liberation or restriction	41
2.4 Metaphysics and theory of science	48
3. The transcendental turn	51
3.1 The phenomenological criticism	51
3.2 The epoché and reduction	56
3.3 Transcendental phenomenology and metaphysics	60
4. Internalism, externalism, and transcendental idealism	77
4.1 Internalism and methodological solipsism	77
4.2 Intentionality and the noema	82
4.3 Transcendental idealism	94
4.4 Facticity and constitution	108
4.5 Beyond internalism and externalism	115
4.6 Intersubjectivity and the transcendental	120
5. The Naturalist challenge	137
5.1 Naturalizing phenomenology	139
5.2 Husserl's anti-naturalism	144
5.3 Transcendental phenomenology and phenomenological psychology	150
5.4 Phenomenological naturalism	162
6. Real realism	170
6.1 The end of phenomenology	170
6.2 Speculative realism	174
6.3 Forms of realism	180

6.4 Cognitive neuroscience and neo-Kantianism	187
6.5 Phenomenology and science	199
Conclusion	205
<i>References</i>	213
<i>Index of names</i>	231
<i>Index of subjects</i>	234