Grace, Predestination, and the Salvific Will of GOD

New Answers to Old Questions

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The Councils of Orange, Quiersy and Valence certainly exclude antecedent positive reprobation, and say that predestination is decreed differently from reprobation. So probably both should not be before, nor both after prevision of merits (§§21-23).

In the OT God redeemed His people in freeing them from Egypt, and made them His people by the covenant. By the covenant, God became as it were the kinsman of His people, united in life with them. Out of intense love God wanted to bind Himself by a bilateral covenant, to favor them (§41); He bound Himself to prove His love, so as to reassure them, and move them to respond, so that He might give the more (§§43-43a); the new covenant as foretold by Jeremiah, and described by St. Paul in the Epistle to the Hebrews, and other NT writings, is parallel to the old: in both God binds Himself on conditional human obedience to a law. The obedience of the new covenant is basically Christ's, to which that of His members is joined (§42); on the most basic level, in both covenants, human obedience does not move the Father: the fundamental reason for the grant of favor is His spontaneous love, which leads Him to bind Himself, and thereby to have a superadded reason in the covenant (§44); in the new covenant, the Father bound Himself by infinite objective

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titles (§45) to establish an infinite treasury (§46) and to distribute it (§47). He provided infinite titles for each individual man (§48). Conclusions: If someone fails to receive a rich abundance, the reason cannot be on God's part, for He bound Himself by infinite titles, even after original sin: the reason for failure is man's resistance. So there is no reprobation before foreseen demerits (§49). Objections: On gratuity of predestination and perseverance (§50) and on mere permission of ruin (§51).

Implicitly revealed in OT (§52); explicitly in NT (§53); Select Fathers (§54). This will is sincere, since it is a part of the love of God (to love is to will good to someone), and its force is the same as the force of God's love, which is measured by the infinite titles established at such pain in the Passion. Therefore God showed He sets no limits (short of miracles) which He will not pass to save: man sets limits by resistance (§§55-56). This appears also in the Father analogy (§57); and is confirmed by reason (§58). Conclusion: Negative reprobation before foreseen demerits contradicts the salvific will (§59). Objections: On mere permission (§60); from omnipotence (§61); from original sin (§62); from case of unbaptized infants (§63); from problem of pagans (§§64-69); from human weakness ($\S\S70-72$); from the good of the universe ($\S73$).

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