

Persons and Causes

The Metaphysics of Free Will

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Contents

Introduction xi

1. *Freedom and Determinism 3*
 - 1.1 An Ancient Argument 3
 - 1.2 Some Modal Principles and the Argument for Incompatibilism 5
 - 1.3 The Fixity of the Past and of Natural Laws 15
 - 1.4 Freedom and Responsibility 18
2. *Freedom and Indeterminism: Some Unsatisfactory Proposals 23*
 - 2.1 The Trouble with Incompatibilism 23
 - 2.2 Simple Indeterminism: Carl Ginet on Choice and Control 24
 - 2.3 Causal Indeterminism: The General Strategy and a Problem Posed 27
3. *The Agent as Cause: Reid, Taylor, and Chisholm 43*
 - 3.1 The Agency Theory 43
 - 3.2 Thomas Reid 43
 - 3.3 Richard Taylor 49
 - 3.4 Roderick Chisholm 55
 - 3.5 Summary 60

Appendix: Chisholm's Later Writings on Agency 61
4. *The Metaphysics of Free Will 67*
 - 4.1 Overview 67
 - 4.2 Event Causation 68
 - 4.3 Agent Causation 71
 - 4.4 C. D. Broad's Objection to the Very Idea of Agent Causation 74
 - 4.5 Remarks on a Contemporary Alternative Account of Agent Causation 76
 - 4.6 Ersatz Agent Causation? 79
 - 4.7 Alternative Possibilities, Responsibility, and Agent Causation 81

5. *Reasons and Causes* 85
 - 5.1 Reasons Explanation and the Agency Theory 85
 - 5.2 Objections to the Account 86
 - 5.3 Reasons and Contrastive Explanation 91
 - 5.4 Reasons and Tendencies to Act: A Residual Problem and a Speculative Proposal 95
 - 5.5 When Is the Will Free? 101
 - 5.6 Conclusion 107

6. *Agency, Mind, and Reductionism* 108
 - 6.1 Introductory Polemics: 'The Emerging Scientific Picture of the World' 108
 - 6.2 Emergence 110
 - 6.3 Emergence and Consciousness 115
 - 6.4 The Emergence of Active Power 121
 - 6.5 An Epistemological Objection to Agent Causation 123
 - 6.6 Conclusion 125

- References* 127

- Index* 133