A Spirit of Trust

A READING OF HEGEL'S *PHENOMENOLOGY*

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Contents

Reference Abbreviations xiii

Introduction: A Pragmatist Semantic Reading of Hegel's *Phenomenology* 1

I. The Focal Topic: The Content and Use of Concepts 1
II. The Strategy of Semantic Descent 4
III. The Social Dimension of Discursiveness: Normativity and Recognition 9
IV. The Historical Dimension of Discursiveness: Recollective Rationality 12
V. Cognition, Recognition, and Recollection: Semantics and Epistemology, Normative Pragmatics, and the Historicity of *Geist* 19

PART ONE. Semantics and Epistemology: Knowing and Representing the Objective World

1. Conceptual Realism and the Semantic Possibility of Knowledge 35

I. Classical Representational Epistemology 35
II. Genuine Knowledge and Rational Constraint 44
III. A Nonpsychological Conception of the Conceptual 50
IV. Alethic Modal and Deontic Normative Material Incompatibility 57

2. Representation and the Experience of Error: A Functionalist Approach to the Distinction between Appearance and Reality 63

I. Introduction 63
II. Two Dimensions of Intentionality and Two Orders of Explanation 66
III. Two Kantian Ideas 67

IV. Hegel's Pragmatist Functionalist Idea 68
V. The Mode of Presentation Condition 72
VI. The Experience of Error 75
VII. The Two Sides of Conceptual Content Are Representationally Related 80
VIII. Conclusion 85

3. Following the Path of Despair to a Bacchanalian Revel: The Emergence of the New, True Object 87

I. The Emergence of the Second Object 87
II. From Skepticism to Truth through Determinate Negation 94
III. Recollection and the Science of the Experience of Consciousness 101

4. Immediacy, Generality, and Recollection: First Lessons on the Structure of Epistemic Authority 107

I. Sense Certainty Introduced 107
II. Two Senses of "Immediacy" 110
III. A Bad Argument 115
IV. First Good Argument: Classification 118
V. Second Good Argument: Anaphoric Recollection 124

5. Understanding the Object / Property Structure in Terms of Negation: An Introduction to Hegelian Logic and Metaphysics in the *Perception* Chapter 133

I. The Lessons of *Sense Certainty* 134
II. Determinateness and Exclusive Negation 136
III. Formal Negation and Two Orders of Explanation 142
IV. Properties and Objects 148
V. Two Metaphysical Roles of Objects 151
VI. Ten Kinds of Metaphysical Differences 158
VII. From Perception to Understanding 164

6. "Force" and Understanding—From Object to Concept: The Ontological Status of Theoretical Entities and the Laws that Implicitly Define Them 169

I. Forces as Allegorical for Theoretical Entities 169
II. Invidious Eddingtonian Theoretical Realism 176
III. Holism and the "Play of Forces" 180
IV. From Forces to Laws as Superfacts 188
V. The "Inverted World" and Possible-World Semantics 192

7. Objective Idealism and Modal Expressivism 198

I. Explanation and the Expression of Implicit Laws 198
II. Objective Idealism 204
III. "Infinity" as Holism 217
IV. Expressivism, Objective Idealism, and Normative Self-Consciousness 224

PART TWO. Normative Pragmatics: Recognition and the Expressive Metaphysics of Agency

8. The Structure of Desire and Recognition: Self-Consciousness and Self-Constitution 235

I. The Historicity of Essentially Self-Conscious Creatures 235
II. Identification, Risk, and Sacrifice 237
III. Creatures Things Can Be Something *For*: Desire and the Triadic Structure of Orectic Awareness 240
IV. From Desire to Recognition: Two Interpretive Challenges 243
V. Simple Recognition: Being Something Things Can Be Something *for* Is Something Things Can Be *for* One 248
VI. Robust Recognition: Specific Recognition of Another as a Recognizer 253
VII. Self-Consciousness 258
VIII. Conclusion 260

9. The Fine Structure of Autonomy and Recognition: The Institution of Normative Statuses by Normative Attitudes 262

I. Normative Statuses and Normative Attitudes: A Regimented Idiom 262
II. The Kantian Autonomy Model of the Institution of Normative Statuses by Normative Attitudes 269
III. A Model of General Recognition 277
IV. A Model of Specific Recognition 285
V. The Recognitive Institution of Statuses, Subjects, and Communities 290
VI. The Status-Dependence of Attitudes 298
VII. Conclusion 305

10. Allegories of Mastery: The Pragmatic and Semantic Basis of the Metaphysical Incoherence of Authority without Responsibility 313

I. Introduction: Asymmetrical, Defective Structures of Recognition 313
II. The Subordination-Obedience Model 316
III. Identification 326

IV. The Practical Conception of Pure Independence 329
V. The Struggle 332
VI. The Significance of Victory 334
VII. The Master-Servant Relationship 338
VIII. The Metaphysical Irony at the Heart of Mastery 340
IX. From Subjects to Objects 343
X. Recognition and Cognition 347
XI. The Semantic Failures of Stoicism and Skepticism 352

11. Hegel's Expressive Metaphysics of Agency: The Determination, Identity, and Development of What Is Done 363

I. Looking Ahead: From Conceptual Realism and Objective Idealism to Conceptual Idealism 363
II. Two Sides of the Concept of Action: The Unity and Disparity that Action Involves 374
III. Two Models of the Unity and Disparity that Action Essentially Involves 380
IV. Intentional and Consequential Specifications of Actions 384
V. Practical Success and Failure in the Vulgar Sense: The *Vorsatz/Absicht* Distinction 398
VI. Identity of Content of Deed and Intention 403
VII. Further Structure of the Expressive Process by Which the Intention Develops into the Deed 410

12. Recollection, Representation, and Agency 422

I. Hegelian vs. Fregean Understandings of Sense and Reference 422
II. Retrospective and Prospective Perspectives on the Development of Conceptual Contents 432
III. Intentional Agency as a Model for the Development of Senses 442
IV. Contraction and Expansion Strategies 452

PART THREE. Recollecting the Ages of Spirit: From Irony to Trust

13. The History of Normative Structures: On Beyond Immediate *Sittlichkeit* 469

I. Epochs of *Geist* 469
II. Immediate *Sittlichkeit* 477
III. The Rise of Subjectivity 487
IV. Alienation and Culture 493

14. Alienation and Language 500

I. Introduction: Modernity, Legitimation, and Language 500
II. Actual and Pure Consciousness 502
III. Recognition in Language 506
IV. Authority and Responsibility in Language as a Model of Freedom 514
V. Pure Consciousness: Alienation as a Disparity between Cognition and Recognition 523
VI. Faith and Trust 527
VII. Morality and Conscience 538

15. *Edelmütigkeit* and *Niederträchtigkeit*: The *Kammerdiener* 547

I. Two Meta-attitudes 547
II. The *Kammerdiener* 550
III. The Authority of Normative Attitudes and Statuses 554
IV. Naturalism and Genealogy 560
V. Four Meta-meta-attitudes 569
VI. Looking Forward to Magnanimity 580

16. Confession and Forgiveness, Recollection and Trust 583

I. *Niederträchtig* Assessment 583
II. Confession 592
III. Forgiveness 596
IV. Recollection 600
V. The Conditions of Determinate Contentfulness 610
VI. Trust and Magnanimous Agency 621
VII. Hegel's Recollective Project 628

Conclusion: Semantics with an Edifying Intent: Recognition and Recollection on the Way to the Age of Trust 636

I. Edifying Semantics 636
II. *Geist*, Modernity, and Alienation 639
III. Some Contemporary Expressions of Alienation in Philosophical Theories 648
IV. Three Stages in the Articulation of Idealism 666
V. Recollection: How the Process of Experience Determines Conceptual Contents and Semantic Relations 675
VI. From *Verstand* to *Vernunft*: Truth and the Determinateness of Conceptual Content 688
VII. Normativity and Recognition 698
VIII. Dimensions of Holism: Identity through Difference 707
IX. Truth as Subject, *Geist* as Self-Conscious 712

X. The Age of Trust: Reachieving Heroic Agency 726
XI. Forgiveness: Recognition as Recollection 744

Afterword: To the Best of My Recollection 759

Notes 771

Index 793