

# *Truth and Truthmakers*

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# *Contents*

<i>Preface</i>	<i>page</i> xi
1. An introduction to truthmakers	1
2. The general theory of truthmaking	4
2.1. Introduction	4
2.2. Historical	4
2.3. The truthmaking relation	5
2.4. Falsemakers	9
2.5. The Entailment principle	10
2.6. Truths and falsehoods are propositions	12
2.7. Connecting truth with reality	16
2.8. A realist definition of truth?	17
2.9. Truthmakers for <i>p</i> may (properly) include truthmakers for <i>p</i>	17
2.10. Minimal truthmakers	19
2.11. A truth may have many minimal truthmakers	21
2.12. Truths without minimal truthmakers	21
2.13. Unique minimal truthmakers	22
2.14. The postulation of truthmakers contrasted with ‘quantifying over’	23
2.15. Different truths, same minimal truthmakers	24
3. Epistemology and methodology	26
3.1. The epistemic base	26
3.2. Moorean truths	26
3.3. The rational sciences	30
3.4. The empirical sciences	32
3.5. Deflationary truthmakers	32
3.6. Going beyond the rational consensus	34

## Contents

3.7. Truthmakers that are too narrow or too wide	36
3.8. Metaphysics and epistemology	37
4. Properties, relations and states of affairs	39
4.1. Introduction	39
4.2. Properties	39
4.3. Predication necessary or contingent?	45
4.4. Universals and instantiation	46
4.5. States of affairs	48
4.6. Relations	50
5. Negative truths	53
5.1. Introduction	53
5.2. Can we dispense with negative facts?	54
6. General truths	68
6.1. Truthmakers for general truths	68
6.2. The logical form of general facts	72
6.3. Totality states of affairs and the causal order	76
6.4. Why did Russell want both general facts and negative facts?	79
6.5. New thinking about general facts	80
6.6. <i>In memoriam:</i> George Molnar	81
7. Truthmakers for modal truths, part 1: possibility	83
7.1. Introduction	83
7.2. The Possibility principle	83
7.3. The possibility of aliens	86
7.4. Is it possible for there to be nothing at all?	89
7.5. Minimal truthmakers for truths of possibility	91
8. Truthmakers for modal truths, part 2: necessity	95
8.1. Against extensional accounts of necessity	95
8.2. Necessary states of affairs in the rational sciences?	96
8.3. Interpolation: truthmakers for 7, 5, 12 etc.	99
8.4. Truthmakers for truths of necessity in the rational sciences	100
8.5. A deeper hypothesis	103
8.6. Hochberg on identity and diversity	104
8.7. Internal properties	105
8.8. Truths of impossibility	107

*Contents*

8.9. Analytic and conceptual necessities	109
8.10. Summing up	111
9. Numbers and classes	112
9.1. Introduction	112
9.2. Truthmakers for the existence of numbers	112
9.3. A problem for this account	116
9.4. Many-membered classes	118
9.5. Singletons	120
9.6. The account of singletons refined	122
9.7. A difficulty for Possibilism	124
10. Causes, laws and dispositions	125
10.1. Truthmakers for causal truths	125
10.2. Causal laws	126
10.3. Dispositions	137
10.4. Against power theories of properties	138
10.5. The attraction of power theories explained away	142
10.6. What sort of terms does the causal relation take?	143
11. Time	145
<i>References</i>	151
<i>Index</i>	155