Contents

General Introduction

I. Problems About Mind

Introduction 15

A. Mind as Consciousness

1. René Descartes, Selections

from Meditations on First Philosophy, Meditations II and VI, and Fourth Replies 21
from Principles of Philosophy I: 9, 11, 32-35, 66-71 30
from Letter to Elizabeth (6-28-43) 33
from Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting One's Reason and Seeking the Truth in the Sciences V 34
from Letter to the Marquess of Newcastle (11-23-46) and Letter to More (2-5-49) 35

- 2. John Locke, from Essay Concerning Human Understanding II.i.2-5; II.i.19; II.xxvii.9; IV.vii.4; II.viii.7-15, 23-26; IV.iii.6,x.9-10 38
- 3. Thomas Reid, from Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, Essays I and II 45

B. Mind and Nature

- 4. Gilbert Ryle, "Descartes' Myth" 51
- 5. P. F. Strawson, "Self, Mind and Body" 58
- 6. Gareth B. Matthews, "Consciousness and Life" 63
- 7. G.E.M. Anscombe, "The First Person" 71

CONTENTS

II. Self and Other

83

Introduction

	A. Knowing Other Minds
9. 0.	Bertrand Russell, "Analogy" 89 Norman Malcolm, "Knowledge of Other Minds" 92 Stuart Hampshire, "The Analogy of Feeling" 98 P. F. Strawson, "Persons" 104
	B. Privileged Access
3.	Sydney Shoemaker, from "How Is Self-Knowledge Possible?" 116 D. M. Armstrong, "Is Introspective Knowledge Incorrigible?" 126 Richard Rorty, from "Mind-Body Identity, Privacy, and Categories" 133
	C. The Theory Approach
	C. S. Chihara and J. A. Fodor, "Operationalism and Ordinary Language: A Critique of Wittgenstein" 137 Hilary Putnam, "Brains and Behaviour" 151
	III. Mind and Body
	Introduction 161
	A. The Topic-Neutral Approach
8. 9.	J.J.C. Smart, "Sensations and Brain Processes" 169 Jerome Shaffer, "Mental Events and the Brain" 177 D. M. Armstrong, "The Causal Theory of Mind" 181 Keith Campbell, from "Central State Materialism" 189
	B. Functionalist Approaches
2. 3.	Hilary Putnam, "The Nature of Mental States" 197 David Lewis, "Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications" 204 Ned Block, "Troubles with Functionalism" 211 David Lewis, "Mad Pain and Martian Pain" 229 Postscript: "Knowing What It's Like" 234
	C. The Mental-Physical Contrast
6.	Saul A. Kripke, from Naming and Necessity 236 Donald Davidson, "Mental Events" 247 Jaegwon Kim, "Epiphenomenal and Supervenient Causation" 257
	D. Eliminative Materialism
9.	Paul Feyerabend, "Mental Events and the Brain" 266 Richard Rorty, from "Persons Without Minds" 268 W. V. Quine, "States of Mind" 287

CONTENTS

۱	<i>.</i>	The	Nature	of	Mind
11		1110	HULLIU	VI.	ITHIIM

Introd	luction	289
77 JU VW		خ کا سکت

A. Thinking

- 31. Roderick M. Chisholm, "Intentional Inexistence" 297
- 32. W. V. Quine, from "The Double Standard" 304
- 33. W. V. Quine, "Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes" 306
- 34. Roderick M. Chisholm, from The First Person 312
- 35. J. A. Fodor, "Propositional Attitudes" 325
- 36. Daniel C. Dennett, "True Believers: The Intentional Strategy and Why It Works" 339

Postscript: "Reflections: Real Patterns, Deeper Facts, and Empty Questions" 350

- 37. Fred I. Dretske, "The Intentionality of Cognitive States" 354
- 38. Donald Davidson, "Thought and Talk" 363
- 39. Wilfrid Sellars, from "The Structure of Knowledge," Lecture II: Minds 372

B. Sensing

- 40. Roderick M. Chisholm, from "The Status of Appearances" 380
- 41. Frank Jackson, "The Existence of Mental Objects" 385
- 42. Frank Jackson, "What Mary Didn't Know" 392
- 43. Sydney Shoemaker, "Functionalism and Qualia" 395
- 44. Christopher Peacocke, "Colour Concepts and Colour Experiences" 408
- 45. Wilfrid Sellars, from "Phenomenalism" 417 and from "Being and Being Known" 419
 - C. Consciousness, Self, and Personhood
- 46. Thomas Nagel, "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?" 422
- 47. Gilbert Ryle, from "Self-Knowledge" 429
- 48. Thomas Nagel "Brain Bisection and the Unity of Consciousness" 432
- 49. Harry G. Frankfurt, "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person" 441
- 50. Robert M. Gordon, "Emotions and Knowledge" 450
- 51. Norman Malcolm, "Thoughtless Brutes" 454
- 52. David M. Rosenthal, "Two Concepts of Consciousness" 462

V. Psychological Explanation

Introduction 479

- A. The Computational Approach
- 53. J. A. Fodor, "Methodological Solipsism Considered as a Research Strategy in Cognitive Psychology" 485

Stephen P. Stich, "Paying the Price for Methodological Solipsism" 499 Fodor, from "Author's Response" 500

54.	Daniel C. Dennett, "Brain Writing and Mind Reading" 502 Postscript 506			
55.	John R. Searle, "Minds, Brains, and Programs" 509 J. A. Fodor, "Searle on What Only Brains Can Do" 520 Searle, from "Author's Response" 521 Fodor, "After-thoughts: Yin and Yang in the Chinese Room" 524 Searle, "Yin and Yang Strike Out" 525			
56.	Hilary Putnam, "Computational Psychology and Interpretation Theory" 527	7		
	B. Individualism			
58.	Tyler Burge, "Individualism and the Mental" 536 Brian Loar, "Social Content and Psychological Content" 568 Robert Stalnaker, "On What's in the Head" 576			
	C. Scientific Versus Folk Psychology			
_	 Stephen P. Stich, "Autonomous Psychology and the Belief-Desire Thesis" Paul M. Churchland, "Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes" 601 			
62.	Daniel C. Dennett, "Three Kinds of Intentional Psychology" 613 Postscript: "Reflections: Instrumentalism Reconsidered" 626			
	Bibliography 634			