

Contents

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	ix
INTRODUCTION	xi
1 THE IDENTITY OF THINGS THAT HAPPEN	
Section 1 Davidson does not offer an adequate account of event identity.	1
Section 2 Strawson's thesis about the conceptual dependence of event particulars can withstand certain criticisms if sympathetically reinterpreted. The reinterpreted thesis is open to attack along two lines (to be pursued in Chapters 2 and 3).	8
Section 3 The grasp of the identity of events cannot be accounted for simply by listing the semantically significant parts of a sentence reporting that event.	17
Section 4 To evaluate the prospects for attacking Strawson's position along the two lines opened in Section 2 requires beginning with and attempting to elaborate the model of a feature placing language.	24
2 A FEATURE PLACER ON HIS OWN	
Section 5 The first lesson to be learned from the model of a feature placer is the importance of principles for applying more than one word or phrase to a single thing.	29
Section 6 Mereology provides a basis for representing a minimal grasp of limits and extent.	36
Section 7 The model language user of Section 6 has a principle of reidentification at his disposal, but lacks nearly everything he would need to make use of it.	45
Section 8 Elementary topological notions can be added to mereology to arrive at a more adequate representation of the grasp of limits and extent.	50

Section 9	
The grasp of a principle of distinctness involves a grasp of what constitutes a complete instance. In some cases it is possible to distinguish incomplete instances, in other cases it is possible only to fail to distinguish completely.	5
Section 10	
Sections 8 and 9 have located resources which overcome the crucial limitations observed in the model language user of Sections 6 and 7.	6
3 A SOCIETY OF FEATURE PLACERS	
Section 11	
The model language user of Chapter 2 can be used to clarify the issues which surround Strawson's position on events vis-à-vis basic particulars.	7
Section 12	
A community, whose members conceived of changes in their own position, would need to use a principle of identity for events.	8
Section 13	
It is not impossible for a language community to operate with a spatiotemporal framework which is unified temporally but not spatially. Such a community would, naturally, not be able to do many things with their language which humans are able to do.	8
Section 14	
A community whose members did not conceive of changes in their own positions could have a partially unified space if they could establish that members had overlapping viewpoints. This is not a satisfactorily unified space.	9
Section 15	
The community of Section 14 can take Strawson's 'decisive conceptual step'. To apply the distinction attained in taking the step to anything like the extent to which humans apply it, requires the use of a principle of identity for events.	9
Section 16	
The preceding eleven sections have established a number of points relevant to any more general theoretical approach to our grasp of identity principles.	10
NOTES	11
INDEX OF INITIAL OCCURRENCES	11
BIBLIOGRAPHY	11