

CONTENTS

<i>Editor's preface</i>	<i>page xi</i>
CHAPTER 1 General introduction	1
1 The main problem	1
2 Kant's notion of the <i>a priori</i>	2
2.1 ' <i>A priori</i> ' as applied to judgments	3
2.2 ' <i>A priori</i> ' as applied to concepts and percepts	9
2.2.1 Concepts	9
2.2.2 Percepts	11
2.3 Implications of Kant's notion of the <i>a priori</i>	11
3 The Copernican revolution	12
4 Transcendental arguments	13
CHAPTER 2 Space, time, and mathematics	16
1 Introductory remarks	16
2 The <i>Transcendental Aesthetic</i>	17
2.1 General introduction	17
2.1.1 Intuition	17
2.1.1.1 Pure and empirical intuition	19
2.1.1.1.1 Facts at the back of Kant's theory	20
2.1.1.1.2 Kant's view of the difference between spatial characteristics and sensible qualities	23
2.2 Theory of space	27
2.2.1 Special arguments to prove that our knowledge of space is non-empirical	27
I First argument	27
II Second argument	30
2.2.2 Special arguments to prove that our knowledge of space is intuitive	31
I First argument	32

vi CONTENTS

II	Second argument	33
	First edition	34
	Second edition	35
2.2.2.1	What did Kant think that he had proved?	36
2.2.3	The arguments from incongruent counterparts	37
I	<i>Von dem ersten Grunde</i>	38
II	The <i>Inaugural Dissertation</i>	40
III	<i>Prolegomena</i> and <i>Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science</i>	40
2.2.3.1	Independent comments on the arguments	42
2.2.4	The argument from our knowledge of geometry	45
2.2.5	Summary of Kant's theory of space	50
2.3	Theory of time	51
2.3.1	Special arguments	54
2.3.1.1	Arguments for the non-empirical and intuitive character of our knowledge of time	55
2.3.2	Argument from our knowledge of certain propositions about time	56
3	The nature of mathematics	57
3.1	Geometry	58
3.1.1	Comments on Kant's account of geometry	60
3.2	Arithmetic	66
3.3	Algebra	69
CHAPTER 3 The <i>Transcendental Analytic</i>		72
1	General remarks on the <i>Analytic</i>	72
2	Discovery of the categories and principles by help of formal logic	73
2.1	Discursive and intuitive cognition	73
2.2	Transcendental logic	74
2.3	Nature of judgment	75
2.3.1	The table for classifying judgments	76
2.4	Transition to the table of categories	79
2.4.1	Imaginative synthesis	80
2.4.1.1	What is imaginative synthesis?	80
2.4.1.2	What are the data to be synthesised?	84
2.4.1.3	What is the product of synthesis?	86
2.4.1.4	Sketch of a possible account of synthesis	89
2.4.2	Transition from judgments to categories	90

2.5	The table of categories	91
2.5.1	Kant's comments on the table	92
2.6	The doctrine of schematism	94
2.6.1	Kant's problem	94
2.6.1.1	Schemata of geometrical and empirical class-concepts	94
2.6.1.2	The notion of the transcendental schema of a category	97
2.6.2	Kant's list of transcendental schemata and principles	98
2.6.3	Comments on the notion of schematism	
3	The <i>Transcendental Deduction of the Categories</i>	102
3.1	Independent statement of Kant's problem	103
3.2	<i>Transcendental Deduction A</i>	106
3.2.1	Why do the categories need a transcendental deduction?	107
3.2.2	General principles of a transcendental deduction	110
3.2.3	The processes involved in epistemologically objective experiences	116
3.2.3.1	The functions of 'imagination'	117
3.2.3.2	The 'affinity' of appearances	119
3.2.3.3	The understanding and its categories	121
3.2.3.4	The doctrine of a 'synopsis' and three 'syntheses'	122
3.2.4	The notion of physical object	123
3.3	<i>Transcendental Deduction B</i>	128
3.4	Concluding comments on certain points in the two Deductions	134
3.4.1	The notion of conjunction	134
3.4.2	The human mind as the source of the law-abidingness of nature	135
3.5	The theory in the <i>Prolegomena</i>	137
3.5.1	'Judgments of perception' and 'judgments of experience'	138
3.5.2	Introduction of the notion of necessity	140
3.5.3	Necessity and empirical objectivity	142
3.5.4	Introduction of the categories	144
3.5.5	Empirical objects and the categories	145
3.5.6	Relevance of the theory to Hume's problem	146
4	The principles of pure understanding	147
4.1	The mathematical principles	148
4.1.1	The principle of the axioms of intuition	148
4.1.2	The principle for anticipating perceptions	150

viii CONTENTS

4.2	The dynamical principles	155
4.2.1	The first Analogy: substance and its permanence	158
4.2.1.1	First proof	159
4.2.1.2	Second proof	161
4.2.1.3	General remarks about permanence and change	163
4.2.2	The second Analogy: universal causation	164
4.2.2.1	First proof	165
4.2.2.2	Second proof	169
4.2.2.3	Third proof	173
4.2.2.4	General remarks about causation	175
4.2.3	The third Analogy: universal interaction	177
4.2.3.1	The proof in A	179
4.2.3.2	The proof in B	182
4.2.4	Concluding remarks on the Analogies	183
4.3	<i>Postulates of Empirical Thought</i>	184
4.3.1	The postulate of possibility	185
4.3.2	The postulate of actuality	186
4.3.3	The postulate of necessity	187
4.3.4	<i>Refutation of Idealism</i>	188
4.3.4.1	Refutation A	188
4.3.4.2	Refutation B	194
4.4	Phenomena and noumena	199
4.4.1	Empirical and transcendental uses of concepts and principles	199
4.4.2	The notion of a noumenon	201
4.4.2.1	Positive and negative senses of 'noumenon'	201
4.4.2.2	Noumenon and thing-in-itself	202
4.4.3	The sensible world and the world of theoretical physics	203
CHAPTER 4 Transition from epistemology to ontology		205
1	The ideas of reason	205
2	The problems of speculative philosophy	207
CHAPTER 5 Ontology		210
1	Rational cosmology	210
1.1	The general notion of an antinomy	210
1.2	The mathematical antinomies	212

1.2.1	First antinomy	212
1.2.1.1	Argument as applied to duration	212
1.2.1.2	Argument as applied to extension	218
1.2.1.3	Concluding comments	220
1.2.2	Second antinomy	221
1.3	Solution of the antinomies	225
1.3.1	General principles of solution	226
1.3.2	Application to the mathematical antinomies	229
2	The self and self-consciousness	234
2.1	Epistemological part	235
2.1.1	Inner sense	235
2.1.2	Apperception	240
2.1.3	Comments	244
2.2	Ontological part	251
2.2.1	The negative side	252
2.2.1.1	Self as substance	253
2.2.1.2	Simplicity of the self	255
2.2.1.3	Personal identity	257
2.2.1.4	Mind and body	259
2.2.1.5	Immortality	261
2.2.2	The positive side: ethical argument for immortality	263
2.2.2.1	Virtue and happiness	264
2.2.2.2	Virtue and moral perfection	266
2.2.2.3	The postulates of practical reason	266
2.2.2.4	Comments	268
3	Freedom and determinism	270
3.1	The third antinomy	270
3.1.1	The argument	271
3.1.2	The solution	273
3.1.2.1	Dynamical and mathematical antinomies	273
3.1.2.2	Solution of the general problem	274
3.1.2.3	Application to human volition	275
3.1.2.3.1	'Intelligible' and 'empirical' characters of a thing	276
3.1.2.3.2	'Practical' and 'transcendental' concepts of freedom	278
3.1.2.3.3	Reason as practical	279
3.1.2.3.4	Reconciliation of freedom and determinism	285
3.2	Freedom in Kant's ethical works	287
3.2.1	Freedom and the moral law	287
3.2.2	Freedom and determinism	290

X CONTENTS

4	God	293
4.1	Theology in the <i>Critique of Pure Reason</i>	293
4.1.1	The transcendental ideal	294
4.1.2	The three speculative arguments	294
4.1.2.1	Interrelations of the three arguments	295
4.1.2.2	The ontological argument	296
4.1.2.3	The cosmological argument	297
4.1.2.4	The physico-theological argument	298
4.1.3	Explanation of the illusion in these arguments	298
4.2	Theology in the <i>Critique of Practical Reason</i>	300
4.3	Theology in the <i>Critique of Judgment</i>	301
4.3.1	'Determinant' and 'reflective' judgments	301
4.3.2	Purposiveness	302
4.3.2.1	Subjective purposiveness	303
4.3.2.2	Objective purposiveness	303
4.3.2.3	'Natural purposes' and 'purposes of nature'	304
4.3.3	The status of teleological judgments	306
4.3.3.1	The use of teleological concepts in natural science	306
4.3.3.2	The intrinsic nature of teleological judgments	307
4.3.3.3	The notion of an 'intuitive understanding'	309
4.3.3.4	Teleology and mechanism in science	314
4.3.4	Application to theology	315
4.3.4.1	Natural theology	315
4.3.4.2	Moral theology	316
	Index of proper names	320