LOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS

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from the Second German Edition of Logische Untersuchungen

VOLUME ONE

PROLEGOMENA TO PURE LOGIC

(Volume One of the German Edition)

EXPRESSION AND MEANING

(Investigation I, Volume II of the German Edition)

THE IDEAL UNITY OF THE SPECIES

(Investigation II, Volume II of the German Edition)



NEW YORK
HUMANITIES PRESS

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