

LOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS

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VOLUME ONE

PROLEGOMENA TO PURE LOGIC

(Volume One of the German Edition)

EXPRESSION AND MEANING

(Investigation I, Volume II of the German Edition)

THE IDEAL UNITY OF THE SPECIES

(Investigation II, Volume II of the German Edition)



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