

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

- § 1. Descartes' *Meditations* as the prototype of philosophical reflection 1
§ 2. The necessity of a radical new beginning of philosophy 4

FIRST MEDITATION. THE WAY TO THE TRANSCENDENTAL EGO

- § 3. The Cartesian overthrow and the guiding final idea of an absolute grounding of science 7
§ 4. Uncovering the final sense of science by becoming immersed in science qua noematic phenomenon . . . 9
§ 5. Evidence and the idea of genuine science 11
§ 6. Differentiations of evidence. The philosophical demand for an evidence that is apodictic and first in itself 14
§ 7. The evidence for the factual existence of the world not apodictic; its inclusion in the Cartesian overthrow 17
§ 8. The *ego cogito* as transcendental subjectivity 18
§ 9. The range covered by apodictic evidence of the "Iam" 22
§ 10. Digression: Descartes' failure to make the transcendental turn 23
§ 11. The psychological and the transcendental Ego. The transcendency of the world 25

SECOND MEDITATION. THE FIELD OF TRANSCENDENTAL EXPERIENCE LAID OPEN IN RESPECT OF ITS UNIVERSAL STRUCTURES

- § 12. The idea of a transcendental grounding of knowledge 27
§ 13. Necessity of at first excluding problems relating to the range covered by transcendental knowledge . . . 29
§ 14.⁴ The stream of *cogitationes*. *Cogito* and *cogitatum* . . . 31
§ 15. Natural and transcendental reflection 33
§ 16. Digression: Necessary beginning of both transcendental "purely psychological" reflection with the *ego cogito* 37

§ 17. The two-sidedness of inquiry into consciousness as an investigation of correlatives. Lines of description. Synthesis as the primal form belonging to consciousness 39

§ 18. Identification as the fundamental form of synthesis. The all-embracing synthesis of transcendental time 41

§ 19. Actuality and potentiality of intentional life 44

§ 20. The peculiar nature of intentional analysis 46

§ 21. The intentional object as "transcendental clue" . . . 50

§ 22. The idea of the universal unity comprising all objects, and the task of clarifying it constitutionally 53

THIRD MEDITATION. CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS. TRUTH AND ACTUALITY

§ 23. A more pregnant concept of constitution, under the titles "reason" and "unreason" 56

§ 24. Evidence as itself-giveness and the modifications of evidence 57

§ 25. Actuality and quasi-actuality 58

§ 26. Actuality as the correlate of evident varification . . 59

§ 27. Habitual and potential evidence as functioning constitutively for the sense "existing object" 60

§ 28. Presumptive evidence of world-experience. World as an idea correlative to a perfect experiential evidence 61

§ 29. Material and formal ontological regions as indexes pointing to transcendental systems of evidence . . . 62

FOURTH MEDITATION. DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS PERTAINING TO THE TRANSCENDENTAL EGO HIMSELF

§ 30. The transcendental ego inseparable from the processes making up his life 65

§ 31. The Ego as identical pole of the subjective processes 66

§ 32. The Ego as substrate of habitualities 66

§ 33. The full concretion of the Ego as monad and the problem of his self-constitution 67

§ 34. A fundamental development of phenomenological method. Transcendental analysis as eidetic 69

§ 35. Excursus into eidetic internal psychology	72
§ 36. The transcendental ego as the universe of possible forms of subjective process. The compossibility of subjective processes in coexistence or succession as subject to eidetic laws	73
§ 37. Time as the universal form of all egological genesis	75
§ 38. Active and passive genesis	77
§ 39. Association as a principle of passive genesis	80
§ 40. Transition to the question of transcendental idealism	81
§ 41. Genuine phenomenological explication of one's own "ego cogito" as transcendental idealism	83

FIFTH MEDITATION. UNCOVERING OF THE SPHERE OF
TRANSCENDENTAL BEING AS MONADOLOGICAL INTER-
SUBJECTIVITY

§ 42. Exposition of the problem of experiencing someone else, in rejoinder to the objection that phenomenology entails solipsism	89
§ 43. The noematic-ontic mode of givenness of the Other, as transcendental clue for the constitutional theory of the experience of someone else	90
§ 44. Reduction of transcendental experience to the sphere of ownness	92
§ 45. The transcendental ego, and self-apperception as a psychophysical man reduced to what is included in my ownness	99
§ 46. Ownness as the sphere of the actualities and potentialities of the stream of subjective processes	100
§ 47. The intentional object also belongs to the full monadic concretion of ownness. Immanent transcendence and primordial world	103
§ 48. The transcendency of the Objective world as belonging to a level higher than that of primordial transcendency	105
§ 49. Predelineation of the course to be followed by intentional explication of experiencing what is other	106
§ 50. The mediate intentionality of experiencing someone else, as "appresentation" (analogical apperception) .	108

§ 51. "Pairing" as an associatively constitutive component of my experience of someone else	112
§ 52. Appresentation as a kind of experience with its own style of verification	113
§ 53. Potentialities of the primordial sphere and their constitutive function in the apperception of the Other	116
§ 54. Explicating the sense of the appresentation wherein I experience someone else	117
§ 55. Establishment of the community of monads. The first form of Objectivity: intersubjective Nature . .	120
§ 56. Constitution of higher levels of intermonadic community	128
§ 57. Clarification of the parallel between explication of what is internal to the psyche and egological transcendental explication	131
§ 58. Differentiation of problems in the intentional analysis of higher intersubjective communities. I and my surrounding world	131
§ 59. Ontological explication and its place within constitutional transcendental phenomenology as a whole .	136
§ 60. Metaphysical results of our explication of experiencing someone else	139
§ 61. The traditional problems of "psychological origins" and their phenomenological clarification	141
§ 62. Survey of our intentional explication of experiencing someone else	148

CONCLUSION

§ 63. The task of criticizing transcendental experience and knowledge	151
§ 64. Concluding word	152