

# LOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS

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VOLUME TWO

ON THE THEORY OF WHOLE AND PARTS

(Investigation III, Volume II of the German Edition)

THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN INDEPENDENT AND  
NON-INDEPENDENT MEANINGS

(Investigation IV, Volume II of the German Edition)

ON INTENTIONAL EXPERIENCES AND  
THEIR 'CONTENTS'

(Investigation V, Volume II of the German Edition)

ELEMENTS OF A PHENOMENOLOGICAL ELUCIDATION  
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