



CONTENTS

List of Abbreviations	xv
Introduction	xvii
Suggested Readings	xliv
A Note on the Translation	xliv
Translators' Acknowledgments	liii
Dedicatory Letter	3

❧ FIRST BOOK ❧

Preface	5
1 What Have Been Universally the Beginnings of Any City Whatever, and What Was That of Rome	7
2 Of How Many Species Are Republics, and Which Was the Roman Republic	10
3 What Accidents Made the Tribunes of the Plebs Be Created in Rome, Which Made the Republic More Perfect	15
4 That the Disunion of the Plebs and the Roman Senate Made That Republic Free and Powerful	16
5 Where the Guard of Freedom May Be Settled More Securely, in the People or in the Great; and Which Has Greater Cause for Tumult, He Who Wishes to Acquire or He Who Wishes to Maintain	17
6 Whether a State Could Have Been Ordered in Rome That Would Have Taken Away the Enmities between the People and the Senate	20
7 How Far Accusations May Be Necessary in a Republic to Maintain It in Freedom	23
8 As Much As Accusations Are Useful to Republics, So Much Are Calumnies Pernicious	26
9 That It Is Necessary to Be Alone If One Wishes to Order a Republic Anew or to Reform It Altogether outside Its Ancient Orders	28
10 As Much As the Founders of a Republic and of a Kingdom Are Praiseworthy, So Much Those of a Tyranny Are Worthy of Reproach	31

11	Of the Religion of the Romans	34
12	Of How Much Importance It Is to Take Account of Religion, and How Italy, for Lacking It by Means of the Roman Church, Has Been Ruined	36
13	How the Romans Made Religion Serve to Reorder the City and to Carry Out Their Enterprises and to Stop Tumults	39
14	The Romans Interpreted the Auspices according to Necessity, and with Prudence Made a Show of Observing Religion When Forced Not to Observe It; and If Anyone Rashly Disdained It, They Punished Him	41
15	The Samnites, as an Extreme Remedy for the Things Afflicting Them, Had Recourse to Religion	43
16	A People Used to Living under a Prince Maintains Its Freedom with Difficulty, If by Some Accident It Becomes Free	44
17	Having Come to Freedom, a Corrupt People Can with the Greatest Difficulty Maintain Itself Free	47
18	In What Mode a Free State, If There Is One, Can Be Maintained in Corrupt Cities; or, If There Is Not, in What Mode to Order It	49
19	After an Excellent Prince a Weak Prince Can Maintain Himself, but after a Weak One No Kingdom Can Be Maintained by Another Weak One	52
20	Two Virtuous Princes in Succession Produce Great Effects; and That Well-Ordered Republics Have of Necessity Virtuous Successions, and So Their Acquisitions and Increases Are Great	54
21	How Much Blame That Prince and That Republic Merit That Lack Their Own Arms	54
22	What Is to Be Noted in the Case of the Three Roman Horatii and the Three Alban Curiatii	56
23	That One Should Not Put All One's Fortune in Danger, and Not All One's Forces; and Because of This, the Guarding of Passes Is Often Harmful	57
24	Well-Ordered Republics Institute Rewards and Punishments for Their Citizens and Never Counterbalance One with the Other	59
25	He Who Wishes to Reform an Antiquated State in a Free City May Retain at Least the Shadow of Its Ancient Modes	60

26	A New Prince Should Make Everything New in a City or Province Taken by Him	61
27	Very Rarely Do Men Know How to Be Altogether Wicked or Altogether Good	62
28	For What Cause the Romans Were Less Ungrateful toward Their Citizens Than the Athenians	63
29	Which Is More Ungrateful, a People or a Prince	64
30	Which Modes a Prince or a Republic Should Use So As to Avoid the Vice of Ingratitude; and Which a Captain or a Citizen Should Use So As Not to Be Crushed by It	67
31	That the Roman Captains Were Never Extraordinarily Punished for an Error Committed; nor Were They Ever Punished When Harm Resulted to the Republic through Their Ignorance or through Bad Policies Adopted by Them	68
32	A Republic or a Prince Should Not Defer Benefiting Men in Their Necessities	70
33	When an Inconvenience Has Grown Either in a State or against a State, the More Salutary Policy Is to Temporize with It Rather Than to Strike at It	71
34	The Dictatorial Authority Did Good, and Not Harm, to the Roman Republic; and That the Authorities Citizens Take for Themselves, Not Those Given Them by Free Votes, Are Pernicious to Civil Life	73
35	The Cause Why the Creation of the Decemvirate in Rome Was Hurtful to the Freedom of That Republic, Notwithstanding That It Was Created by Public and Free Votes	76
36	Citizens Who Have Had Greater Honors Should Not Disdain Lesser Ones	77
37	What Scandals the Agrarian Law Gave Birth to in Rome; and That to Make a Law in a Republic That Looks Very Far Back and Is against an Ancient Custom of the City Is Most Scandalous	78
38	Weak Republics Are Hardly Resolute and Do Not Know How to Decide; and If They Ever Take Up Any Policy, It Arises More from Necessity Than from Choice	81
39	In Diverse Peoples the Same Accidents May Often Be Seen	83

40	The Creation of the Decemvirate in Rome, and What Is to Be Noted in It; Where It Is Considered, among Many Other Things, How through Such an Accident One Can Either Save or Crush a Republic	85
41	To Leap from Humility to Pride, from Mercy to Cruelty, without Due Degrees Is Something Imprudent and Useless	90
42	How Easily Men Can Be Corrupted	90
43	Those Who Engage in Combat for Their Own Glory Are Good and Faithful Soldiers	91
44	A Multitude without a Head Is Useless; and That One Should Not First Threaten and Then Request Authority	92
45	Nonobservance of a Law That Has Been Made, and Especially by Its Author, Is a Thing That Sets a Bad Example; and to Freshen New Injuries Every Day in a City Is Most Harmful to Whoever Governs It	93
46	Men Ascend from One Ambition to Another; First One Seeks Not to Be Offended, and Then One Offends Others	95
47	However Deceived in Generalities, Men Are Not Deceived in Particulars	96
48	He Who Wishes That a Magistracy Not Be Given to Someone Vile or Someone Wicked Should Have It Asked for Either by Someone Too Vile and Too Wicked or by Someone Too Noble and Too Good	99
49	If Those Cities That Have had a Free Beginning, Such as Rome, Have Difficulty in Finding Laws That Will Maintain Them, Those That Have Had One Immediately Servile Have Almost an Impossibility	100
50	One Council or One Magistrate Should Not Be Able to Stop the Actions of Cities	102
51	A Republic or a Prince Should Make a Show of Doing through Liberality What Necessity Constrains Him to Do	103
52	To Repress the Insolence of One Individual Who Rises Up in a Powerful Republic, There Is No More Secure and Less Scandalous Mode Than to Anticipate the Ways by Which He Comes to That Power	103
53	Many Times the People Desires Its Own Ruin, Deceived by a False Appearance of Good; and That Great Hopes and Mighty Promises Easily Move It	105
54	How Much Authority a Grave Man May Have to Check an Excited Multitude	108

CONTENTS

55	How Easily Things May Be Conducted in Those Cities in Which the Multitude Is Not Corrupt; and That Where There Is Equality, a Principality Cannot Be Made, and Where There Is Not, a Republic Cannot Be Made	109
56	Before Great Accidents Occur in a City or in a Province, Signs Come That Forecast Them, or Men Who Predict Them	113
57	The Plebs Together Is Mighty, by Itself Weak	114
58	The Multitude Is Wiser and More Constant Than a Prince	115
59	Which Confederation or Other League Can Be More Trusted, That Made with a Republic or That Made with a Prince	119
60	That the Consulate and Any Other Magistracy Whatever in Rome Was Given without Respect to Age	121

SECOND BOOK

	Preface	123
1	Which Was More the Cause of the Empire the Romans Acquired, Virtue or Fortune	125
2	What Peoples the Romans Had to Combat, and That They Obstinate-ly Defended Their Freedom	129
3	Rome Became a Great City through Ruining the Surrounding Cities and Easily Admitting Foreigners to Its Honors	133
4	Republics Have Taken Three Modes of Expanding	135
5	That the Variation of Sects and Languages, Together with the Accident of Floods or Plague, Eliminates the Memories of Things	138
6	How the Romans Proceeded in Making War	140
7	How Much Land the Romans Gave per Colonist	142
8	The Cause Why Peoples Leave Their Ancestral Places and Inundate the Country of Others	143
9	What Causes Commonly Make Wars Arise among Powers	146
10	Money Is Not the Sinew of War, As It Is according to the Common Opinion	147
11	It Is Not a Prudent Policy to Make a Friendship with a Prince Who Has More Reputation Than Force	150

12	Whether, When Fearing to Be Assaulted, It Is Better to Bring On or Await War	151
13	That One Comes from Base to Great Fortune More through Fraud Than through Force	155
14	Often Men Deceive Themselves Believing That through Humility They Will Conquer Pride	156
15	Weak States Will Always Be Ambiguous in Their Resolutions; and Slow Decisions Are Always Hurtful	157
16	How Much the Soldiers of Our Times Do Not Conform to the Ancient Orders	160
17	How Much Artillery Should Be Esteemed by Armies in the Present Times; and Whether the Opinion Universally Held of It Is True	163
18	How by the Authority of the Romans and by the Example of the Ancient Military Infantry Should Be Esteemed More Than Horse	168
19	That Acquisitions by Republics That Are Not Well Ordered and That Do Not Proceed according to Roman Virtue Are for Their Ruin, Not Their Exaltation	172
20	What Danger That Prince or Republic Runs That Avails Itself of Auxiliary or Mercenary Military	175
21	The First Praetor the Romans Sent Anyplace Was to Capua, Four Hundred Years after They Began to Make War	177
22	How False the Opinions of Men Often Are in Judging Great Things	179
23	How Much the Romans, in Judging Subjects for Some Accidents That Necessitated Such Judgment, Fled from the Middle Way	181
24	Fortresses Are Generally Much More Harmful Than Useful	184
25	To Assault a Disunited City So As to Seize It by Means of Its Disunion Is a Contradictory Policy	190
26	Vilification and Abuse Generate Hatred against Those Who Use Them, without Any Utility to Them	191
27	For Prudent Princes and Republics It Should Be Enough to Conquer, for Most Often When It Is Not Enough, One Loses	193
28	How Dangerous It Is for a Republic or a Prince Not to Avenge an Injury Done against the Public or against a Private Person	195

CONTENTS

29	Fortune Blinds the Spirits of Men When It Does Not Wish Them to Oppose Its Plans	197
30	Truly Powerful Republics and Princes Buy Friendships Not with Money but with Virtue and the Reputation of Strength	199
31	How Dangerous It Is to Believe the Banished	202
32	In How Many Modes the Romans Seized Towns	203
33	How the Romans Gave Free Commissions to Their Captains of Armies	206

THIRD BOOK

1	If One Wishes a Sect or a Republic to Live Long, It Is Necessary to Draw It Back Often toward Its Beginning	209
2	That It Is a Very Wise Thing to Simulate Crazyiness at the Right Time	213
3	That It Is Necessary to Kill the Sons of Brutus If One Wishes to Maintain a Newly Acquired Freedom	214
4	A Prince Does Not Live Secure in a Principality While Those Who Have Been Despoiled of It Are Living	215
5	What Makes a King Who Is Heir to a Kingdom Lose It	216
6	Of Conspiracies	218
7	Whence It Arises That Changes from Freedom to Servitude and from Servitude to Freedom Are Some of Them without Blood, Some of Them Full of It	236
8	Whoever Wishes to Alter a Republic Should Consider Its Subject	237
9	How One Must Vary with the Times if One Wishes Always to Have Good Fortune	239
10	That a Captain Cannot Flee Battle When the Adversary Wishes Him to Engage in It in Any Mode	241
11	That Whoever Has to Deal with Very Many, Even Though He Is Inferior, Wins If Only He Can Sustain the First Thrusts	244
12	That a Prudent Captain Ought to Impose Every Necessity to Engage in Combat on His Soldiers and Take It Away from Those of Enemies	246
13	Which Is More to Be Trusted, a Good Captain Who Has a Weak Army or a Good Army That Has a Weak Captain	249
14	What Effects New Inventions That Appear in the Middle of the Fight and New Voices That Are Heard May Produce	251

15	That One Individual and Not Many Should Be Put over an Army; and That Several Commanders Hurt	253
16	That in Difficult Times One Goes to Find True Virtue; and in Easy Times Not Virtuous Men but Those with Riches or Kinship Have More Favor	254
17	That One Individual Should Not Be Offended and Then That Same One Sent to an Administration and Governance of Importance	257
18	Nothing Is More Worthy of a Captain Than to Foretell the Policies of the Enemy	258
19	Whether to Rule a Multitude Compliance Is More Necessary Than Punishment	260
20	One Example of Humanity Was Able to Do More with the Falisci Than Any Roman Force	261
21	Whence It Arises That with a Different Mode of Proceeding Hannibal Produced Those Same Effects in Italy as Scipio Did in Spain	262
22	That the Hardness of Manlius Torquatus and the Kindness of Valerius Corvinus Acquired for Each the Same Glory	264
23	For What Cause Camillus Was Expelled from Rome	268
24	The Prolongation of Commands Made Rome Servile	269
25	Of the Poverty of Cincinnatus and of Many Roman Citizens	271
26	How a State Is Ruined Because of Women	272
27	How One Has to Unite a Divided City; and How That Opinion Is Not True That to Hold Cities One Needs to Hold Them Divided	274
28	That One Should Be Mindful of the Works of Citizens Because Many Times underneath a Merciful Work a Beginning of Tyranny Is Concealed	276
29	That the Sins of Peoples Arise from Princes	277
30	For One Citizen Who Wishes to Do Any Good Work in His Republic by His Authority, It Is Necessary First to Eliminate Envy; and How, on Seeing the Enemy, One Has to Order the Defense of a City	278
31	Strong Republics and Excellent Men Retain the Same Spirit and Their Same Dignity in Every Fortune	281
32	What Modes Some Have Held to for Disturbing a Peace	284

33	If One Wishes to Win a Battle, It Is Necessary to Make the Army Confident Both among Themselves and in the Captain	285
34	What Fame or Word or Opinion Makes the People Begin to Favor a Citizen; and Whether It Distributes Magistracies with Greater Prudence Than a Prince	287
35	What Dangers Are Borne in Making Oneself Head in Counseling a Thing; and the More It Has of the Extraordinary, the Greater Are the Dangers Incurred in It	290
36	The Causes Why the French Have Been and Are Still Judged in Fights at the Beginning As More Than Men and Later As Less Than Women	292
37	Whether Small Battles Are Necessary before the Main Battle; and If One Wishes to Avoid Them, What One Ought to Do to Know a New Enemy	294
38	How a Captain in Whom His Army Can Have Confidence Ought to Be Made	296
39	That a Captain Ought to Be a Knower of Sites	297
40	That to Use Fraud in Managing War Is a Glorious Thing	299
41	That the Fatherland Ought to Be Defended, Whether with Ignominy or with Glory; and It Is Well Defended in Any Mode Whatever	300
42	That Promises Made through Force Ought Not to Be Observed	301
43	That Men Who Are Born in One Province Observe Almost the Same Nature for All Times	302
44	One Often Obtains with Impetuosity and Audacity What One Would Never Have Obtained through Ordinary Modes	304
45	What the Better Policy Is in Battles, to Resist the Thrust of Enemies and, Having Resisted It, to Charge Them; or Indeed to Assault Them with Fury from the First	305
46	Whence It Arises That One Family in One City Keeps the Same Customs for a Time	306
47	That a Good Citizen Ought to Forget Private Injuries for Love of His Fatherland	307
48	When One Sees a Great Error Made by an Enemy, One Ought to Believe That There Is a Deception Underneath	307

CONTENTS

49	A Republic Has Need of New Acts of Foresight Every Day If One Wishes to Maintain It Free; and for What Merits Quintus Fabius Was Called Maximus	308
	Glossary	311
	Index of Proper Names	349