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- (3) Language has no unique characteristic in terms of which it can be defined. Different languages have "family resemblances." Whether an object is simple depends on the context. In itself an object is neither composite nor simple. No states of affairs exist.
- (4) The task of philosophy no longer seen as finding the *correct* logical form of particular sentences, for every sentence "is in order as it is." The job is to understand what function the sentence performs. Philosophical problems arise from a misunderstanding of language, and are eliminated as understanding is achieved.
- (5) Misunderstanding of such utterances as "Now I understand." Such expressions are not a description or report; they act like a signal.
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