

Contents

Acknowledgments	v
---------------------------	---

One: Prolegomena

1.1 Epistemic notions	3
1.2 Statements <i>v.</i> sentences	6
1.3 Qualifications and limitations	7
1.4 The plan of this study	10
1.5 Symbolic notation	10
1.6 Formulas <i>v.</i> sentences	11
1.7 Difficulties of translation	12

Two: Criteria of Consistency

2.1 The actualization of possibilities	16
2.2 Defending the rule (A.PKK*)	17
2.3 Further rules	22
2.4 Rules for the notion of belief	23
2.5 Two critical rules	29

Contents

2.6	Consistency reinterpreted as defensibility	31
2.7	Defensibility and analyticity	33
2.8	The applicability of our results	34
2.9	Defensibility and analyticity again	36
2.10	An alternative interpretation	38

Three: Model Sets and Model Systems

3.1	Model sets	40
3.2	Model systems	42
3.3	The interrelations of our rules and conditions	43
3.4	Alternative conditions	44
3.5	The notion of belief	47
3.6	Knowledge and belief combined	49
3.7	Knowing that one believes	51
3.8	The argument from introspection	53
3.9	Knowledge, belief, and introspection	56
3.10	The self-sustenance of implications	57
3.11	Reductive arguments as abortive constructions of counterexamples	57

Four: Problems, Theorems, and Definitions

4.1	Knowing that others know	60
4.2	The transmissibility of knowledge	61
4.3	Knowledge and belief compared with respect to trans- missibility	62
4.4	The difficulty of merely believing that you know	63
4.5	Moore's problem of saying and disbelieving	64
4.6	Our solution	67
4.7	Proof of the solution	69
4.8	Doxastic indefensibility	71
4.9	Doxastic implication	76
4.10	The performativeness of doxastic indefensibility	77

Contents

4.11 An analogue to Moore's problem for the notion of knowledge	78
4.12 Epistemic indefensibility	79
4.13 Applications	80
4.14 Knowledge and belief compared	82
4.15 Introspectiveness as a symptom of an epistemic implication	84
4.16 Thinking that one may be mistaken	88
4.17 An analogue to Moore's paradox for the second person	89
4.18 A generalization	92
4.19 The privileges of the first person	93
4.20 Comparing different solutions to Moore's problem	95
4.21 The economy of our solution	98

Five: Knowing that One Knows

5.1 The meaning of "knowing that one knows" is not clear	103
5.2 "Knowing that one knows" virtually equivalent to "knowing"	104
5.3 On the history of the problem of "knowing that one knows"	106
5.4 The basis of the equivalence	110
5.5 The limitations of a virtual equivalence	112
5.6 Virtual equivalence does not preclude a difference in meaning	113
5.7 A comparison with double negation	115
5.8 The residual meanings of "knowing that one knows"	116
5.9 The choice between the residual meanings	121
5.10 Believing that one believes	123

Six: Knowledge, Belief, and Existence

6.1 Quantifiers in model sets	126
6.2 Eliminating existential presuppositions	128
6.3 Knowing who	131

Contents

6.4	Identity in model systems	132
6.5	The influence of epistemic implications	137
6.6	Referential opacity as referential multiplicity	138
6.7	The necessity of quantifying into opaque contexts	141
6.8	The prerequisites for quantifying into opaque contexts	144
6.9	The prerequisites for knowing who	148
6.10	The prerequisites as requirements of uniqueness	150
6.11	All men <i>v.</i> all known men	155
6.12	The condition (C.KK*) qualified	158
6.13	“Knowing who” behaves like “knowing that”	159
6.14	Laws of commutation	162

A List of Frequently Mentioned Rules, Conditions, and Sentences	169
Index of Authors	175
Index of Subjects	177