

Contents

INTRODUCTION	vii
I CONTEMPORARY SKEPTICISM	1
The Impossibility of the "Theory of Knowledge," <i>L. Nelson</i>	3
Four Forms of Skepticism, <i>G. E. Moore</i>	20
Skepticism and Conceptual Change, <i>K. Lehrer</i>	47
Epistemology Naturalized, <i>W. V. Quine</i>	59
Why I Know So Much More Than You Do, <i>W. W. Rozeboom</i>	75
II THE EVIDENCE OF THE SENSES	93
Belief and Evidence, <i>H. H. Price</i>	95
The Bases of Empirical Knowledge, <i>C. I. Lewis</i>	127
The Verification Argument, <i>N. Malcolm</i>	155
The Anatomy of Certainty, <i>R. Firth</i>	203
On the Nature of Empirical Evidence, <i>R. M. Chisholm</i>	224

III	MEMORY	251
	Toward an Epistemological Assessment of Memory, <i>A. Meinong</i>	253
	The Epistemological Status of Memory Beliefs, <i>R. Brandt</i>	271
	A Definition of Factual Memory, <i>N. Malcolm</i>	286
	Remembering, <i>C. B. Martin & M. Deutscher</i>	302
IV	OUR KNOWLEDGE OF OUR PSYCHOLOGICAL STATES	333
	Basic Propositions, <i>A. J. Ayer</i>	335
	Are Phenomenal Reports Absolutely Certain? <i>H. Reichenbach</i>	348
	Sense and Certainty, <i>N. Goodman</i>	360
	The Given Element in Empirical Knowledge, <i>C. I. Lewis</i>	368
	Varieties of Privileged Access, <i>W. Alston</i>	376
V	DOES EMPIRICAL KNOWLEDGE HAVE A FOUNDATION?	411
	The Foundation of Knowledge, <i>M. Schlick</i>	413
	Epistemological Premises, Basic Propositions, and Factual Premises, <i>B. Russell</i>	431
	Coherence, Certainty, and Epistemic Priority, <i>R. Firth</i>	459
	Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, <i>W. Sellars</i>	471
	The Foundations of Knowledge, <i>A. Quinton</i>	542