CONTENTS

			PAGE
On the Improvement of the Understanding	•	•	. 1
Of the ordinary objects of men's desires	•	•	. 3
Of the true and final good	•	•	. 6
Certain rules of life		•	. 7
Of the four modes of perception		•	. 8
Of the best mode of perception		•	. 10
Of the instruments of the intellect, or true ideas	•	•	. 12
Answers to objections	•	•	. 16
First part of method. Distinction of true idea	s froi	n fict	i-
tious ideas	•		. 18
And from false ideas	•		. 24
Of doubt	•	•	. 29
Of memory and forgetfulness			. 31
Mental hindrances from words—and from the pop			l•
sion of ready imagination with distinct understa	indin	g	. 33
Second part of method. Its object, the acquisiti	on o	f clea	r
and distinct ideas		•	. 34
Its means, good definitions. Conditions of definit	ion		. 35
How to define the understanding	•	•	. 38
THE ETHICS	•	•	. 43
Part I. Concerning God		_	. 45
Definitions			. 45
Axioms			. 46
		_	
Prop. I. Substance is by nature prior to its modific			. 46
Prop. II. Two substances, whose attributes are di	ij eren	i, nai	
nothing in common	•		. 46
Prop. III. Things, which have nothing in commo	n, cw	nnoi c	. 47
one the cause of the other	•		
Prop. IV. Two or more distinct things are distinct	nguisi	rea on	e
from the other either by the difference of the attr		OFER	
substances, or by the difference of their modificat	ions	•	. 47
Prop. V. There cannot exist in the universe two	or mo	re suc)- 4 - 7
stances having the same nature or attribute.		•	. 47
Prop. VI. One substance cannot be produced by	anoth	er suc)- 4 1 7
stance .	•	•	. 47
Prop. VII. Existence belongs to the nature of subst	a nce	•	. 48
Prop. VIII. Every substance is necessarily infinite	•	•	. 48

r	AGE
Prop. IX. The more reality or being a thing has, the greater the	
number of its attributes	50
Prop. X. Each particular attribute of the one substance must be conceived through itself	50
Prop. XI. God, or substance consisting of infinite attributes, of	•
which each expresses eternal and infinite essentiality, neces-	
sarily exists	51
Prop. XII. No attribute of substance can be conceived, from	٠.
which it would follow that substance can be divided	54
Prop. XIII. Substance absolutely infinite is indivisible	54
Prop. XIV. Besides God no substance can be granted or conceived	54
Prop. XV. Whatsoever is, is in God, and without God nothing	
can be, or be conceived	55
Prop. XVI. From the necessity of the divine nature must follow	
an infinite number of things in infinite ways—that is, all	
things which fall within the sphere of infinite intellect	59
Prop. XVII. God acts solely by the laws of his own nature,	
and is not constrained by anyone	59
Prop. XVIII. God is the indwelling and not the transient cause	33
1 rop. A v 111. God is the inaweiting and not the transient cause	
of all things	62
Prop. XIX. God and all the attributes of God are eternal .	62
Prop. XX. The existence of God and his essence are one and the	co
same.	63
Prop. XXI. All things, which follow from the absolute nature	
of any attribute of God, must always exist and be infinite, or	
in other words, are eternal and infinite through the said attribute	60
	63
Prop. XXII. Whatever follows from any attribute of God, in so	
far as it is modified by a modification, which exists necessarily	
and as infinite through the said attribute, must also exist	
necessarily and as infinite	65
Prop. XXIII. Every mode, which exists both necessarily and as	
infinite, must necessarily follow either from the absolute	
nature of some attribute of God, or from an attribute modi-	
fied by a modification, which exists necessarily and as infinite	65
Prop. XXIV. The essence of things produced by God does not	00
	CE
involve existence	65
Prop. XXV. God is the efficient cause not only of the existence	
of things, but also of their essence	66
Prop. XXVI. A thing, which is conditioned to act in a par-	
ticular manner, has necessarily been thus conditioned by God;	
and that which has not been conditioned by God cannot con-	
dition itself to act	66
Prop. XXVII. A thing, which has been conditioned by God to	
act in a particular way, cannot render itself unconditioned.	66
Prop. XXVIII. Every individual thing, or everything which is	_
finite and has a conditioned existence, cannot exist or be con-	
ditioned to act, unless it be conditioned for existence and	
action by a cause other than itself, which also is finite and has	
a conditioned existence; and likewise this cause cannot in its	
w communication cartoconice, and vinewase into curae curation the tis	

	PAGE
turn exist or be conditioned to act, unless it be conditioned	
for existence and action by another cause, which also is finite	
and has a conditioned existence, and so on to infinity .	. 67
Prop. XXIX. Nothing in the universe is contingent, but all	• 0,
things are conditioned to exist and operate in a particular	
	co
manner by the necessity of the divine nature	68
Prop. XXX. Intellect, in function finite, or in function infinite,	
must comprehend the attributes of God and the modifications	
of God, and nothing else	69
Prop. XXXI. The intellect in function, whether finite or in-	
finite, as will, desire, love, &c., should be referred to passive	
nature, and not to active nature	69
Prop. XXXII. Will cannot be called a free cause, but only a	
necessary cause	70
Prop. XXXIII. Things could not have been brought into being	, 0
by Cod in many many and and different from that	
by God in any manner or in any order different from that	-0
which has in fact obtained	70
Prop. XXXIV. God's power is identical with his essence	74
Prop. XXXV. Whatsoever we conceive to be in the power of	
God, necessarily exists	74
Prop. XXXVI. There is no cause from whose nature some effect	
does not follow	74
Appendix	74
	• •
Part II. Of the Nature and Origin of the Mind	82
Preface	82
Definitions	82
Axioms	83
	CO
Prop. I. Thought is an attribute of God, or God is a think-	
ing thing	83
Prop. II. Extension is an attribute of God, or God is an ex-	
tended thing	84
Prop. III. In God there is necessarily the idea, not only of his	
essence, but also of all things which necessarily follow from	
his essence	84
Prop. IV. The idea of God, from which an infinite number of	0.1
things follow in in finite every sam only he one	05
things follow in infinite ways, can only be one	85
Prop. V. The actual being of ideas owns God as its cause, only	
in so far as he is considered as a thinking thing, not in so far	
as he is unfolded in any other attribute; that is, the ideas	
both of the attributes of God and of particular things do not	
own as their efficient cause their objects, or the things perceived,	
but God himself, in so far as he is a thinking thing	85
Prop. VI. The modes of any given attribute are caused by God,	
in so far as he is considered through the attribute of which	
they are modes, and not in so far as he is considered through	
any other attribute	86
Prop. VII. The order and connection of ideas is the same as	60
110p. vii. The order who connection of thems is the same as	0.0
the order and connection of things	86
Prop. VIII. The ideas of particular things, or of modes, that	

	LWGP
do not exist, must be comprehended in the infinite idea of God,	
in the same way as the formal essences of particular things	
or modes are contained in the attributes of God	87
Prop. IX. The idea of an individual thing actually existing is	
caused by God, not in so far as he is infinite, but in so far as	
he is considered as affected by another idea of a thing actually	
existing, of which he is the cause, in so far as he is affected	•
by a third idea, and so on to infinity	88
Prop. X. The being of substance does not appertain to the	
essence of man-in other words, substance does not constitute	
the actual being of man	89
Prop. XI. The first element, which constitutes the actual being	
of the human mind, is the idea of some particular thing	00
actually existing	90
Prop. XII. Whatsoever comes to pass in the object of the idea,	
which constitutes the human mind, must be perceived by the	
human mind, or there will necessarily be an idea in the	
human mind of the said occurrence. That is, if the object of	
the idea constituting the human mind be a body, nothing can	0.1
take place in that body without being perceived by the mind.	91
Prop. XIII. The object of the idea constituting the human mind	
is the body, in other words a certain mode of extension which	00
actually exists, and nothing else.	92
Digression on the nature of bodies—Axioms I., II. Lemmas I.—III.	0.0
	93
Axioms I., II. Definition—Axiom III.—Lemmas IV., V	94
	95
Lemmas VI., VII	96
Postulates	97
Prop. XIV. The human mind is capable of perceiving a great	
number of things, and is so, in proportion as its body is capable of receiving a great number of impressions	07
Prop. XV. The idea, which constitutes the actual being of the	97
human mind, is not simple, but compounded of a great number	
of ideas	97
Prop. XVI. The idea of every mode, in which the human body	34
is affected by external bodies, must involve the nature of the	
human body, and also the nature of the external body.	98
Prop. XVII. If the human body is affected in a manner which	00
involves the nature of any external body, the human mind	
will regard the said external body as actually existing, or as	
present to itself, until the human body be affected in such a	
way as to exclude the existence of the said external body .	98
Prop. XVIII. If the human body has once been affected by two	•
or more bodies at the same time, when the mind afterwards	
imagines any of them, it will straightway remember the	
others also	100
Prop. XIX. The human mind has no knowledge of the body,	
and does not know it to exist, save through the ideas of the	
modifications, whereby the body is affected	101
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	_

	PAGE
Prop. XX. The idea or knowledge of the human mind is also	
in God, following in God in the same manner, and being	
referred to God in the same manner, as the idea or know-	
ledge of the human body	102
Prop. XXI. This idea of the mind is united to the mind, in the	102
	100
same way as the mind is united to the body	102
Prop. XXII. The human mind perceives not only the modifica-	
tions of the body, but also the ideas of such modifications .	103
Prop. XXIII. The mind does not know itself, except in so far	
as it perceives the ideas of the modifications of the body .	103
Prop. XXIV. The human mind does not involve an adequate	
knowledge of the parts composing the human body	104
Prop. XXV. The idea of each modification of the human body	
does not involve an adequate knowledge of the external	
body	104
	104
Prop. XXVI. The human mind does not perceive any external	
body as actually existing, except through the ideas of the	
modifications of its own body	105
Prop. XXVII. The idea of each modification of the human	
body does not involve an adequate knowledge of the human	
$body\ itself$	105
Prop. XXVIII. The ideas of the modifications of the human	
body, in so far as they have reference only to the human	
mind, are not clear and distinct, but confused	105
Prop. XXIX. The idea of the idea of each modification of the	
human body does not involve an adequate knowledge of the	
human mind	106
Prop. XXX. We can only have a very inadequate knowledge	106
	100
of the duration of our body	107
Prop. XXXI. We can only have a very inadequate knowledge	
of the duration of particular things external to ourselves .	107
Prop. XXXII. All ideas, in so far as they are referred to God,	
are true	108
Prop. XXXIII. There is nothing positive in ideas, which	
causes them to be called false	.108
Prop. XXXIV. Every idea, which in us is absolute or adequate	
and perfect, is true	108
Prop. XXXV. Falsity consists in the privation of knowledge,	200
which inadequate, fragmentary, or confused ideas involve .	108
Draw VVVII In James on an final idea fallow to the	100
Prop. XXXVI. Inadequate or confused ideas follow by the	3.00
same necessity, as adequate or clear and distinct ideas	109
Prop. XXXVII. That which is common to all, and is equally	
in a part and in the whole, does not constitute the essence of	
any particular thing	109
Prop. XXXVIII. Those things, which are common to all, and	
are equally in a part and in the whole, cannot be conceived	
except adequately	109
Prop. XXXIX. That, which is common to and a property of	
the human body and such other bodies as are wont to affect	
the human body, and which is present equally in each part of	
PRO TRANSMIN COMO & GRAGE GUICACIE AS DI COCIE CUMULVE DIA CUCIE DEFE DI	

	PAGE
either or in the whole, will be represented by an adequate idea	
in the mind Prop. XL. Whatsoever ideas in the mind follow from ideas,	110
which are therein adequate, are also themselves adequate Prop. XLI. Opinion is the only source of falsity, reason and	111
intuition are necessarily true	114
tinguish the true from the false	114
thing perceived	114
as contingent, but as necessary Prop. XLV. Every idea of every body, or of every particular thing actually existing, necessarily involves the eternal and	116
infinite essence of God	117
of God, which every idea involves, is adequate and perfect. Prop. XLVII. The human mind has an adequate knowledge of	118
the eternal and infinite essence of God. Prop. XLVIII. In the mind there is no absolute or free will; but the mind is determined to wish this or that by a cause, which has also been determined by another cause, and this last	118
by another cause, and so on to infinity. Prop. XLIX. There is in the mind no volition, or affirmation and negation, save that which an idea, inasmuch as it is an	119
idea, involves	120
Part III. On the Origin and Nature of the Emotions	128
Definitions	129
Postulates Prop. I. Our mind is in certain cases active, and in certain cases passive. In so far as it has adequate ideas, it is necessarily active, and in so far as it has inadequate ideas, it is	130
necessarily passive Prop. II. Body cannot determine mind to think, neither can mind determine body to motion or rest, or any state different	130
from these, if such there be. Prop. III. The activities of the mind arise solely from adequate ideas; the passive states of the mind depend solely on inade-	131
quate ideas Prop. IV. Nothing can be destroyed, except by a cause external to itself	135 136
Prop. V. Things are naturally contrary, that is, cannot exist in	
the same object, in so far as one is capable of destroying the other Prop. VI. Everything, in so far as it is in itself, endeavours to	136
persist in its own being Prop. VII. The endeavour, wherewith everything endeavours to persist in its own being is nothing else but the actual essence	136
of the thing in question	136

	PAGE
Prop. VIII. The endeavour, whereby a thing endeavours to per-	
sist in its heing, involves no finite time, but an indefinite time	137
Prop. IX. The mind, both in so far as it has clear and distinct	
ideas, and also in so far as it has confused ideas, endeavours	
to persist in its being for an indefinite period, and of this en-	
deavour it is conscious	137
Prop X. An idea, which excludes the existence of our body	
cannot be postulated in our mind, but is contrary thereto .	138
Prop. XI. Whatsoever increases or diminishes, helps or hinders	
the power of activity in our body, the idea thereof increases or	
diminishes, helps or hinders the power of thought in our mind	138
Prop. XII. The mind, as far as it can, endeavours to conceive	
those things, which increase or help the power of activity in	
the body	139
Prop. XIII. When the mind conceives things which diminish or	-00
hinder the body's power of activity, it endeavours, as far as	
possible. to remember things, which exclude the existence of the	
first-named things	139
Prop. XIV. If the mind has once been affected by two emotions	100
at the same time, it will, whenever it is afterwards affected by	
one of the two, be also affected by the other . ,	140
Prop. XV. Anything can, accidentally, be the cause of pleasure,	410
pain, or desire	140
Prop. XVI. Simply from the fact that we conceive, that a given	170
object has some point of resemblance with another object, which	
is wont to affect the mind pleasurably or painfully, although	
the point of resemblance be not the efficient cause of the said	
emotions, we shall still regard the first-named object with love	
or hate	141
Prop. XVII. If we conceive that a thing, which is wont to affect	
us painfully, has any point of resemblance with another thing,	
which is wont to affect us with an equally strong emotion of	'
pleasure, we shall hate the first-named thing, and at the same	
time we shall love it	142
Prop. XVIII. A man is as much affected pleasurably or pain-	
fully by the image of a thing past or future, as by the image	
of a thing present	143
Prop. XIX. He, who conceives that the object of his love is	
destroyed, will feel pain; if he conceives that it is preserved,	
he will feel pleasure	144
Prop. XX. He who conceives that the object of his hate is	
destroyed, will feel pleasure	144
Prop. XXI. He who conceives that the object of his love is	
affected pleasurably or painfully, will himself be affected	
pleasurably or painfully; and the one or the other emotion	
will be greater or less in the lover, according as it is greater or	
less in the thing loved	145
Prop XXII. If we conceive that anything pleasurably affects	
some object of our love, we shall be affected with love towards	
that thing. Contrariwise, if we conceive that it affects an object	

	40.00
of our love painfully, we shall be affected with hatred towards	1 45
Prop. XXIII. He who conceives that an object of his hatred is	145
painfully affected, will feel pleasure. Contrariwise, if he	
thinks that the said object is pleasurably affected, he will feel	
pain. Each of these emotions will be greater or less, according	
as its contrary is greater or less in the object of hatred	146
Prop. XXIV. If we conceive that any one pleasurably affects an	
object of our hate, we shall feel hatred towards him also. If we conceive that he painfully affects the said object, we shall	
feel love towards him	146
Prop. XXV. We endeavour to affirm, concerning ourselves and	
concerning what we love, everything that we conceive to affect	
pleasurably ourselves or the loved object. Contrariwise, we	
endeavour to negative everything, which we conceive to affect	
painfully ourselves or the loved object	147
Prop. XXVI. We endeavour to affirm, concerning that which we hate, everything which we conceive to affect it painfully;	
and contrariwise, we endeavour to deny concerning it every-	
thing which we conceive to affect it pleasurably	147
Prop. XXVII. By the very fact that we conceive a thing, which	
is like ourselves, and which we have not regarded with any	
emotion, to be affected with any emotion, we are ourselves	7.40
affected with a like emotion. Prop. XXVIII. We endeavour to bring about whatsoever we	148
conceive to conduce to pleasure; but we endeavour to remove	
or destroy whatsoever we conceive to be truly repugnant	
thereto, or to conduce to pain	149
Prop. XXIX. We shall also endeavour to do whatsoever we con-	
ceive men to regard with pleasure, and contrariwise we shall	140
shrink from doing that which we conceive men to shrink from Prop. XXX. If any one has done something which he conceives	149
as affecting other men pleasurably, he will be affected by plea-	
sure, accompanied by the idea of himself as a cause; in	
other words, he will regard himself with pleasure. On the	
other hand, if he has done anything which he regards as affect-	
ing others painfully, he will regard himself with pain	150
Prop. XXXI. If we conceive that anyone loves, desires, or hates anything which we love, desire, or hate, we shall thereupon	
regard the thing in question with more steadfast love, &c. On	
the contrary, if we think, that anyone shrinks from some-	
thing that we love, we shall undergo vacillation of soul	151
Prop. XXXII. If we conceive that anyone takes delight in	
something, which only one person can possess, we shall endea-	
vour to bring it about, that the man in question shall not	150
gain possession thereof	152
endeavour, as far as we can, to bring it about, that it should	
love us in return	152
Prop. XXXIV. The greater the emotion with which we con-	

	PAGE
ceive a loved object to be affected towards us, the greater will	
be our complacency	153
Prop. XXXV. If anyone conceives, that an object of his love	
joins itself to another with closer bonds of friendship than he	
himself has attained to be will be affected with here I towards	
himself has attained to, he will be affected with hatred towards	
the loved object and with envy towards his rival	15 3
Prop. XXXVI. He who remembers a thing, in which he has	
once taken delight, desires to possess it under the same circum-	
stances as when he first took delight therein	154
Prop. XXXVII. Desire arising through pain or pleasure, hatred	
or love, is greater in proportion as the emotion is greater	15 5 -
Prop. XXXVIII. If a man has begun to hate an object of his	100
1 10p. AAA v 111. If a man has begun to have an object of his	
love, so that love is thoroughly destroyed, he will, causes being	
equal, regard it with more hatred than if he had never loved	
it, and his hatred will be in proportion to the strength of his	
former love	155
Prop. XXXIX. He who hates anyone will endeavour to do him	
an injury, unless he fears that a greater injury will thereby	
accrue to himself; on the other hand, he who loves anyone	
will, by the same law, seek to benefit him	156
Draw VI He wile conscious himself to be hated by another	150
Prop. XL. He, who conceives himself to be hated by another,	
and believes that he has given him no cause for hatred, will	
hate that other in return	157
Prop. XLI. If anyone conceives that he is loved by another,	
and believes that he has given no cause for such love, he will	
love that other in return	158
Prop. XLII. He, who has conferred a benefit on anyone from	
motives of love or honour, will feel pain, if he sees that the	
benefit is received without gratitude	158
Prop. XLIII. Hatred is increased by being reciprocated, and	100
Frop. ALIII. Haired is increased by being reciprocated, and	150
can on the other hand be destroyed by love	159
Prop. XLIV. Hatred which is completely vanquished by love,	
passes into love; and love is thereupon greater, than if hatred	
had not preceded it	159
Prop. XLV. If a man conceives, that anyone similar to him-	
self hates anything also similar to himself, which he loves, he	
will hate that person	160
Prop. XLVI. If a man has been affected pleasurably or painfully	
by anyone of a class or nation different from his own, and if	
the pleasure or pain has been accompanied by the idea of the	
the pleasure or pain has been accompanied by the face of the	
said stranger as cause, under the general category of the class	
or nation: the man will feel love or hatred not only to the	
individual stranger, but also to the whole class or nation,	
whereto he belongs	160
Prop. XLVII. Joy arising from the fact, that anything we	
hate is destroyed or suffers other injury, is never unaccom-	
panied by a certain pain in us	160
Prop. XLVIII. Love or hatred towards, for instance, Peter is	
destroyed, if the pleasure involved in the former, or the pain	
involved in the latter emotion, be associated with the idea of	
involved in the satter emotion, be associated with the fact of	

	PAGE
another cause; and will be diminished in proportion as we conceive Peter not to have been the sole cause of either emotion	161
Prop. XLIX. Love or hatred towards a thing, which we conceive	
to be free, must, other conditions being similar, be greater, than if it were felt towards a thing acting by necessity.	161
Prop. L. Anything whatever can be, accidentally, a cause of	
hope or fear	162
Prop. LI. Different men may be differently affected by the same	
object, and the same man may be differently affected at different times by the same object	163
Prop. LII. An object, which we have formerly seen in conjunc-	
tion with others, and do not conceive to have any property	
that is not common to many, will not be regarded by us for so	
long as an object, which we conceive to have some property peculiar to itself	164
Prop. LIII. When the mind regards itself and its own power of	
activity, it feels pleasure; and that pleasure is greater in pro-	
portion to the distinctness, wherewith it conceives itself and	
its own power of activity Prop. LIV. The mind endeavours to conceive only such things	165
as assert its power of activity	166
Prop. LV. When the mind contemplates its own weakness, it	
feels pain thereat	166
Prop LVI. There are as many kinds of pleasure, of pain, of desire, and of every emotion compounded of these, such as	
vacillations of spirit, or derived from these, such as love,	
hatred, hope, fear, &c., as there are kinds of objects, whereby	•
we are affected	168
Prop. LVII. Any emotion of a given individual differs from the emotion of another individual, only in so far as the essence	
of the one individual differs from the essence of the other .	169
Prop. LVIII. Besides pleasure and desire, which are passivities	
or passions, there are other emotions derived from pleasure	
and desire, which are attributable to us, in so far as we are active	171
Prop. LIX. Among all the emotions attributable to the mind as	
active, there are none which cannot be referred to pleasure or	
pain	171 173
Definitions of the Emotions	185
Part IV. Of Human Bondage or the Strength of the Emotions Preface.	187 187
Definitions	190
Axiom	191
Prop. I. No positive quality possessed by a false idea is removed	
by the presence of what is true in virtue of its being true .	191
Prop. II. We are only passive in so far as we are a part of	
Nature, which cannot be conceived by itself without other parts.	192

	PAGE
Prop. III. The force whereby a man persists in existing is limited, and is infinitely surpassed by the power of external	300
causes	193
Prop. IV. It is impossible, that man should not be a part of	
Nature, or that he should be capable of undergoing no	
changes, save such as can be understood through his nature	
only as their adequate cause	193
Prop. V. The power and increase of every passion, and its	200
persistence in existing are not defined by the power, whereby	
persistence in existing are not defined by the power, whereby	
we ourselves endeavour to persist in existing, but by the power	
of an external cause compared with our own	194
Prop. VI. The force of any passion or emotion can overcome the	
rest of a man's activities or power, so that the emotion becomes	
obstinately fixed to him	194
Prop. VII. An emotion can only be controlled or destroyed by	
another emotion contrary thereto, and with more power for	
controlling emotion	194
Duan VIII The humanistance of and and milion other also had	134
Prop. VIII. The knowledge of good and evil is nothing else, but	
the emotions of pleasure or pain, in so far as we are conscious	
thereof	195
Prop. IX. An emotion, whereof we conceive the cause to be with	
us at the present time, is stronger than if we did not conceive	
the cause to be with us	196
Prop. X. Towards something future, which we conceive as close	
at hand, we are affected more intensely, than if we conceive	
that its time for existence is separated from the present by a	
longer interval; so too by the remembrance of what we con-	
soins to have not long proceed some one afford more in	
ceive to have not long passed away we are affected more in-	100
tensely, than if we conceive that it has long passed away	196
Prop. XI. An emotion towards that which we conceive as neces-	
sary is, when other conditions are equal, more intense than an	
emotion towards that which is possible, or contingent, or non-	
necessary	197
Prop. XII. An emotion towards a thing, which we know not to	
exist at the present time, and which we conceive is possible, is	
more intense, other things being equal, than an emotion to-	
wards a thing contingent	197
Prom VIII Prosting towards a thing continued which	131
Prop. XIII. Emotion towards a thing contingent, which we	
know not to exist in the present, is, other conditions being	
equal, fainter than an emotion towards a thing past	198
Prop. XIV. A true knowledge of good and evil cannot check	
any emotion by virtue of being true, but only in so far as it	
is considered as an emotion	198
Prop. XV. Desire arising from the knowledge of good and evil	
can be quenched or checked by many other desires arising	
from the emotions, whereby we are assailed	198
	100
Prop. XVI. Desire arising from the knowledge of good and	
evil, in so far as such knowledge regards what is future, may	
be more easily controlled or quenched, than the desire for what	
is agreeable at the present moment	199

x x	AUD
Prop. XVII. Desire arising from the true knowledge of good and evil, in so far as such knowledge is concerned with what	
is contingent, can be controlled far more easily still, than	
desire for things that are at present	199
Prop. XVIII. Desire arising from pleasure is, other things being	***
equal, stronger than desire arising from pain	200
Prop. XIX. Every man, by the laws of his nature, necessarily	
desires or shrinks from that which he deems to be good or	
bad	202
Prop. XX. The more every man endeavours and is able to seek	
what is useful to him, in other words to preserve his own being,	
the more is he endowed with virtue; on the contrary, in pro-	
portion as a man neglects to seek what is useful to him, that	
is, to preserve his own being, he is wanting in power	202
Prop. XXI. No one can rightly desire to be blessed, to act	
rightly, and to live rightly, without at the same time wishing	000
to be, to act, and to live, in other words, to actually exist.	203
Prop. XXII. No virtue can be conceived as prior to this en-	203
deavour to preserve one's own being	203
action because he has inadequate ideas, cannot be absolutely	
said to act in obedience to virtue; he can only be so described,	
in so far as he is determined for the action, because he under-	
stands	204
Prop. XXIV. To act absolutely in obedience to virtue, is in us	
the same thing as to act, to live, or to preserve one's being	
(these three terms are identical in meaning) in accordance	
with the dictate of reason on the basis of seeking what is	
useful to one's self	204
Prop. XXV. No one wishes to preserve his being for the sake of	
anything else	204
Prop. XXVI. Whatsoever we endeavour in obedience to reason	
is nothing further than to understand; neither does the mind,	
in so far as it makes use of reason, judge anything to be	
useful to it, save such things as are conducive to under-	005
standing	205
Prop. XXVII. We know nothing to be certainly good or evil,	
save such things as really conduce to understanding, or such	205
as are able to hinder us from understanding	200
God, and the mind's highest virtue is to know God	205
Prop. XXIX. No individual thing, which is entirely different	200
from our own nature, can help or check our power of activity,	
and absolutely nothing can do us good or harm, unless it has	
something in common with our nature	206
Prop. XXX. A thing cannot be bad for us through the	
quality which it has in common with our nature, but it is bad	
for us, in so far as it is contrary to our nature	206
Prop. XXXI. In so far as a thing is in harmony with our	
nature, it is necessarily good	207

	PAGE
Prop. XXXII. Whatsoever we understand by intuition, we take delight in, and our delight is accompanied by the idea of God	
as cause	263
Prop. XXXIII. The intellectual love of God, which arises from intuition, is eternal	263
Prop. XXXIV. The mind is, only while the body endures, sub-	
ject to those emotions, which are attributable to passions .	264
Prop. XXXV. God loves himself with an infinite intellectual love	264
Prop. XXXVI. The intellectual love of the mind towards God is that very love of God, whereby God loves himself, not in so far as he is infinite, but in so far as he can be explained through the essence of the human mind regarded under the form of eternity; in other words, the intellectual love of the mind towards God is part of the infinite love, wherewith God	201
loves himself	264
Prop. XXXVII. There is nothing in nature, which is contrary	
to this intellectual love, or which can take it away	266
Prop. XXXVIII. In proportion as the mind understands more	
things by reason and intuition, it is less subject to those	000
emotions which are evil, and stands in less fear of death Prop. XXXIX. He, who possesses a body capable of the greatest	266
number of activities, possesses a soul whereof the greatest part	
is eternal	267
Prop. XL. In proportion as each thing possesses more of per-	_ • •
fection, so is it more active, and less passive; and, vice versa,	
in proportion as it is more active, so is it more perfect.	268
Prop. XLI. Even if we did not know that our mind is eternal,	
we should still consider as of primary importance piety and	
religion, and generally all things, which in Part IV. we showed to be attributable to courage and high-mindedness.	268
Prop. XLII. Blessedness is not the reward of virtue, but virtue	200
itself; neither do we rejoice therein, because we control our	
lusts, but, contrariwise, because we rejoice therein, we are able	
to control our lusts	270
Spinoza's Correspondence (Abridged)	273
Letters I.—XXV.A. (1661-1676.) Between Spinoza and	
Henry Oldenburg	275
Letters XXVI.—XXVIII. Between Spinoza and Simon de	
Vries	309
Letters XXIX., XXIX.A. (1663.) From Spinoza to Lewis	
Meyer	317
Letter XXX. (1664.) From Spinoza to Peter Balling. Letters XXXI.—XXXVIII. (1664-5.) Between Spinoza and	325
William Blyenbergh	327
Letters XXXIX.—XLI. (1666.) From Spinoza to Christian	
Huyghens, on the unity of God	351
Letters XLI.A., XLII. (1665-6.) From Spinoza to a cor-	
respondent probably identified with John Bresser	358

	PAGE
sociated with the images referred to things which we clearly	
and distinctly understand, than with others	254
Prop. XIII. A mental image is more often vivid, in proportion	0.55
as it is associated with a greater number of other images	255
Prop. XIV. The mind can bring it about, that all bodily	
modifications or images of things may be referred to the idea of God	255
Prop. XV. He, who clearly and distinctly understands himself	200
and his emotions, loves God, and so much the more in propor-	
tion as he more understands himself and his emotions.	255
Prop. XVI. This love towards God must hold the chief place	
in the mind	255
Prop. XVII. God is without passions, neither is he affected by	
any emotion of pleasure or pain	255
Prop. XVIII. No one can hate God	256
Prop. XIX. He, who loves God, cannot endeavour, that God	
should love him in return	256
Prop. XX. This love towards God cannot be stained by the	
emotion of envy or jealousy; contrariwise, it is the more	
fostered, in proportion as we conceive a greater number of men to be joined to God by the same bond of love	256
Prop. XXI. The mind can only imagine anything, or remember	250
what is past, while the body endures	259
Prop. XXII. Nevertheless in God there is necessarily an idea,	200
which expresses the essence of this or that human body under	
the form of eternity	259
Prop. XXIII. The human mind cannot be absolutely destroyed	
with the body, but there remains of it something which is	
_ eternal	259
Prop. XXIV. The more we understand particular things, the	
more do we understand God	260
Prop. XXV. The highest endeavour of the mind, and the	0.00
highest virtue, is to understand things by intuition .	260
Prop. XXVI. In proportion as the mind is more capable of understanding things by intuition, it desires more so to under-	
stand things	260
Prop. XXVII. From intuition arises the highest possible	200
mental acquiescence	261
Prop. XXVIII. The endeavour or desire to know things by	
intuition cannot arise from opinion, but from reason	261
Prop. XXIX. Whatsoever the mind understands under the form	
of eternity, it does not understand by virtue of conceiving the	
present actual existence of the body, but by virtue of con-	
ceiving the essence of the body under the form of eternity	261
Prop. XXX. Our mind, in so far as it knows itself and the	
body under the form of eternity, has to that extent neces-	
sarily a knowledge of God, and knows that it is in God, and	262
is conceived through God. Prop. XXXI. Intuition depends on the mind, as its formal	202
cause, in so far as the mind itself is eternal.	262

	AUL
Prop. XXXII. In so far as men are a prey to passion, they	
cannot, in that respect, be said to be naturally in harmony.	207
Prop. XXXIII. Men can differ in nature, in so far as they are	
assailed by those emotions, which are passions or passive	
states; and to this extent one and the same man is variable	
and inconstant	208
Prop. XXXIV. In so far as men are assailed by emotions	
which are passions, they can be contrary one to another .	208
Prop. XXXV. In so far only as men live in obedience to	
reason, do they always necessarily agree in nature	209
Prop. XXXVI. The highest good of those who follow virtue	
is common to all, and therefore all can equally rejoice therein	211
Prop. XXXVII. The good, which every man who follows after	
virtue desires for himself, he will also desire for other men,	
and so much the more, in proportion as he has a greater know-	
ledge of God	211
Prop. XXXVIII. Whatsoever disposes the human body, so as	
to render it capable of being affected in an increased number	
of ways, or of affecting external bodies in an increased number	
of ways, is useful to man; and is so, in proportion as the	
body is thereby rendered more capable of being affected or of	
affecting other bodies in an increased number of ways; con-	
trariwise, whatsoever renders the body less capable in this	
respect is hurtful to man	215
Prop. XXXIX. Whatsoever brings about the preservation of	213
the proportion of motion and rest, which the parts of the	
the proportion of motion and rest, which the parts of the	
human body mutually possess, is good; contrariwise, whatso-	015
ever causes a change in such proportion is bad	215
Prop. XL. Whatsoever conduces to man's social life, or causes	
men to live together in harmony, is useful, whereas whatsoever	016
brings discord into a State is bad	216
Prop. XLI. Pleasure in itself is not bad but good; contrari-	018
wise, pain in itself is bad	217
Prop. XLII. Mirth cannot be excessive, but is always good;	~ -
contrariwise, Melancholy is always bad	217
Prop. XLIII. Stimulation may be excessive and bad; on the	
other hand, grief may be good, in so far as stimulation or	
pleasure is bad	217
Prop. XLIV. Love and desire may be excessive	218
Prop. XLV. Hatred can never be good	218
Prop. XLVI. He, who lives under the guidance of reason, en-	
deavours, as far as possible, to render back love, or kindness,	
for other men's hatred, anger, contempt, etc., towards him .	220
Prop. XLVII. Emotions of hope and fear cannot be in them-	
selves good	220
Prop. XLVIII. The emotions of over-esteem and disparagement	
are always bad	221
Prop. XLIX. Over esteem is apt to render its object proud .	221
Prop. L. Pity, in a man who lives under the guidance of	
reason, is in itself bad and useless	221
\mathbf{n} . b	

PAGE

Prop. LI. Approval is not repugnant to reason, but can agree	
therewith and arise therefrom	222
Prop. LII. Self-approval may arise from reason, and that	
which arises from reason is the highest possible	222
Prop. LIII. Humility is not a virtue, or does not arise from	
reason	223
Prop. LIV. Repentance is not a virtue, or does not arise from	
reason, but he who repents of an action is doubly wretched or	
infirm	223
Prop. LV. Extreme pride or dejection indicates extreme igno-	
rance of self	224
Prop. LVI. Extreme pride or dejection indicates extreme in-	
firmity of spirit	224
Prop. LVII. The proud man delights in the company of	
flatterers and parasites, but hates the company of the high-	
minded	224
Prop. LVIII. Honour (gloria) is not repugnant to reason, but	
may arise therefrom	226
Prop. LIX. To all the actions, whereto we are determined by	
emotions, wherein the mind is passive, we can be determined	
without emotion by reason	227
Prop. LX. Desire arising from a pleasure or pain, that is, not	
attributable to the whole body, but only to one or certain	
parts thereof, is without utility in respect to man as a whole.	228
Prop. LXI. Desire which springs from reason cannot be ex-	
cessive	229
Prop. LXII. In so far as the mind conceives a thing under the	
dictate of reason, it is affected equally, whether the idea be of	
a thing present, past, or future	229
Prop. LXIII. He who is led by fear, and does good in order to	
escape evil, is not led by reason	230
Prop. LXIV. The knowledge of evil is an inadequate know-	
ledge	231
Prop. LXV. Under the guidance of reason we should pursue	
the greater of two goods and the lesser of two evils	231
Prop. LXVI. We may, under the guidance of reason, seek a	
greater good in the future in preference to a lesser good in the	
present, and we may seek a lesser evil in the present in pre-	
ference to a greater evil in the future	231
Prop. LXVII. A free man thinks of nothing less than of	
death; and his wisdom is a meditation not of death, but of	
life	232
Prop. LXVIII. If men were born free, they would, so long as	
they remained free, form no conception of good or evil	232
Prop. LXIX. The virtue of a free man is seen to be as great,	
when it declines dangers, as when it overcomes them	233
Prop. LXX. The free man, who lives among the ignorant,	
strives, as far as he can, to avoid receiving favours from them	234
Prop. LXXI. Only free men are thoroughly grateful, one to	
another	234

TO THEFT OF A	PAGE
Prop. LXXII. The free man never acts fraudulently, but	
always in good faith	235
Prop. LXXIII. The man, who is guided by reason, is more free	
in a State, where he lives under a general system of law, than	
in solitude, where he is independent	235
Appendix on the Right Way of Life	236
Appendix on the regit way of the	2.50
Part V. On the Power of the Understanding, or of Human	
Freedom	244
Preface	244
Axioms	247
	411
Prop. I. Even as thoughts and the ideas of things are arranged	
and associated in the mind, so are the modifications of the	
body, or the images of things precisely in the same way	
arranged and associated in the body	247
Prop. II. If we remove a disturbance of the spirit, or emotion,	211
from the thought of an enternal array and finite it to other	
from the thought of an external cause, and unite it to other	
thoughts, then will the love or hatred towards that external	
cause, and also the vacillations of spirit, which arise from	
these emotions, be destroyed	248
Prop. III. An emotion, which is a passion, ceases to be a	
passion, as soon as we form a clear and distinct idea thereof.	248
Prop. IV. There is no modification of the body, whereof we	
cannot form some clear and distinct conception	248
Description of the second of t	240
Prop. V. An emotion towards a thing which we conceive	
simply, and not as necessary, or as contingent, or as possible,	
is, other conditions being equal, greater than any other	
emotion	249
Prop. VI. The mind has greater power over the emotions, and	
is less subject thereto, in so far as it understands all things as	
necessary	250
Prop. VII. Emotions, which are aroused or spring from reason,	200
if any table governs of time are attended or spring from reasons,	
if we take account of time, are stronger than those, which are	
attributable to particular objects, that we regard as absent.	250
Prop. VIII. An emotion is stronger in proportion to the num-	
ber of simultaneous concurrent causes whereby it is aroused.	251
Prop. IX. An emotion, which is attributable to many and	
diverse causes, which the mind regards as simultaneous with	
the emotion itself, is less hurtful, and we are less subject	
thereto, and less affected towards each of its causes, than if it	
were a different and equally powerful emotion, attributable to	
from a success to a single series of the control of	051
fewer causes or to a single cause	251
Prop. X. So long as we are not assailed by emotions contrary to	
our nature, we have the power of arranging and associating	
the modifications of our body according to the intellectual	
order	252
Prop. XI. In proportion as a mental image is referred to more	
objects, so is it more frequent, or more often vivid, and affects	
the mind more	254
Prop. XII. The mental images of things are more easily as-	
LIOP. ALL. The mentur thinges of things we more easily us-	

	FAGE
Letter XLIII. (1666.) Spinoza to I. v. M. on a problem	
connected with games of chance (omitted).	
Letters XLIV.—XLVI. (on scientific subjects, and omitted),	
and Letter XLVII. (1667-71.) From Spinoza to a cor-	
respondent probably identified with Jarig Jellis	362
Letter XLVIII. (1671.) From Lambert de Velthuysen to	
Isaac Orobio against Tractatus Theologico-Politicus (omitted).	
Letter XLIX. (1671.) Spinoza's answer to XLVIII., ad-	
dressed to Isaac Orobio	364
Letter L. (1674.) From Spinoza to Jarig Jellis, on Hobbes, &c.	369
Letters LI., LII. (1671.) Between Spinoza and Leibnitz .	370
Letters LIII., LIV. (1673.) Between Spinoza and Fabritius	373
Letters LV.—LX. (1674.) Between Spinoza and Hugo	
Boxel on ghosts	375
Letters LXI.—LXXII. (1674-6.) Between Spinoza, E. W.	
von Tschirnhausen, and G. H. Schaller	389
Letters LXXIII., LXXIV. (1675.) Between Spinoza and	
Albert Burgh	410
Letter LXXV. (1675?) From Spinoza to Lambert de Vel-	
thuysen	419