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THE ETHICS (1677)

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Axioms

Part I. Concerning God

modifications

SPINOZA (1632-1677)

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Prop. IV. Two or more distinct things are distinguished one from the other either by the difference of the attributes of the substances, or by

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Prop. X. Each particular attribute of the one sub- stance must be conceived through itself
Prop. XI. God, or substance, consisting of infinite attributes, of which each expresses eternal and infinite essentiality, necessarily exists
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