

# CONTENTS

1. Introduction	1
1.1. An Overview	1
1.2. Moral Argument	6
1.3. Some Presuppositions	12
<b>PART I. EQUALITY OF FORTUNE</b>	17
2. The Presumption in Favor of Equal Shares	19
2.1. The Ends of Justice	20
2.2. Welfare-Based Conceptions of Equality	23
A. Utilitarianism	23
(i) The Problem of External Preferences	25
(ii) Indirect Utilitarianism	29
(iii) Utilitarian Injustice	33
B. Egalitarian Welfarism	39
2.3. Opportunity-Based Conceptions of Equality with Welfarist Roots	43
A. Equality of Opportunity for Welfare	44
B. Equal Access to Advantage	52
(i) Jude and Cheap Expensive Tastes	54
(ii) Paul and Naturally Expensive Tastes	56
(iii) Berg Lovers, Monument Builders, and Intrinsic Connections between Commitments and Costs	58
2.4. Equal Shares in a Free Market	65
3. Voluntary Choices and Emergent Inequalities	73
3.1. Open Lotteries	77
3.2. Dangerous Activities	79
3.3. Natural Disasters	79
3.4. Business Losses	81
3.5. Unemployment	81
3.6. Good Brute Luck in Business and Finance	83
A. Profitable Discoveries	84
B. Profitable Inventions	86

4. Ineluctable Risks: Illness and Injury	88
4.1. Normal Adults	88
4.2. Minors and Mentally Infirm Adults	92
A. Rival Rights-Based Proposals	93
B. Dworkin's Approach and Equality of Fortune	97
5. Occupational Preferences, Effort, and Desert	107
5.1. Preferences for Jobs and Leisure and Unequal Effort	107
5.2. A Rawlsian Challenge	112
6. Unequal Endowments	120
6.1. The Hypothetical Insurance Approach	121
6.2. Dworkin's Proposal	126
6.3. Equality of Fortune	138
7. Gifts, Bequests, and Intergenerational Obligations	149
7.1. The Basic Stipend	150
7.2. The Division of Intestate Property	155
7.3. Directed Gifts and Bequests	158
7.4. Two Countervailing Considerations	162
7.5. The Basic Stipend over Time	164
8. Justice and the Transfer of Body Parts	167
8.1. The Argument for Compulsory Organ Transfers	168
8.2. Arguments against Involuntary Organ Removal	183
<b>PART II. CORRECTIVE JUSTICE</b>	197
9. The Problem of Liability Rules: The Failings of Wealth Maximization as a Normative Ideal	199
9.1. Specifying the Preconditions for Applying the Wealth Maximization Criterion	201
9.2. The Presumption in Favor of Market Exchanges	210
9.3. The Moral Foundations of Wealth Maximization	214
A. The Intuitive Appeal of Wealth Maximization	214
B. Justification by Consent	218
(i) Defining the Status Quo	220
(ii) Defining Permissible Departures from the Status Quo	221
(iii) Choosing between Permissible Departures from the Status Quo	225

10. Outline of a Theory of Corrective Justice	227
10.1. Setting the Stage	227
10.2. Permissible Departures from the Status Quo	232
10.3. Some Generalizations about Negligence and Strict Liability	239
11. Illustrations	244
11.1. Intentional Torts	245
11.2. Nuisances	253
11.3. Abnormally Dangerous Activities	262
11.4. Collision Cases	265
<b>PART III. SAVING AND TAKING LIFE</b>	
12. Do Numbers Count when Saving Lives?	277
12.1. The Case for the Moral Irrelevance of Numbers	278
12.2. Objections to the Claim that Numbers do not Matter	291
12.3. Some Leading Arguments on Behalf of the Maximizing Policy	299
12.4. A Deontological Defense of the Maximizing Policy	304
13. The Relevance of Personal Characteristics to Choices between Lives	310
13.1. Troublesome Cases	310
13.2. Justice, Medical Insurance, and Expensive Life-Saving Resources	313
A. The Hypothetical Insurance Approach	313
B. Equality of Fortune	318
13.3. Justice and the Allocation of Cadaver Organs	324
A. Random Selection	324
B. Allocation by Auction	325
(i) Predictable Shortages	326
(ii) Unpredictable Shortages	330
C. A Comparison of the Two Plans	331
13.4. Emergencies	331
14. Killing People or Animals to Benefit Others	333
14.1. Introductory Remarks	333
14.2. Permissible Killing in a Just Society	335
A. Killing to Reduce Total Deaths	338
B. Relative Quality of Victims' and Beneficiaries' Lives	347

C. Killing under Duress	349
14.3. Killing Outsiders	352
14.4. Killing Animals for Human Gain	356
14.5. Should We Kill Off the Carnivores?	363
Envoi	368
<i>Bibliography</i>	371
<i>Index</i>	381