CONTENTS

PART I

CONCERNING GOD

)ef	INITIONS-										
	I. Cause of	Itself (ca	usa s	ui)							r
	II. Finite in	n its Kin	d (in	suo g	enere	finita)					1
	III. Substa	nce (subs	tantia	ı) ·							ı
	IV. Attribu	ite (attrib	utum))			• .				r
	V. Mode (n	wdus) .									ı
	VI. God (L	eus) .									Í
	VII. The the saria).	hing is sa or Comp	id to	be F	ree (l	ibera),	Nece	ssary	(neces	-	2
	VIII. Eteri	-		•	•						2
\xı	oms IVII.										2
PRO	POSITIONS-										_
	I. A substa	nce is pr	ior in	its	natur	e to it	s mo	lificat	ions		3
	II. Two si	ibstances in comr					attri	butes,	hav	re	3
	III. Of two	•	havi	ng n	othin	g in	comn other	on b	etwee		3
		three dis er either aces or b	by th	e difi	ferenc	e of th	ie attr	ibutes	of th	.e	3
	V. In the n	ature of I having	thing the s	s, tw	o or a	more t	things	may te	not b		3
	VI. One su Corollary	bstance c	anno	be j	produ •	ced by	y anot	her		:	4
	VII. Existe	nce appe	rtains	s to t	he na	ture o	f subs	tance			4
	VIII. All su	ıbstance	is nec	cessai	rily in	finite					4
	Notes				•						5
	IX. The mo	ore realit vill it hav		being	g a th	ing ha	as, the	e more	e attr	i- •	7
	X. Each at		of the	one	subst	ance 1	must	be cor	ceive	d	
	through Note	h itself .			•	•	•	•	•	•	7
	More		•		•	•	•	•	•	•	7

xxviii The Ethics of Spinoza

PART II

CONCERNING	THE	NATHRE	AND	ORIGIN	OF THE	MIND
CONCERNING	1115	MAIONE	ΔND	OKIGIN	Or Inc	TATILITY

VII. Reality and Perfection (realitas et perfectio)
I. Body (corpus)
II. That which appertains to the essence of a thing
III. Idea (idea)
IV. Adequate Idea (idea adæquata)
V. Duration (duratio) VI. Reality and Perfection (realitas et perfectio) VII. Individual Things (res singulares) AXIOMS IV. PROPOSITIONS— I. Thought (cogitatio) is an attribute of God, or God is a thinking thing Note II. Extension (extensio) is an attribute of God, or God is an extended thing VIII. In God there is granted not only the idea of his essence, but also the idea of all the things which follow necessarily from his essence Note IV. The idea of God from which infinite things in infinite modes follow can only be one V. The formal being of ideas acknowledges God as its cause only in so far as he is considered as a thinking thing, and not in so far as he is a thinking thing their ideals or the objects perceived as their effecting cause, but God himself in so far as he is a thinking thing VI. The modes of any attribute of God have God for their cause only in so far as he is considered through that attribute, and not in so far as he is considered through that attribute, and not in so far as he is considered through that attribute, and not in so far as he is considered through that attribute, and not in so far as he is considered through
VII. Reality and Perfection (realitas et perfectio)
VII. Reality and Perfection (realitas et perfectio)
VII. Individual Things (res singulares)
Axioms IV
PROPOSITIONS— I. Thought (cogitatio) is an attribute of God, or God is a thinking thing
I. Thought (cogitatio) is an attribute of God, or God is a thinking thing
thinking thing Note Note II. Extension (extensio) is an attribute of God, or God is an extended thing III. In God there is granted not only the idea of his essence, but also the idea of all the things which follow necessarily from his essence Note IV. The idea of God from which infinite things in infinite modes follow can only be one V. The formal being of ideas acknowledges God as its cause only in so far as he is considered as a thinking thing, and not in so far as he is revealed in some other attribute: that is, the ideas, not only of the attributes of God, but also of individual things, do not acknowledge their ideals or the objects perceived as their effecting cause, but God himself in so far as he is a thinking thing VI. The modes of any attribute of God have God for their cause only in so far as he is considered through that attribute, and not in so far as he is considered through
II. Extension (extensio) is an attribute of God, or God is an extended thing
extended thing III. In God there is granted not only the idea of his essence, but also the idea of all the things which follow necessarily from his essence Note IV. The idea of God from which infinite things in infinite modes follow can only be one V. The formal being of ideas acknowledges God as its cause only in so far as he is considered as a thinking thing, and not in so far as he is revealed in some other attribute: that is, the ideas, not only of the attributes of God, but also of individual things, do not acknowledge their ideals or the objects perceived as their effecting cause, but God himself in so far as he is a thinking thing VI. The modes of any attribute of God have God for their cause only in so far as he is considered through that attribute, and not in so far as he is considered through
III. In God there is granted not only the idea of his essence, but also the idea of all the things which follow necessarily from his essence
but also the idea of all the things which follow necessarily from his essence
Note
Note
IV. The idea of God from which infinite things in infinite modes follow can only be one
V. The formal being of ideas acknowledges God as its cause only in so far as he is considered as a thinking thing, and not in so far as he is revealed in some other attribute: that is, the ideas, not only of the attributes of God, but also of individual things, do not acknowledge their ideals or the objects perceived as their effecting cause, but God himself in so far as he is a thinking thing VI. The modes of any attribute of God have God for their cause only in so far as he is considered through that attribute, and not in so far as he is considered through
only in so far as he is considered as a thinking thing, and not in so far as he is revealed in some other attribute: that is, the ideas, not only of the attributes of God, but also of individual things, do not acknowledge their ideals or the objects perceived as their effecting cause, but God himself in so far as he is a thinking thing VI. The modes of any attribute of God have God for their cause only in so far as he is considered through that attribute, and not in so far as he is considered through
not in so far as he is revealed in some other attribute: that is, the ideas, not only of the attributes of God, but also of individual things, do not acknowledge their ideals or the objects perceived as their effecting cause, but God himself in so far as he is a thinking thing. VI. The modes of any attribute of God have God for their cause only in so far as he is considered through that attribute, and not in so far as he is considered through
that is, the ideas, not only of the attributes of God, but also of individual things, do not acknowledge their ideals or the objects perceived as their effecting cause, but God himself in so far as he is a thinking thing VI. The modes of any attribute of God have God for their cause only in so far as he is considered through that attribute, and not in so far as he is considered through
but also of individual things, do not acknowledge their ideals or the objects perceived as their effecting cause, but God himself in so far as he is a thinking thing. VI. The modes of any attribute of God have God for their cause only in so far as he is considered through that attribute, and not in so far as he is considered through
but God himself in so far as he is a thinking thing . 40 VI. The modes of any attribute of God have God for their cause only in so far as he is considered through that attribute, and not in so far as he is considered through
VI. The modes of any attribute of God have God for their cause only in so far as he is considered through that attribute, and not in so far as he is considered through
cause only in so far as he is considered through that attribute, and not in so far as he is considered through
any other attribute
Corollary
VII. The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things
Corollary
Note
VIII. The ideas of individual things or modes which do not
exist must be comprehended in the infinite idea of God
in the same way as the formal essences of individual things or modes are contained in the attributes of God. 42

$\overline{}$				
	on	ten	ts	

	•	
XX	1	X

PROPOSITIONS Corollary .				•				PAGE 42
Note .	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	• 43
IX. The idea God for it far as he i individua the cause idea, and	s cause, n is consider I thing ac , in so fa	ot in s red as a ctually r as h	o far a affecte existi e is af	s he is d by t ng of	s infin the ide which	ite, bu ea of a also	it in so nother God is) : :
Corollary .		•	•	•	•	•	•	• 44
X. The being of man, of form (form	of substant or, again,	nce doe subst	es not ance	apper does r	tain to	o the e	essence te the	e e • 44
Notes .	<i>,,,</i> 01 1114		•	•	•	•	•	• 44
Corollary .		•	:	:	:	•		. 44
					1	L.:	- C 4 h	• • •
XI. The first y human m dual thing	ind is not	hing e	lse tha					
Corollary .	•	CAISTI		•	•	•		. 46
Note .		:				-	-	. 46
XII. Whatever ing the himind, or to in the huconstituting the period of the constitution of the constituti	uman mir the idea of man min	nd mus that t d: tha	st be p hing n it is i	perceiv nust n f the	ved by ecessa object	y the l rily be t of th	humar founc ie idea	1 [1
Note .								47
XIII. The obj	y, or a cer	tain m						•
ing and no		е	•	•	•	•	•	47
Corollary . Note .	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	47
		•,	•	•	•	•	•	47
Axioms I., I		•	•	•	•	•		48
LEMMAS II		•	•	•	•	•		
Corollary	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	49
Axioms II		•	•	•	•	•	•	50
Lemmas IV.		-	•		•	•	•	50
Note .		•	•	•	•	•	•	51
Postulates		•	•	•	•	•		52
XIV. The hur more so a ways	nan mind .ccording	is apt as its l	to per body o	rceive can be	many dispo	thing sed in	s, and more	;
XV. The idea human mi								
XVI. The idea affected b the human	a of every y externa	mode I bodie	in wl	nich ti st inv	he hu	man b he nat	ody is	
external b	ody.	•	•	•	•			53
Corollaries.	•	•	•	•	•	•		53

ROF	POSITIONS	PAGI
	XVII. If the human body is affected in a mode which involves the nature of any external body, the human mind regards that external body as actually existing, or as present to itself until the body is affected by a modification which cuts off the existence or presence of that body	53
	Corollary	54
	Note	5
	XVIII. If the human body has once been affected at the same time by two or more bodies, when the mind afterwards remembers any one of them it will straightway remember the others	5.
	Note	5
	XIX. The human mind has no knowledge of the human body, nor does it know it to exist save through ideas of modifications by which the body is affected	50
	XX. The idea or knowledge of the human mind is granted in God and follows in God in the same manner, and is referred to God in the same manner as the idea or knowledge of the human body	- 52
	XXI. This idea of the mind is united to the mind in the same manner as the mind is united to the body. Note	51 51
	VVII The human mind novectives not only the modifications	Ū
	XXII. The human mind perceives not only the modifications of the body, but also the ideas of these modifications.	58
	XXIII. The mind has no knowledge of itself save in so far as it perceives the ideas of the modifications of the body .	58
	XXIV. The human mind does not involve an adequate knowledge of the component parts of the human body	59
	XXV. The idea of each modification of the human body does not involve an adequate knowledge of the external body	60
	XXVI. The human mind perceives no external body as actually existing save through ideas of modifications of	_
	its body	60 60
	XXVII. The idea of each modification of the human body does not involve adequate knowledge of the human body itself	60
	XXVIII. The ideas of the modifications of the human body, in so far as they are referred to the human mind alone,	
	are not clear and distinct but confused	61
		61
	XXIX. The idea of the idea of each modification of the human mind does not involve adequate knowledge of the human mind	61
	Corollary	62
	Note	62
	XXX. We can have only a very inadequate knowledge of the	-
	duration of our body	62

xxxi

PROPOSITIONS	PAGE
XXXI. We can only have a very inadequate knowledge	
individual things which are outside us	. 63
•	. 63
XXXII. All ideas, in so far as they have reference to Go are true.	. 63
XXXIII. There is nothing positive in ideas, wherefore the could be called false	y . 63
XXXIV. Every idea in us which is absolute, or adequate and perfect, is true.	te • 63
XXXV. Falsity consists in privation of knowledge which involved by inadequate or mutilated and confused idea Note	is as 64 . 64
XXXVI. Inadequate and confused ideas follow from the same necessity as adequate or clear and distinct ideas	
XXXVII. That which is common to all, and that which equally in a part and in the whole, do not constitut the essence of an individual thing	is :e . 65
XXXVIII. Those things which are common to all, an which are equally in a part and in the whole, can only be	
conceived as adequate	. 65
Corollary	. 65
XXXIX. That which is common to and a property of th human body, and certain external bodies by which th human body is used to be affected, and which is equall in the part and whole of these, has an adequate idea i	e y
the mind	. 66
Corollary	. 66
XL. Whatever ideas follow in the mind from ideas which ar	
adequate in the mind, are also adequate	. 66
Notes	. 66
XLI. Knowledge of the first kind is the only cause of falsity knowledge of the second and third kinds is necessarily	ý
true	. 69
XLII. Knowledge of the second and third kinds and not o the first kind teaches us to distinguish the true fron the false.	
XLIII. He who has a true idea, knows at that same time	-
that he has a true idea, nor can he doubt concerning the truth of the thing	е
Note	. 69 . 70
XLIV. It is not the nature of reason to regard things as con tingent but necessary	- . 71
Corollaries	. 7I
Note	. 7I
XLV. Every idea of every body or individual thing actually existing necessarily involves the eternal and infinite	•
essence of God	72
Note	73

xxxii	The	Ethics	of	Spinoza

PROPOSITIONS XLVI. The knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God which each idea involves is adequate and perfect.	
XLVII. The human mind has an adequate knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God	
Note	73 74
XLVIII. There is in no mind absolute or free will, but the mind is determined for willing this or that by a cause which is determined in its turn by another cause, and	
this one again by another, and so on to infinity. Note	74 75
XLIX. There is in the mind no volition or affirmation and negation save that which the idea, in so far as it is an idea, involves	
PART III	
CONCERNING THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE EMOT	IONS
Definitions—	
I. Adequate Cause (adæquata causa); Inadequate or Partial (inadæquata seu partialis).	84
II. Action and Passion	84
III. Emotion (affectus)	84
Postulates I., II	85
Propositions—	
I. Our mind acts certain things and suffers others: namely, in so far as it has adequate ideas, thus far it necessarily acts certain things, and in so far as it has inadequate ideas, thus far it necessarily suffers certain things. Corollary	
II. The body cannot determine the mind to think, nor the mind the body to remain in motion, or at rest, or in any other state (if there be any other)	86
Note	- 86
III. The actions of the mind arise from adequate ideas alone, but passions depend on inadequate ideas alone. Note	90
IV. Nothing can be destroyed save by an external cause	90
V. Things are contrary by nature, that is, they cannot exist in the same subject in so far as one can destroy the other	-
VI. Everything in so far as it is in itself endeavours to persist in its own being	-

xxxiii

PROI		rions . The en									
		sist in it that thi		g is no	othing •	else t	han tl	he act	ual ess	ence.	of • 91
	VII	I. The essist in it definite	ts owi								
	IX.	The min confuse indefini	d ídea	s, end	eavou	rs to p	persist	in its	being	g for a	nd an
	N	ote									. 92
	X.	The idea be giver	which in ou	ı cuts ır min	off th	e exist	tence ntrary	of our	body eto	cann	-
	XI.	Whatev power of or dimin our min	f actionishes,	on of	our bo	ody, ti	he ide	a the	reof in	creas	es
	N	ote	•								. 93
	XII	. The m									ne
	XII	I. When hinder t much a	the pos	mind wer of in to	imagi actin	nes th g of th	nings ne bod	which y, it e	dimi ndeav	nish ours	or as
	c	their ex	istence	е	•	•	•	•	•	•	• 94
		orollary ote	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	. 95
		7. If the emotion it will b	s, whe	en afte	erward	ls it is	affec				
	XV.	Anythi pain, or	ng car	n acci	identa	lly be	the	cause	of p	leasur	e,
	Co	orollary		· .	•	•	•			•	. 96
		ote	•					:	:		. 96
	XV:	I. From has som affect th which the ing caus or love it	nething ne min he thir se of t	g simi id withing is si hose e	lar to h plea imilar emotic	an c sure c to the	object or pair object	which n, alth at be n	h is vough	vont that effec	ch to in et-
	XV	II. If we the emo another of pleas same tir	thing ure, v	of sad which	lness 1 equa	to hav lly aff	ve sor ects u	nethir s with	ng sin the e	nilar motic	to on
	N	ote		•							. 97
	XV.	III. Am or pain	from t	he im	age of	a thir	ame e	motio t or fu	n of p	leasu as fro	re
		the imag	ge of a	thing	g prese	ent	•	•	•	•	• 97
	. N	otes									. 98

xxxiv The Ethics of Spinoza

PROPOSITIONS		PAGE
XIX. He will be saddened who imagines that which loves to be destroyed: if he imagines it to be preser he is rejoiced.	he ved	98
XX. He will be rejoiced who imagines what he hates to destroyed	be •	99
XXI. He who imagines that which he loves to be affect by pleasure or pain, will also be affected by pleasure pain: and these will be greater or less in the lover according as they are greater or less in the thing loved.	or	99
XXII. If we imagine anything to affect with pleasure w we love, we are affected with love towards it: and, the other hand, if we imagine anything to affect it w pain, we are affected with hatred towards it.	on	100
Note		100
XXIII. He will be rejoiced who imagines that which hates to be affected with pain; if, on the other hand, imagines it to be affected with pleasure, he will saddened: and these emotions will be greater or l according as the contrary emotions were greater or lin the things hated.	he be ess	100
Note	٠	IOI
XXIV. If we imagine any one to affect a thing we hate we pleasure, we are affected with hatred towards to person. If, on the other hand, we imagine him affect it with pain, we are affected with love towards him.	hat to	10 1
Note		IOI
XXV. We endeavour to affirm, concerning ourselves what we love, everything that we imagine to affi what we love or ourselves with pleasure; and, on other hand, we endeavour to deny, concerning oursel and the object loved, everything that we imagine affect us or the object loved with pain	ect the ves	101
XXVI. We endeavour to affirm, concerning a thing to we hate, that which we imagine will affect it with pe and, on the contrary, to deny all that which we imag will affect it with pleasure	in,	102
Note		102
XXVII. By the fact that we imagine a thing which is leading ourselves, and which we have not regarded with a emotion to be affected with any emotion, we also	ny	
affected with a like emotion	٠	102
Notes	•	103
XXVIII. We endeavour to promote the being of everyth that we imagine conducive to pleasure; but what	ing we	103
find repugnant or conducive to pain we endeavour	to	
remove or destroy	•	103

XXXV

POSITIONS	PAGE
XXIX. We also shall endeavour to do everything which w	e
imagine men to regard with pleasure, and, on the other	r
hand, we shall be averse to doing what we imagin men to turn away from	
Note	. 104
	. 104
XXX. If any one has done anything which he imagine	es
to affect others with pleasure, he will be affected wit	h
pleasure accompanied by the idea of himself as the	.e
cause, or he will regard himself with pleasure. On the other hand, if he has done anything which he imagine	e
to affect the others with pain, he regards himself the	ia n
with pain	. 105
Note	. 105
XXXI. If we imagine any one to love, desire, or hate any	-
thing which we ourselves love, hate, or desire, by that	·-
very fact we shall love, hate, or desire it the more. But	
on the other hand, if we imagine that what we love it	
avoided by some one, then we undergo a wavering of th	е
mind	. 105
Corollary	. 106
Note	. 106
XXXII. If we imagine any one to enjoy anything which	h
only one can possess, we shall endeavour to bring it t	0
pass that he does not possess it	. 106
Note	. 106
XXXIII. When we love a thing similar to ourselves, w	
endeavour as much as possible to bring it about that i	
also should love us	. 107
XXXIV. The greater the emotion with which we imagine	
thing loved to be affected towards us, the greater will	
be our vanity	. 107
XXXV. If any one imagines that the thing loved is joine	d
to another than himself with the same or a faster bon-	
of love than that which binds it to him, he will b	е
affected with hatred towards the object loved, and envious towards the other	
Note	. 108 . 108
Note	. 108
XXXVI. He who recollects a thing which he once enjoyed	
desires to possess it under the same circumstances a	
those with which he first enjoyed it	. 109
Corollary	. 109
Note	. 109
XXXVII. The desire which arises by reason of sadness, joy	',
hatred, or love, is greater according as the emotion i	
greater	. 109
XXXVIII. If any one begins to hate a thing loved so that	t
his love for it is clearly laid aside, he will bear greate	T A
hatred towards it on that very account than if he hanever loved it, and the more so according as his forme	ı r
love was greater	. 110

xxxvi The Ethics of Spinoza

PROPOSITIONS	PAGI
XXXIX. He who hates any one will endeavour to do hir harm unless he fears to receive a greater harm from him and, on the other hand, he who loves some one will b	ì;
the same law endeavour to do him good	. II
Note	. 11
XL. He who imagines himself to be hated by another, an believes that he has given the other no cause for hatred will have that properly in return	i,
will hate that person in return	. 111
Corollaries	. 112
XLI. If any one imagines himself to be loved by some on	
else, and does not believe that he has given any caus for this love, he shall love that person in return.	
Notes	. 11
Corollary	. 113
XLII. He who confers a benefit on any one moved by low or by the hope of honour, will be saddened if he sees that	ıt
the benefit is received with ingratitude	. 11
XLIII. Hatred is increased by reciprocal hatred, and, on the other hand, can be destroyed by love	. 11.
XLIV. Hatred which is entirely conquered by love passes into love, and love on that account is greater than if it had not been preceded by hatred	
Note	. 11.
XLV. If one imagines that any one similar to himself if affected with hatred towards another thing similar thimself whom he himself loves, then he will hate the first of these two	0
XLVI. If any one has been affected with pleasure or pai by another person of a class or nation different to hi own, and that accompanied by the idea of that perso under the general name of that class or nation as th cause of the pleasure or pain, he will love or hate no only that person, but all of that class or nation.	n is n ie
XLVII. Joy which arises from the fact that we imagine thing which we hate to be destroyed or affected b	У
some evil never arises without some pain in us . Note	. 11
XLVIII. Love and hatred, for example, towards Peter are destroyed, if the pain which the latter involves, an the pleasure which the former involves, are connected the idea of another thing as a cause; and each of ther will be diminished in so far as we imagine Peter not to be the only cause of either	r, d o n
XLIX. Love or hatred towards a thing which we imagin to be free must be greater than the love or hatre towards a necessary thing, provided both are subject to the same cause.	e d
L. Anything can be accidentally the cause of hope or fear	-
Note	. 117

Contents xxxvii

PRO.	POSITIONS									PAGE
	LI. Differen	it men can l	be affe	cted b	y one	and th	ne sam	ie obje	ect	
	in differ	rent manne	rs, an	d one	and the	he san	ie mai	ı can	be	
	differen	l by one an	a the	same	object	m an	егепт	ways	at	***
	Note	t times	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	117
			1	. : 4			· 	. 1	•	110
	LII. We can	r with some								
		that is no								
	which w	ve imagine i	to hav	e som	ething	singu	ılar ab	out it	: .	119
	Note									119
	LIII. When	the mind	regard	s itsel	lf and	its po	wer o	f acti	ng	
		joiced, and					e disti	nctly	iŧ	
	-	s itself and	its po	wer o	f actin	ıg	•	•	٠	120
	Corollary		•	•	•	•	•	•	٠	120
	LIV. The m						thin,	gs on	ly	
		npose its p					•		•	121
	LV. When the by that		agines	its wa	nt of]	power	it is sa	.aaen	ea	121
•	Corollaries		•	•	:	•	•	•	•	121
	Notes	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	121
٠.		• •	· 	· :		•			•	141
	LVI. There	are as mainsequently	ny spo	ecies o	or piea	ch is	pain,	uesu Seed	e, of	
	these, su	ich as wave	ring o	of the	mind.	or wh	ich is	derive	ed	
	from the	ese, such as	love,	fear, h	iope, t	ıatred	, etc., :	as the	re	
	•	ies of objec	ts by	which	we a	e affe	cted	•	٠	123
	Note		•	•	•	•	•	•	٠	124
	LVII. Any	emotion of	ever	y ind	ividua	l diffe	ers fro	om tl	ıe	
		of another				tne e	ssence	or or	ıe	124
	Note	OII the ess	ciicc o	anoi	iici	•	•	•	•	125
	LVIII. Besid	• •	•	• المامية	• •• •••	ioh o	•	•	•	123
1	there or	e other em	e and	s of r	leasur	e and	nain Le pa	whic	∍, ·h	
	refer to	us in so far	as we	are a	ctive				•	125
1	LIX. Among	all the en	notion	s whi	ch ha	ve refe	erence	to th	ıe	•
-	mind, in	so far as it	is act	ive, th	iere ai					
	not refer	ence to ple	asure	or des	sire	•	•	•		126
	Note		•	•	•		•	•	•	126
DEFI	NITIONS OF	тне Емоті	ons-							
I	. Desire (cu)	piditas)								128
.]	II. Pleasure	(lætitia)								128
1	II. Pain (tri	stitia)								128
	V. Wonder	•								129
. 1	7. Contempt									130
7	I. Love (an	ior) .								130
ī	II. Hatred	(odium)			•					130
7	/III. Inclina	tion (prope	nsio)							130
I	X. Aversion	(aversio)					•			130

xxxviii The Ethics of Spinoza

DEFINITIONS OF THE EMOT	ons							PAG
X. Devotion (devotio)								. 13
XI. Derision (irrisio)								. 13
XII. Hope (spes) .								. 13
XIII. Fear (metus).								13
XIV. Confidence (securi	tas)							. 13
XV. Despair (desperatio).							13
XVI. Joy (gaudium)								13
XVII. Disappointment	(consc	ienti	æ mo	rsus)				13:
XVIII. Pity (commisera	tio)							13:
XIX. Favour (favor)								13:
XX. Indignation (indigr	iatio)							13:
XXI. Partiality (existim	atio)							133
XXII. Disparagement (a	lespec	ctus)						133
XXIII. Envy (invidia)	•		,					133
XXIV. Compassion (mis								133
XXV. Self-complacency	(acqu	viesce	ntia 1	in seit	oso)			133
XXVI. Humility (humil	itas)							133
XXVII. Repentance (pa		tia)						133
XXVIII. Pride (superbia	t)							134
XXIX. Self-despising or	deje	ction	(abje	ectio)				135
XXX. Honour or glory	(gloria	z)						135
XXXI. Shame (pudor)	•							135
XXXII. Regret (desideri	um)							136
XXXIII. Emulation (æn	nulati	(o)						136
XXXIV. Gratefulness or			(gra	tia sei	ı gratı	itudo)		137
XXXV. Benevolence (bet	nevole	ntia)						137
XXXVI. Anger (ira)								137
XXXVII. Vengeance (vin	ndicta	(137
XXXVIII. Cruelty or say	vagen	.ess (a	rude	litas s	eu sæ	vitas)	•	137
XXXIX. Timidity (timor	·)			٠.		•		137
XL. Daring (audacia)								137
XLI, Cowardice (pusillan	imita	s')						137
XLII. Consternation (con	sterna	tio)						138
XLIII. Politeness or mod	lesty	(hum	anita	s seu	modes	stia)		138
XLIV. Ambition (ambitio) .							138
XLV. Luxury (luxuria) .								138
XLVI. Drunkenness (ebric								138
XLVII. Avarice (avaritia)								138
XLVIII. Lust (libido) .							·	138
GENERAL DEFINITION OF THE		TION	s					130

PART IV

ON HUMAN SERVITUDE, OR THE STRENGTH OF THE EMOTIONS

											PAGE
Prefac	E .		•							٠	141
DEFINIT	rions—										
I.	Good (bor	um)									144
IJ.	Bad (ma	lum)									144
III	. Conting	ent in	dividu	ıal thi	ngs (c	onting	entes)				144
IV.	Possible	indivi	idual t	things	(poss	ibiles)					144
v.	Contrary	Emot	ions (affectu	s cont	rarii)					144
VI.	Emotion	towa	rds a	thing	future	e, pres	sent, o	or pas	t		144
VII	. End (fir	nis)									145
VII	I. Virtue	(virtu	s)								145
Ахіом	•										145
Proposi	TIONS-										
I. 1	Nothing	positiv	e, wl	nich a	false	idea	has,	is r	emove	$^{\mathrm{ed}}$	
ν.	from the lote	prese	ence o	f what	t is tru	ie in s	o far	as it i	s true	٠	145
_		•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•		145
II.	We are p									•	146
III.	The force and is fa									i, •	146
	It cannonature, a save tho alone, an	nd thise whi	at he s ich ca	should n be t	l be at inders	ole not tood t	to su	ıffer cl gh his	hange	s,	147
	orollary	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	148
V. 7	The force in existin endeavor external	r to p	ersist	in exi	isting,	but b	y the	s pers where powe	sistence by wer of a	e e n	148
VI.	The force rest of t emotion	he ac	tions	or th	e pow	er of	a m	surpan th	ass the	e e	148
VII.	An emo									g	- 0
C	emotion orollary	•				•	.,	•	•		148 149
							T. J	.1 41	• 41		-4 <i>9</i>
	. The kn emotion o	owleds of plea	ge of g sure o	good o r pain	r evil i , in s o	s not far as	ning e s we a	eise th ire con	an the iscious	5	
	of it .										149

PAGE
LAGE
149
150
136
150
15
151
1,7
151
131
152
152
152
153
153
153
154
154
156
156
150

xli

٠	POSITIONS	FAGE
	XXI. No one can desire to be blessed, to act well, or live well, who at the same time does not desire to be, to act, and to live, that is, actually to exist	157
	XXII. No virtue can be conceived as prior to this virtue of	13/
	endeavouring to preserve oneself	157
	Corollary	157
	XXIII. Man, in so far as he is determined to do anything, by the fact that he has inadequate ideas cannot absolutely be said to act from virtue, but only in so far as he is determined by the fact that he understands	157
	XXIV. To act absolutely according to virtue is nothing else in us than to act under the guidance of reason, to live so, and to preserve one's being (these three have the same meaning) on the basis of seeking what is useful to one-self	158
	XXV. No one endeavours to preserve his being for the sake of anything else	158
	XXVI. Whatever we endeavour to do under the guidance of reason is nothing else than to understand; nor does the mind, in so far as it uses reason, judge anything useful to itself save what is conducive to understanding.	158
•	XXVII. We know nothing to be certainly good or evil save what is truly conducive to understanding or what prevents us from understanding	159
	XXVIII. The greatest good of the mind is the knowledge of God, and the greatest virtue of the mind is to know God	159
	XXIX. Any individual thing whose nature is altogether different to ours can aid or hinder our power of understanding, and absolutely nothing can be either good or bad save if it have something in common with us	160
	XXX. Nothing can be bad through that which it has in common with our nature; but in so far as it is bad, thus far it is contrary to us	160
	XXXI. In so far as anything agrees with our nature, thus	100
	far it is necessarily good	161
	Corollary	161
	XXXII. In so far as men are liable to passions they cannot thus far be said to agree in nature	161
	Note	161
	XXXIII. Men can differ in nature in so far as they are assailed by emotions which are passions, and thus far one and the same man is variable and inconstant.	162
	XXXIV. Men, in so far as they are assailed by emotions which are passions, can be contrary one to the other.	162
	Note	162
	XXXV. In so far as men live under the guidance of reason,	_
	thus far only they always necessarily agree in nature.	163
	Corollaries	164

xlii The Ethics of Spinoza

AUPUSITIONS	PAGI
XXXVI. The greatest good of those who follow virtue is common to all, and all can equally enjoy it	s . 16:
Note	. 16
XXXVII. The good which each one who follows virtue desires for himself, he also desires for other men, and the more so the more knowledge he has of God	l . 165
Notes	. 16
XXXVIII. That is useful to man which so disposes the human body that it can be affected in many modes, or which renders it capable of affecting external bodies it many modes, and the more so according as it renders the body more apt to be affected in many modes or to affect other bodies so; and, on the contrary, that is harmful (noxius) to man which renders the body less apt for this	r 1 3 5
XXXIX. Whatever brings it to pass that the proportion of motion and rest which the parts of the human body hold one to the other is preserved, is good; and contrariwise, that is bad which brings it about that the parts of the human body have another proportion	<i>7</i> -
mutually of motion and rest	169
Note	170
XL. Whatever is conducive of the common society of men or whatever brings it about that men live together ir peace and agreement, is useful, and, on the contrary that is bad which induces discord in the state	í
XLI. Pleasure clearly is not evil but good; but pain, on the contrary, is clearly evil	171
XLII. There cannot be too much merriment, but it is always good; but, on the other hand, melancholy is always bad	
XLIII. Titillation can be excessive and be bad; but gries may be good in so far as titillation or pleasure is bad.	E
XLIV. Love and desire can be excessive	172
Note	172
XLV. Hatred can never be good	173
Notes	173
Corollaries	173
XLVI. He who lives under the guidance of reason en-	
deavours as much as possible to repay his fellow's	3
hatred, rage, contempt, etc., with love and nobleness	
Note	174
XLVII. The emotions of hope and fear cannot be in them- selves good	
Note	175 175
XLVIII. The emotions of partiality and disparagement are	
always bad	175
XLIX. Partiality easily renders the man who is over-esti-	
mated, proud	175

ents xliii

ROPOSITIONS										PAG
L. Pity in a				nder	the gu	idanc	e of re	ason is	s in	
itself b		d usel	ess	•	•	•	•	•	٠	17
Corollary	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	17
Note	•	•	•	•	•	. •	•	•	•	17
LI. Favour				to re	ason,	but o	can ag	gree w	ith	T 47
it and a Note	arise n	rom 1		•	•	•	•	•	•	17 17
	•	•	•		·		•		٠	1/
LII. Self-conself-con	nnlace	nev v	vhich	arise	from	reas	on alo	ne is i	the	
greates										17
Note										17
LIII. Humi	ility is	not a	virtu	e if it	does r	ot ar	ise fro	m reas	son	17
LIV. Reper	tance	is no	t a vi	rtue.	or, in	other	word	s, it d	oes	
not aris	e fron	n reas	on, bu	it he	who re	pents	of an	áction	ı is	
twice a	s unha	арру (or as	weak	as bef	ore	•	•	٠	17
Note	٠	•	•	. • .	•	•	•	•	٠	17
LV. The gre of self	eatest	pride	or de	je cti o	n is th	e gre	atest i	gnorai	ıce	
	•		•	•	. · .			•		17
LVI. The g weakne			e or	aeject	ion in	dicat	es tne	great	est	17
Corollary	33 01 1	·	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	17
Note	:	:	:	:	:	:	·	Ċ	:	17
			102200	+ba	-		f nor	naitan	۰.	-,
LVII. A pr									OI.	179
Note		•								17
LVIII. Hon	our ic	not or	nnose	d to re	escon	hut c	an aric	e from	ı it	180
Note	loui 15	not o _j	ppose	utore	ason,	Dui C	an ans	e non	110	180
		. ,	٠,	. ,	•		·.		•	10.
LIX. For a emotion										
that em									•	18:
Note										182
LX. Desire	which	arise	s fro	m ple	easure	or p	ain w	hich h	as	
referenc	e to o	one o	r cert	ain r	arts o	of the	body	has	no	
advanta	ige t o	man	as a v	vhole			•	•	•	183
Note	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	٠	183
LXI. Desire	which	h aris	es fro	m rea	son ca	n hav	ze no e	excess	•	183
LXII. In so	far a	s the	mind	conc	eives a	thin	g acco	rding	to	
the dict								wheth	ıer	
the idea	ı be of	a thi	ng pr	esent,	, past,	or tu	ture	•	٠	184
Note	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	184
LXIII. He				ır to	do goo	d in	order	to avo	oid	- 0
evil is n	ot led	by re	eason	٠	•	•	•	•	•	184
Notes	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	185 185
Corollary		•	•	•	•	•	٠.		•	
LXIV. The	knowl	ledge	of evi	l is in	adequ	ate k	nowle	dge	•	185
Corollary								•		18€

xliv The Ethics of Spinoza

PROPOSITIONS										PAGE
LXV. Unde of two										
things v Corollary	vhich a	re evi	.1	•		•			•	186 186
LXVI. Und future g in the	er the	fore a	lesser	prese	ent on	e, and	i a les	ser e	vil	
Vloten's								. '''	•	186
Corollary		•								186
Note										186
LXVII. A f										187
LXVIII. If tion of a								conce	p-	187
Note				•						187
LXIX. The refusing									in •	188
Corollary										188
Note										188
LXX. A fre							eople •	tries	as •	188
Note										189
LXXI. Only	z free r	nen aı	e trul	v gra	teful o	ne to	the c	ther		189
Note				•						189
LXXII. A f	ree ma	an nev	ver ac	ts by	fraud	l, but	alwa	ys wi	th	-0-
good fai	tn	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	189
Note	•	•	٠		•	٠.	٠,	٠.	•	190
LXXIII. A state wh solitude	iere he	lives	accor	ding	to cor	nmon	law	ee in than	a in	190
Note										190
Appendix .	_	_		_						191
······································										- 9-
			PAR	TV	•					
CONCERN			POW JMAN				NTEL	LEC	r	
Preface .										199
Axioms I., II.										202
Propositions—										
I. Just as the and contions or	nected the n	in the	e mino cations	d, so i s of t	n the hings	body	its m	odific	a-	
connect	ed acco	ording	to th	eir ore	1er		•	•	•	202

PROPOSITIONS	PAGE
II. If we remove disturbance of the min the thought of an external cause an thoughts, then love or hatred tow cause, as well as waverings of the min these emotions, are destroyed.	d unite it to other vards the external
III. An emotion which is a passion cease soon as we form a clear and distinct i	
Corollary	203
IV. There is no modification of the body of form some clear and distinct concept	
Corollary	203
Note	203
V. Emotion towards a thing which we in not as necessary nor possible nor co paribus, the greatest of all	
VI. In so far as the mind understands all it has more power over the emotions	or is less passive to
them	205
Note	205
VII. Emotions which arise or are excited regard time, are greater than those which we regard as	nich are referred to
VIII. The more an emotion is excited by n	nany emotions con-
curring at the same time, the greater	it will be 206
Note	206
IX. Emotion which has reference to man which the mind regards at the same titself is less harmful, and we are less less affected toward each cause that equally great which has reference to causes	me as the emotion passive to it and another emotion
X. As long as we are not assailed by emoti trary to our nature we are able to ar the modifications of the body accord	range and connect
lectual order	206
Note	207
XI. The more any image has reference to more frequent it is, the more often it more it occupies the mind	
XII. The images of things are more easilwhich have reference to things which clearly and distinctly than to others	ch we understand
XIII. The more an image is associated things, the more often it flourishes	
XIV. The mind can bring it to pass that al of the body or images of things hav idea of God	
XV. He who understands himself and he God, and the more so the more he un and his emotions	is emotions loves

xlvi The Ethics of Spinoza

PROPOSITIONS XVI. This love towards God must occupy the mind chiefly. XVII. God is free from passions, nor is he affected with any emotion of pleasure or pain Corollary		
XVII. God is free from passions, nor is he affected with any emotion of pleasure or pain Corollary		
Corollary	XVII. God is free from passions, nor is he affected with any	27
XVIII. No one can hate God		
Corollary	•	
XIX. He who loves God cannot endeavour to bring it about that God should love him in return		
XIX. He who loves God cannot endeavour to bring it about that God should love him in return		
XX. This love towards God cannot be polluted by an emotion either of envy or jealousy, but it is cherished the more, the more we imagine men to be bound to God by this bond of love Note XXI. The mind can imagine nothing nor recollect past things save while in the body XXII. In God, however, there is necessarily granted the idea which expresses the essence of this or that human body under the species of eternity XXIII. The human mind cannot be absolutely destroyed with the human body, but there is some part of it that remains eternal Note XXIV. The more we understand individual things, the more we understand God XXV. The greatest endeavour of the mind and its greatest virtue is to understand things by the third class of knowledge XXVI. The more apt the mind is to understand things by the third class of knowledge XXVII. From this third class of knowledge the greatest possible mental satisfaction arises XXVIII. The endeavour or desire of knowing things according to the third class of knowledge cannot arise from the first but the second class of knowledge XXIX. Whatever the mind understands under the species of eternity, it does not understand owing to the fact that it conceives the actual present existence of the body, but owing to the fact that it conceives the essence of the body under the species of eternity, thus far it necessarily has knowledge of God, and knows that it exists in God and is conceived through God XXXI. The third kind of knowledge depends on the mind as its formal cause in so far as the mind is eternal		
emotion either of envy or jealousy, but it is cherished the more, the more we imagine men to be bound to God by this bond of love	that God should love him in return	21
XXI. The mind can imagine nothing nor recollect past things save while in the body	emotion either of envy or jealousy, but it is cherished the more, the more we imagine men to be bound to God	
XXI. The mind can imagine nothing nor recollect past things save while in the body	•	
things save while in the body		21
idea which expresses the essence of this or that human body under the species of eternity		21
with the human body, but there is some part of it that remains eternal	idea which expresses the essence of this or that human	21
Note	with the human body, but there is some part of it that	
XXIV. The more we understand individual things, the more we understand God		
we understand God	•••••	21
virtue is to understand things by the third class of knowledge	we understand God	21.
the third class of knowledge, the more it desires to understand things by this class of knowledge	virtue is to understand things by the third class of	21
possible mental satisfaction arises	the third class of knowledge, the more it desires to	21
XXVIII. The endeavour or desire of knowing things according to the third class of knowledge cannot arise from the first but the second class of knowledge. XXIX. Whatever the mind understands under the species of eternity, it does not understand owing to the fact that it conceives the actual present existence of the body, but owing to the fact that it conceives the essence of the body under the species of eternity. Note XXX. The human mind in so far as it knows itself and its body under the species of eternity, thus far it necessarily has knowledge of God, and knows that it exists in God and is conceived through God XXXI. The third kind of knowledge depends on the mind as its formal cause in so far as the mind is eternal		27
ing to the third class of knowledge cannot arise from the first but the second class of knowledge	•	21
of eternity, it does not understand owing to the fact that it conceives the actual present existence of the body, but owing to the fact that it conceives the essence of the body under the species of eternity	ing to the third class of knowledge cannot arise from	215
XXX. The human mind in so far as it knows itself and its body under the species of eternity, thus far it necessarily has knowledge of God, and knows that it exists in God and is conceived through God. XXXI. The third kind of knowledge depends on the mind as its formal cause in so far as the mind is eternal. 217	of eternity, it does not understand owing to the fact that it conceives the actual present existence of the body, but owing to the fact that it conceives the essence of the	21(
body under the species of eternity, thus far it necessarily has knowledge of God, and knows that it exists in God and is conceived through God. XXXI. The third kind of knowledge depends on the mind as its formal cause in so far as the mind is eternal.	Note	216
XXXI. The third kind of knowledge depends on the mind as its formal cause in so far as the mind is eternal . 217	body under the species of eternity, thus far it necessarily has knowledge of God, and knows that it exists in God	216
as its formal cause in so far as the mind is eternal . 217		
Note		•

xlvii

OPOSITIONS XXXII. Whatever we understand according to the third class of knowledge we are pleased with, and that according to the complex of the control of	PAGE i -
panied with the idea of God as the cause	. 217
Corollary	. 218
XXXIII. The intellectual love towards God which arise from the third kind of knowledge is eternal	s . 218
Note	. 218
XXXIV. The mind is only liable to emotions which ar	e
referred to passions while the body lasts	. 218
Corollary	. 218
Note	. 218
XXXV. God loves himself with infinite intellectual love	. 219
XXXVI. The mental intellectual love towards God is th very love of God with which God loves himself, not in s far as he is infinite, but in so far as he can be expresse through the essence of the human mind considere under the species of eternity, that is, mental intellectual love towards God is part of the infinite love with which	o d d l h
God loves himself	. 219
Corollary	. 219
Note	. 219
XXXVII. There is nothing in nature which is contrary to this intellectual love or which can remove it.	. 220
Note	. 220
XXXVIII. The more the mind understands things by th second and third kinds of knowledge, the less it will be passive to emotions which are evil, and the less it will fear death	e
Note	. 221
XXXIX. He who has a body capable of many things, has	
mind of which the greater part is eternal. Note	. 221
Note	. 221
XL. The more perfection anything has, the more active and the less passive it is; and contrariwise, the more active	e
it is, the more perfect it becomes	. 222
Corollary	. 222
Note	. 222
XLI. Although we did not know that our mind is eterna we would hold before all things piety and religion, an absolutely all things which we have shown in Part IV to have reference to courage and nobility.	ĺ
Note	. 223
	_
XLII. Blessedness is not the reward of virtue, but virtu itself: nor should we rejoice in it for that we restrai our lusts, but, on the contrary, because we rejoic therein we can restrain our lusts	n. e
Moto	· 223
Note	. 224

xlviii The Ethics of Spinoza

TREATISE ON THE CORRECTION OF THE UNDERSTAN	DING
I. On the Good Things which Men desire for the most Part .	PAGI 227
II. On the True and Supreme Good	229
III. Certain Rules of Life	231
IV. On the Four Modes of Perception	232
V. On the Best Mode of Perception	234
VI. On the Instruments of the Understanding, True Ideas .	235
VII. On the Right Method of Knowing	237
VIII. First Part of the Method—On Fictitious Ideas	241
IX. On the False Idea	248
X. On the Doubtful Idea	252
XI. On Memory and Forgetfulness-Conclusion	253
XII. Second Part of the Method—On Double Perception .	256
XIII. On the Conditions of Definition	258
XIV. Of the Means by which Eternal Things are known .	259
XV. On the Power of the Understanding and its Properties .	261