

Contents

Acknowledgments	ix
Introduction	1
Part 1 Historical Background: Practical Reasoning in Aristotle, Hume, and Kant	
1 Aristotle on Practical Reasoning and the Structure of Action	13
I <i>Deliberation</i>	14
II <i>The practical syllogism</i>	17
III <i>Weakness of will</i>	19
IV <i>Practical and theoretical reasoning</i>	24
V <i>The explanation of action</i>	28
VI <i>The structure of action</i>	32
VII <i>Conclusion</i>	36
2 Hume and the Instrumentalist Conception of Practical Reasoning	39
I <i>The instrumental role of reason</i>	39
II <i>Reasoning as an element in the genesis of action</i>	43
III <i>Reason, rational action, and moral judgment</i>	48
IV <i>Weakness of will, practical judgment, and Humean internalism</i>	51
V <i>Conclusion</i>	56

Practical Reasoning

3	Kant and the Autonomy of Practical Reason	60
I	<i>Practical reason in the moral sphere</i>	60
II	<i>The motivational and normative power of reason</i>	68
III	<i>Weakness of will and the conflict between reason and inclination</i>	72
IV	<i>The unity of practical and theoretical reason</i>	76
V	<i>Conclusion</i>	78

Part 2 Practical Reasoning, Intentional Action, and Rationality

4	The Varieties and Basic Elements of Practical Reasoning	85
I	<i>The diversity of practical reasoning</i>	86
II	<i>Practical reasoning, practical argument, and means-end inference</i>	90
III	<i>A cognitive-motivational conception of practical reasoning</i>	95
IV	<i>Practical and theoretical reasoning</i>	102
V	<i>Practical reasoning and actions for reasons</i>	106
5	Practical Reasoning and Intentional Action	108
I	<i>The range of intentional action</i>	108
II	<i>The reconstructive role of practical arguments</i>	113
III	<i>Inferentialism and the realization of practical arguments</i>	116
IV	<i>Unconscious and self-deceptive elements in practical reasoning</i>	119
V	<i>Practical reasoning and reasoned action</i>	123
6	Practical Reasoning in the Dynamics of Action	126
I	<i>The need for a dynamic account</i>	127
II	<i>Practical reasoning as a causative process</i>	129
III	<i>Causality, nomic connections, and intentional action</i>	133
IV	<i>The dynamics of incontinence</i>	135
V	<i>Causality and freedom</i>	139
7	The Assessment of Practical Reasoning	142
I	<i>Logical and inferential criteria</i>	143

Contents

II	<i>Common patterns of practical reasoning</i>	146
III	<i>The defeasibility of practical reasoning</i>	151
IV	<i>Epistemic criteria</i>	153
V	<i>Rationality and relativity</i>	162
VI	<i>The special role of moral reasons</i>	164
8	Practical Reasoning and Rational Action	168
I	<i>Practical reasoning, rational action, and rationalization</i>	168
II	<i>Reasoned action and acting for reasons</i>	175
III	<i>Aristotelian, Humean, and Kantian views of rational action</i>	178
IV	<i>An epistemic conception of rational action</i>	182
	Conclusion	186
	Notes	192
	Index	209