							PAGE
EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION		•					xv
NOTE ON THE TEXT							xlix
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY							1
DEMOTED DIDNOOIUUUU	•	•	•	•	•	·	
A SYSTEM	OF	LOO	ЯС				
	•		1-0				
PREFACE	•	•	•	•	·	•	3
INTRODUCTION							
1. Is logic the art and science of	reaso	oning	? [§2]	•	• •	•	7
2. Logic is concerned with infe	erence	es, no	ot wi	th ir	ntuit	ive	
truths [§4, abridged] .		•	•		•		8
3. Relation of logic to the other	r scie	nces	[\$5]	•	•		11
BOOK I: OF NAMES A	ND	PRO)POS	SITI	ONS	}	
Chapter							
I. OF THE NECESSITY OF CO	MME	ENCII	NG W	VITE	I AN		
ANALYSIS OF LANGUAGE				л. г	1	_	10
 Theory of names, why ε First step in the analysi 					10g10	3.	$13 \\ 15$
2. First step in the analysi	IS OF	prope	SILIO	ns	•	·	10
II. OF NAMES							
1. Names are names of thi							16
2. Words which are not nar		out pa	arts o	of na	\mathbf{mes}	•	17
3. General and singular nar	\mathbf{mes}	•	•	•	·	•	20
4. Concrete and abstract	•		<i>:</i> .	.:		•	22
5. Connotative and non-co	nnot	ative	labr	idge	d]	•	24
III. OF THE THINGS DENOTED) BY	NAM	\mathbf{ES}				
1. Necessity of an enumer	atior	n of r	nama	ble	thing	gs.	
The categories of Aris					•		35
2. Feelings, or states of con							35
3. Feelings must be disting					hysi	cal	
antecedents. Percept			t [§4]	1	•	•	37
4. Volitions and actions, w			•	•	•	•	40
5. Substance and attribute	; [§6]	•	•	•	•	•	40

v

Chapter									Page
6.									42
7.	Mind [§8] .		•						48
8.	Qualities [§9]		•		•				49
9.	Relations [§10] Resemblance [§		•				•	•	52
10.	Resemblance [§	11] .	•	•		•	•	•	55
11.	Quantity $[S12]$		•	•	•	•	•	÷	58
12.	All attributes of		es are			on st	tates	of	*0
10	consciousness					•	•	•	59
	So also all attri				-	·	•	•	60
14.	Recapitulation	[§15] .	•	•	•	•	•	•	61
IV. OF	THE IMPORT OF	F PRO	POSIT	TIONS	8 [CH.	. V]			
1.	Doctrine that a				he exp	pressi	on of	fa	
0	relation betwee				•		;	•	64
2.	- that it consi								67
9	excluding som What it really is		g iron	i, a c	ass [§	3, ad	riage	εαj	67 71
	It asserts (or de					origi	on ao	•	11
т.	simple existen							, а	73
5	- or a resembla					lugu	лJ	•	76
6.						stract	1871	•	78
	-						. [9 .]	•	
	PROPOSITIONS N								
1.	All essential prop	positic	ns ar	e ider	ntical	propo	ositio	\mathbf{ns}	
	[§2]					•	•		82
	Individuals have						• .	:	86
3.	* *			ingu	ished	from	vert	oal	~
		• •		.,.	· ·	•	•	;	87
4.	Two modes of r		-	-	impo	ort of	a re	eal	00
	proposition [§	o] .	•	·	•	•	•	·	- 88
	THE NATURE OF REDICABLES [CH		SIFIC	ATIC	N AN	D TH	E FI	VE	
1.	Classification, he	ow cor	mecte	ed wi	th na	ming			9 0
	Kinds have a rea						ridge	d]	91
	DEFINITION [CH						0	•	
	•			1					0.0
	A definition, what				•		•	·	96
2.	Every name can					nmg	is su	.S-	07
9	ceptible of and How distinguishe		. dogi	-	0 n a [8	1			97 100
ð.	110w distinguishe	su iron	u deso	ripu	ous[8	± , ao:	riuge	u	100

vi

Chapter	PAGE
4. What are called definitions of things are defini-	
tions of names with an implied assumption of the existence of things corresponding to them	
[§5, abridged]	102
5. Definitions, though of names only, must be	
grounded on knowledge of the corresponding things [§7, abridged]	106
BOOK II: OF REASONING	
I. OF INFERENCE, OR REASONING, IN GENERAL	
 Retrospect of the preceding book [abridged] Inferences improperly so called [abridged] 	109 110
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	110
II. OF RATIOCINATION, OR SYLLOGISM 1. Analysis of the syllogism [abridged]	111
2. The <i>dictum de omni</i> not the foundation of reason-	
ing, but a mere identical proposition	112
3. What is the really fundamental axiom of ratiocina- tion	116
4. The other form of the axiom	118
III. OF THE FUNCTIONS AND LOGICAL VALUE OF THE	
SYLLOGISM	100
 Is the syllogism a <i>petitio principii</i>? Insufficiency of the common theory 	$\frac{120}{121}$
3. All inference is from particulars to particulars	121
[abridged]	123
4. General propositions are a record of such inferences,	
and the rules of the syllogism are rules for the interpretation of the record	127
5. The syllogism not the type of reasoning, but a test	121
of it [abridged]	130
6. The true type, what [abridged]	133
7. Relation between induction and deduction	134
IV. OF TRAINS OF REASONING AND DEDUCTIVE SCIENCES	
1. For what purpose trains of reasoning exist .	136
2. A train of reasoning is a series of inductive infer-	
ences [abridged]	136
3. — from particulars to particulars through marks	
of marks [abridged]	138

Снар	TER.	PAGE
	 Why there are deductive sciences [abridged] Why other sciences still remain experimental Experimental sciences may become deductive by the progress of experiment [abridged] 	140 142 143
v.	 OF DEMONSTRATION AND NECESSARY TRUTHS 1. The theorems of geometry are necessary truths only in the sense of necessarily following from hypotheses [abridged] 2. Some of the first miniples of memory and the first memory and	144
	 Some of the first principles of geometry are axioms, and these are not hypothetical [§3, abridged] — but are experimental truths [§4] An objection answered [§5, abridged] Dr. Whewell's opinions on axioms examined [§6, abridged] 	148 150 152 156
VI.	 THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED All deductive sciences are inductive [abridged] The propositions of the science of number are not verbal, but generalizations from experience In what sense hypothetical Definition of demonstrative evidence [§5, abridged] 	161 162 167 168
	BOOK III: OF INDUCTION	
I.	PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS ON INDUCTION IN GENERAL	
	 Importance of an inductive logic [abridged] The logic of science is also that of business and life [abridged] 	170 171
II.	 OF INDUCTIONS IMPROPERLY SO CALLED 1. Inductions distinguished from verbal transformations [abridged] 2. — and from descriptions [§3, abridged] 3. Examination of Dr. Whewell's theory of induction [§4, abridged] 	173 175 177
III.	 OF THE GROUND OF INDUCTION 1. Axiom of the uniformity of the course of nature [abridged]	181 184

viii

CHAPTER

1X
Page

IV.	OF LAWS OF NATURE	
	1. The general regularity in nature is a tissue of partial regularities called laws [abridged]	186
	2. Scientific induction must be grounded on previous spontaneous inductions [abridged]	189
	3. Are there any inductions fitted to be a test of all others? [abridged]	190
v.	OF THE LAW OF UNIVERSAL CAUSATION	
	1. The universal law of successive phenomena is the Law of Causation	191
	2. — that is, the law that every consequent has an invariable antecedent [abridged]	194
	3. The cause of a phenomenon is the assemblage of its conditions [abridged]	195
	 4. The cause is not the invariable antecedent, but the unconditional invariable antecedent [§6, abridged] 	198
	5. Idea of a permanent cause, or original natural agent	
	[§8, abridged]	201
VI.	OF THE COMPOSITION OF CAUSES	
	1. Two modes of the conjunct action of causes, the mechanical and the chemical [abridged]	204
	2. The composition of causes the general rule; the other case exceptional [abridged]	207
177	OF ODGEDUATION AND EXPEDIMENT	
V11.	OF OBSERVATION AND EXPERIMENT 1. The first step of inductive inquiry is a mental	
	analysis of complex phenomena into their ele-	
	ments [abridged]	208
	2. The next is an actual separation of those elements $\ .$	210
VIII.	OF THE FOUR METHODS OF EXPERIMENTAL INQUIRY	
	1. Method of agreement	211
	2. Method of difference	214
	3. Mutual relation of these two methods	216
	4. Joint method of agreement and difference	219
	5. Method of residues	221
	6. Method of concomitant variations	223
	7. Limitations of this last method	229

Снар	TER MISCELLANEOUS EXAMPLES OF THE FOUR METHO	Page
121.	1. Dr. Whewell's objections to the four methods [§6].	233
X.	OF PLURALITY OF CAUSES AND OF THE INTER- MIXTURE OF EFFECTS	
	 One effect may have several causes	238
	tion of the method of agreement [abridged] 3. Concurrence of causes which do not compound their	240
	effect [§4, abridged]	243
	 pound their effects [§5, abridged]. 5. Three modes of investigating the laws of complex 	245
	effects [§6]	249
	 6. The method of simple observation inapplicable [§7, abridged] 7. The purely constrained in applicable [§8] 	250
	7. The purely experimental method inapplicable [§8, abridged]	251
XI.		
	1. First stage: ascertainment of the laws of the separate causes by direct induction [abridged]	252
	2. Second stage: ratiocination from the simple laws of the complex cases [abridged] .	254
	3. Third stage: verification by specific experience [abridged]	255
XII.	OF THE LIMITS TO THE EXPLANATION OF LAWS OF NATURE, AND OF HYPOTHESES [CH. XIV]	
	1. Can all the sequences in nature be resolvable into one law? [abridged]	257
	2. Ultimate laws cannot be less numerous than the	
	distinguishable feelings of our nature [abridged] 3. In what sense ultimate facts can be explained	$\frac{258}{259}$
	4. The proper use of scientific hypotheses [abridged] .	261
	5. Their indispensableness	264
	6. The two degrees of legitimacy in hypotheses [abridged]	267
XIII.	OF EMPIRICAL LAWS [CH. XVI]	0.00
	 Definition of an empirical law [abridged] Derivative laws commonly depend on collocations 	$\frac{269}{270}$
	w. Politatito latto commonly depend on conceations	210

x

Chapter	PAGE
 The collocations of the permanent causes are not reducible to any law Hence empirical laws cannot be relied on beyond the 	271
limits of actual experience	272
XIV. OF CHANCE AND ITS ELIMINATION [CH. XVII]	
 The proof of empirical laws depends on the theory of chance [abridged] Chance defined and characterized [abridged] 	$274 \\ 275$
XV. OF THE CALCULATION OF CHANCES [CH. XVIII]	210
 Foundation of the doctrine of chances, as taught by mathematics The doctrine tenable [abridged] On what foundation it really rests [abridged] 	279 281 281
4. Its ultimate dependence on causation [abridged] .	285
XVI. OF THE EVIDENCE OF THE LAW OF UNIVERSAL CAUSATION [CH. XXI]	
1. The law of causality does not rest on an instinct [abridged]	287
 2. — but on an induction by simple enumeration [abridged] . 3. In what cases such induction is allowable [abridged] 	289 290
BOOK FOUR:	
OF OPERATIONS SUBSIDIARY TO INDUCTION	
I. OF ABSTRACTION, OR THE FORMATION OF CONCEPTIONS [CH. II]	
 The comparison which is a preliminary to induction implies general conceptions — but these need not be pre-existent A general conception, originally the result of a comparison, becomes itself the type of comparison 	292 294 297
II. OF CLASSIFICATION, AS SUBSIDIARY TO INDUCTION [CH. XVII]	
 Theory of natural groups [§2, abridged] Kinds are natural groups [§4, abridged] 	300 303

xi

BOOK V:

ON THE LOGIC OF THE MORAL SCIENCES [Bk. VI] Chapter Page

Снарт	ER	PAGE
I.	INTRODUCTORY REMARKS	
	1. The backward state of the moral sciences can only be remedied by applying to them the methods of physical science, duly extended and generalized .	307
II.	THAT THERE IS, OR MAY BE, A SCIENCE OF HUMAN NATURE [CH. III]	
	 There may be sciences which are not exact sciences [abridged] . To what scientific type the science of human nature 	309
	2. To what scientific type the science of human nature corresponds [abridged]	312
II I .	OF THE LAWS OF MIND [CH. IV]	
	1. What is meant by laws of mind [abridged]	314
	2. Is there a science of psychology? [abridged]	314
	3. The principal investigations of psychology charac- terized [abridged]	316
IV.	OF ETHOLOGY, OR THE SCIENCE OF THE FORMATION OF CHARACTER [CH. V]	
	 The empirical laws of human nature [abridged] — are merely approximate generalizations. The universal laws are those of the formation of 	317
	character [abridged]	318
	3. The laws of the formation of character cannot be ascertained by observation and experiment	
	[abridged]	320
	 4. — but must be studied deductively 5. The principles of ethology are the axiomata media 	321
	of mental science [abridged]	322
	6. Ethology characterized [abridged]	323
	OF WITH CUTURIES OF EXPERIMENTAL MEMORY	
	OF THE CHEMICAL OR EXPERIMENTAL METHOD IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCE [CH. VII]	
	1. Characters of the mode of thinking which deduces political doctrines from specific experience	
	[abridged]	324

Снар	TER	PAGE
VI.	OF THE GEOMETRICAL, OR ABSTRACT, METHOD [CH. VIII]	
	 Characters of this mode of thinking The interest-philosophy of the Bentham school 	326
	[§3, abridged]	328
VII.	OF THE PHYSICAL, OR CONCRETE DEDUCTIVE, METHOD [CH. IX]	
	 The direct and inverse deductive methods [abridged] Difficulties of the direct deductive method in the 	332
	social science [abridged]	334
	speculation can be studied apart. Political economy characterized [abridged]	336
	4. The empirical laws of the social science [§5]	338
	5. The verification of the social science [§6, abridged]	340
VIII.	OF THE INVERSE DEDUCTIVE, OR HISTORICAL, METHOD [CH. X]	
	1. Distinction between the general science of society	
	and special sociological inquiries	342
	2. What is meant by a state of society?	342
	3. The progressiveness of man and society [abridged]	344
	4. The laws of the succession of states of society can	
	only be ascertained by the inverse deductive	
	method [abridged]	346
	5. Social statics, or the science of the co-existences of	0.45
	social phenomena [abridged].	347
	6. Social dynamics, or the science of the successions of	940
	social phenomena	348 349
	7. Outlines of the historical method	349
IX.	OF THE LOGIC OF PRACTICE, OR ART; INCLUDING MORALITY AND POLICY [CH. XII]	
	1. Morality not a science but an art	352
	2. Relation between rules of art and the theorems of	
	the corresponding science [abridged]	353
	3. Art cannot be deductive [§4, abridged]	353
	4. Every art consists of truths of science, arranged in	
	the order suitable for some practical use [§5,	
	abridged]	354

xiii

xiv	CONTENTS	
	Teleology, or the doctrine of ends [§6] Necessity of an ultimate standard, or first principle of teleology [§7]	Page 354 356
	FROM AN EXAMINATION	
OF SI	R WILLIAM HAMILTON'S PHILOSOP	ΗY
I. OF	F THE INTERPRETATION OF CONSCIOUSNESS.	361
I AF III. TH	HE PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY OF THE BELIEF IN AN EXTERNAL WORLD	364 377
-	NOTIONS	393
IV. OF	REASONING	397
AND	E DEFINITION OF POLITICAL ECONOMY ON THE METHOD OF INVESTIGATION PER TO IT	407
	ETE TABLE OF CONTENTS OF A SYSTEM OGIC, EIGHTH EDITION	441
INDEX		459

.