

CONTENTS

- 1 Explanation of the way I use the terms "mental act", "content", "object-expression" 1
- 2 The occurrence of mental acts, in my sense of the word, is not controversial. Wittgenstein did not, as some people think, wish to controvert it 2
- 3 Reasons for rejecting Ryle's view that 'reports of mental acts', as I should call them, are really hypothetical or semi-hypothetical statements about overt behaviour 4
- 4 Reasons for beginning with a discussion of concepts and acts of judgment. There *are* episodic acts of judgment, not merely dispositions of a certain sort (beliefs) 7
- 5 Concepts are for me specific mental abilities exercised in acts of judgment, and expressed in the intelligent use of words (though not exclusively in such use). There is no reason to ascribe concepts (in this sense) to brutes 11
- 6 "Abstractionism" defined. I hold that *no* concept is acquired by the supposed process of abstraction. Abstractionism, being a muddled theory, cannot be established experimentally. How abstractionists regard (a) concepts applying to sensible objects, (b) psychological concepts 18

- 7 Abstractionism cannot account for logical concepts like those of *not*, *or*, *every*; though some abstractionists have tried to say that such concepts are derived from characteristic 'feelings' evoked by the logical words. It cannot be said, either, that logical words are mere signals for special exercises of non-logical concepts 22
- 8 Abstractionism is an unworkable theory for arithmetical concepts, even at the level of school arithmetic. 'Abstract' counting—developing the series of numerals—is in fact temporally prior to counting objects: contrary to what abstractionists ought to expect 27
- 9 The characteristic marks of relational concepts are ignored by abstractionists; they would not be able to explain them 32
- 10 Abstractionism does not in fact work even for concepts of simple sensible characteristics, e.g. that of *red*. The abstractionist argument about men born blind, refuted. A difficulty for abstractionists over the concepts *red* and (*chromatic*) *colour* 33
- 11 The mind *makes* concepts, and neither this nor the exercise of concepts consists in finding a characteristic repeated in our experience; but conceptual thought does not falsify reality. Psychologists' attempts to establish abstractionism experimentally either do not treat of what I should recognize as concept-formation, or fail to show that concepts are acquired by a process of abstraction 38
- 12 Russell's theory of judgment: judgment consists in some psychical entity's coming

- into a many-termed relationship, whose other terms are the particular and universal entities being judged about 45
- 13 Logical inadequacies of Russell's theory 47
- 14 Sketch of a new theory: a judgment to the effect that things stand in an n -termed relation R itself consists of Ideas standing in a derivative n -termed relation $\S(R)$ (where " $\S()$ " is a special, undefined, operator). Russell's objections to Ideas' entering into judgment; reply to these objections 52
- 15 In contrast to Russell, I started by considering judgments wholly expressible in general terms. Judgments about directly sensible particulars are to be analysed as judgments of general content standing in some special connexion with certain sense-experiences (Aquinas's *conversio ad phantasmata*). Similarly, the actual time-reference of a tensed judgment is no part of that which is judged, but comes from the sensory context in which the act of judging occurs 61
- 16 Proper names express identifications—e.g. "the Thames" expresses the identification of something as one and the same *river*. Identification involves an unsolved problem—which arises also for the use of "this" to signify not "what is now before me" but "what I had in mind just then" (its use for *demonstratio* not *ad sensum* but *ad intellectum*). The reference of a proper name to one outside object rather than another is not a genuinely psychological problem, and is to be explained only by bringing in the physical context of the utterance 66

- 17 The theory that the concept *judging* is an analogical extension of the concept *saying*. General remarks on analogy-theories of psychological concepts 75
- 18 I shall consider psychological uses of the *oratio recta* construction (as in "The fool hath said in his heart "There is no God" "), rather than those of *oratio obliqua*. The logic of *oratio recta* 79
- 19 Some fallacious arguments against the possibility of using *oratio recta* in psychological descriptions 87
- 20 Discussion of the sort of psychological statement that logically involves 'quantifying into' *oratio obliqua*: e.g. "More people came to Smith's party than James thought would come". Our *oratio recta* paraphrases are adequate for these 92
- 21 The predicate "true" primarily applies to expressions in a language; here as elsewhere language about thought is an analogical extension of language about language 96
- 22 The theory sketched in §14 can be developed, interpreted, in terms of our present theory 98
- 23 Like all analogies, the analogy of judgment to spoken language must not be carried too far. Ockham's idea of an inner language certainly goes wrong in this respect. Again, spoken language has a definite position in the physical time-series, and spoken words occur in a definite order; but it would be quite wrong to ask about the time-order of Ideas in an act of judging, or how long an act of judging goes on 101

- 24 Psychological judgments have been regarded as based on the deliverances of an 'inner sense', which affords the materials from which by abstraction we get psychological concepts. But 'inner sense' is a chimera 107
- 25 Psychological concepts relating to 'sensuous' experiences like seeing, hearing, fearing, pain, are applicable only as part of a complicated web of concepts, others of which relate to external physical objects and to behaviour. This is not behaviourism; but it does involve that, if we try to apply *these* psychological concepts otherwise than to living organisms (e.g. to disembodied spirits or machines), we do not know what we are doing 111
- 26 The fallacy of "*Cogito ergo sum*" as a proof that each of us is directly aware of an immaterial agent 117
- 27 There are genuine descriptions of sensations (besides *Aeusserungen* in Wittgenstein's sense); we have here *conversio ad phantasmata*, the *phantasmata* being the sensations themselves and not 'inner-sense' representations of them. (E.g. if I judge that my pain waxes and wanes regularly, my thought of *pain waxing and waning regularly* stands in the *conversio-ad-phantasmata* relation to the pain, not to an inner-sense representation of it) 121
- 28 What is the difference between the judgments expressed by "I see a round yellow disc a foot across" and "there is a round yellow disc a foot across"? The former is an analogical development of the system of

description used in the latter; the analogy is <i>like</i> the analogy whereby we come to call pictures by the names of the things pictured. We can indeed say that sensations <i>really</i> last a certain time and <i>really</i> have parts (<i>formaliter</i> , as Descartes would say, not just <i>obiective</i>); but even here the concepts we use are used analogically	124
<i>Appendix</i>	
Aquinas used the jargon of "abstraction", but his maturest thought at any rate (in the <i>Summa Theologica</i>) is explicitly opposed to what I call "abstractionism"	130
<i>Bibliography</i>	132
<i>Index</i>	133