

CONTENTS

PREFACE xi

INTRODUCTION xiii

I. THE PRIMACY OF PRACTICAL REASON I

1. The Basic Argument 1
2. Methodological Instrumentalism: The Pragmatic Turn 2
3. Pragmatic Validation of the Criterion of Truth 5
4. Three Strategies of Instrumental Justification 9
5. The Prospects of a Pragmatic Justification of a Nonpragmatic Criterion of Factual Truth 10
6. The Problem of Prior Truths: The Plausibility of Memory as a Minimal Requisite for an Appeal to Experience 13
7. *Post Hoc Ergo Propter Hoc*: A Residual Circularity 15
8. Hume's Problem 19
9. The Primacy of Practical Reason 20
10. Postscript: The Problem of Determinateness 24

II. A PRAGMATIC JUSTIFICATION OF INDUCTION 28

1. Introduction 28
2. The Methodological Perspective 30
3. The Pragmatic Perspective 30
4. Sidestepping Hume's Obstacle 33
5. Practical Precepts *vs.* Factual Theses 34
6. The Structure of Our Argumentation 37
7. The Primacy of Practical Reason 39
8. An Objection 41

9. Rational Darwinism as a Pragmatic Basis of Legitimacy	42
10. A Rebuttal of Scepticism	44
III. THE IMPUTATIONAL THEORY OF LAWS	47
1. What is a Universal Law? The Nature of Lawfulness	47
2. The Problem of the Source of Nomic Necessity: The Insufficiency of Evidence	55
3. Lawfulness as Imputation	56
4. Well-foundedness	59
5. The Heritage of Hume and Kant	62
6. Does the Success of Science Invalidate this Position?	63
7. Imputationism	65
IV. THE PROBLEM OF NOUMENAL CAUSALITY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF KANT	69
1. The Paradox of Noumenal Causality	69
2. Sufficient Reason	70
3. The Impetus to Ontological Autonomy and Insuperable Propensities to Think	75
4. The Role of Postulation (<i>Annehmen</i>)	79
5. Conclusion	86
Postscript	87
V. ON THE SELF-CONSISTENCY OF NATURE	88
1. Background	88
2. What Would an Inconsistent World be Like?	90
3. The Borges World	92
4. The Everett-Wheeler Theory	94
5. Saving the Law of Contradiction in a Borges World	96
6. Branching Time and Multi-Dimensional History	97
7. Could We Abandon the "Law of Contradiction"?	101

8. Variant Logics	101
9. Conclusion	105
VI. A CRITIQUE OF PURE ANALYSIS	107
1. The Purists' View of Conceptual Analysis	107
2. Difficulties of Analytical Purism	108
3. Fact-Coordivative Concepts	109
4. Some Consequences for Conceptual Analysis	113
5. The Kantian Aspect: Antinomies	116
6. The Role of an Empirical Foundation	119
7. Implications for Philosophical Method	120
8. The Pragmatic Aspect	123
VII. THE EXTRA-PRAGMATIC DIMENSION OF HUMAN PURPOSE	124
1. Introduction	124
2. The Scope of Human Purpose	124
3. The Legitimacy of Aristic Goals	129
4. Instrumental <i>vs.</i> Pragmatic Justification: The Question of Reductionism	131
VIII. INSTRUMENTAL REASONING IN ETHICS AND THE NORMATIVE LIMITS OF PRAGMATIC JUSTIFICATION	133
1. The Normative Limits of Pragmatic Justification	133
2. Purposive Justification in the Normative Sphere	134
3. The Contingent Foundation of Human Purpose	136
4. Mill's Fallacy and its Lessons: The "Postulate of Respect"	138
5. A Brief Restrospect	142
6. The Structure of Instrumental Analysis in Ethics	143
7. The Limits of Instrumental Analysis in Ethics	144
8. The Grounds of Pluralism in Ethics	146

X CONTENTS

9. Instrumentalistic Darwinism in Ethics	147
10. Conclusion	151 ✓
NAME INDEX	153
SUBJECT INDEX	155