## CONTENTS

I. TH	E DOCTRINE OF CONTENT AND OBJECT	
I.	The doctrine of content in relation to modern English realism	I
II.	Brentano's doctrine of intentionality. The distinction of the idea, the judgement and the phenomena of love and hate	3
III.	The use of the word 'content' in Brentano and in the early writings of Meinong. The 'immanent' and the 'transcendent' object	6
IV.	Twardowski's account of the content of ideas. His arguments for the existence of contents	8
V.	The content in Twardowski does not resemble the object nor any part of it	I 2
VI.	Meinong's arguments to prove that the object of an experience is not a part of it. The pseudo-existence of objects	17
VII.	Argument for the existence of contents. Contents and acts	22
VIII.	Contents are not mental images or sense data, but are often wholly unlike their objects	26
IX.	Can contents be perceived or are they merely inferred? The pseudo-object. Reasons for thinking that contents can be perceived	28
Х.	Examples from Meinong to prove that contents are in some cases immediately perceived	32
XI.	The relation of content to object	35
XII.	Meinong's theory fails to explain completely how states of mind pass beyond themselves, but is the basis of an important	
	type of research	37
II. THE PURE OBJECT AND ITS INDIFFERENCE TO BEING		
I.	The pure object lies outside of the antithesis of being and non-being. Whether it is or not, makes no difference to what it is. Comparison with Russell's theory	42
II.	Non-existent objects appear to be involved in negative facts. Arguments to prove (a) that there are genuine negative facts, (b) that they do involve non-existent objects. Reasons for our prejudice against non-existent objects	50

## III. THE THEORY OF OBJECTIVES I. Objectives and facts 59 II. The expressive and significant use of words. Sentences express judgements or assumptions, but they mean objectives. Objectives and objecta 60 III. Ameseder's characterization of objectives 69 IV. Objectives are objects of higher order 71 V. Objectives are incapable of existence 73 VI. Objectives do not depend for their being on superordinate objectives 75 VII. The relation of objectives to time 77 VIII. Negativity a characteristic of objectives, not of objecta 8т IX. Comparison of the theory of objectives with the theory of propositions 83 X. Objectives cannot be reduced to characteristics, relations, or concrete objects 89 XI. Objectives are not complexes. Meinong's account of the relation of objectives to complexes 94 XII. Criticism of Russell's theory of judgement as a many-termed relation 100 IV. THE MODAL MOMENT I. The relation of an objective to its factuality 102 II. 'Watered down' and 'full-strength' factuality and existence. The function of the modal moment 103 III. 'Full-strength' factuality or existence cannot be assumed to be present where it is not present 106 IV. How it is possible to think of the factuality of the unfactual, or the existence of the non-existent 109 V Mally's theory of determinates 110 V. OBJECTS OF HIGHER ORDER I. The distinction between existence and subsistence 113 II. Meinong's defence of analysis 116 III. Meinong's criticism of the reduction of characteristics to relations of similarity т т 8

	CONTENTS	xix
IV	. Development of Meinong's theory of the relation of an object to its characteristics	123
$\mathbf{V}$	. Relations and their fundamenta	128
VI	. Meinong's original psychological theory of relations. The distinction between ideal and real relations. His abandonment of this theory	132
VII	. The Principle of Coincidence. Real and ideal complexes	137
VIII.	. Meinong's later theory of the distinction between ideal and real relations	142
IX.	A relation is not a constituent of the complex it generates	145
X	. Comparison of Meinong's conception of complexes with the theories of Russell and Wittgenstein	146
XI.	Criticism of Meinong's conception of relations and complexes as 'objects of higher order'. Meinong's views on continua	148
VI. T	HE THEORY OF INCOMPLETE OBJECTS	
I.	All objects which have being are completely determined	152
II.	Discussion of Meinong's views on relational properties	153
III.	Introduction of incomplete objects	156
IV.	Incomplete objects and the Law of Excluded Middle	159
V.	Reasons for our inattention to incomplete objects. An ambiguity in the word 'universal'	162
VI.	Implexive being and so-being	166
VII.	The reference by way of being and the reference by way of so-being	170
VIII.	The completed object. Difficulties of Meinong's doctrine	174
IX.	Analytic and synthetic judgements	180
X.	Treatment of Meinong's problem in the light of Mally's theory of determinates	182
VII. T	THE MODAL PROPERTIES OF OBJECTIVES	
I.	The modal properties of objectives are wrongly attributed to judgements	185
II.	Factuality and truth	186
III.	Necessity and the experience of understanding. The two species of necessity	187
IV.	Inhesive and adhesive factuality	192

V.	Possibility and probability. Degrees of possibility	195
VI.	The upper and lower limits of possibility	199
VII.	The modal level of objectives	202
VIII.	Internal and external possibility	204
IX.	Possibilities and the Law of Excluded Middle	205
Χ.	The function of incomplete objects in possibilities	209
XI.	The application of possibility to complete objects	214
VIII. '	THE APPREHENSION OF OBJECTS	
I.	The relation of the theory of apprehension and knowledge to the theory of objects	218
II.	Active and passive experiences. The function of ideas	219
III.	The ideas of production and their functions	222
IV.	Experiences of thinking. Moments involved in the judgement, assumption, and surmise	225
V.	Meinong's theory of presentation	230
VI.	Meinong's theory of our reference to objects	238
VII.	Meinong's theory of our awareness of complexes	245
VIII.	Implicit and explicit apprehension	248
IX.	Meinong's theory of knowledge. The experience of 'evidence'	25 I
X.	The evidence of surmises. The epistemology of perception, memory, introspection, and induction	256
IX. V	ALUATION AND VALUES	
I.	Meinong's main writings on value-theory	264
II.	Doctrine of the <i>Psychologisch-ethische Untersuchungen</i> . Valuations as existence-feelings	266
III.	The 'psychological presuppositions' of valuation. Opposition of value-feelings to sense-feelings, aesthetic feelings, and knowledge-feelings. Relation of value-feelings to judgements of instrumentality, of non-existence, and to modal distinctions. Relation to the distinction of Ego and Alter. Errors in valuation	269
IV.	Analysis of moral value: distinctions of the meritorious, the correct, the allowable, and the censurable. Types of egoistic and altruistic motivation. Use of binomial formulae to express principles of moral valuation	275

V.	Moral valuation measures good-will, ill-will, and indifference. Relation to valuations of justice. The 'subject' of moral valuation as the 'environing collectivity' of unconcerned persons. Connexion with obligation and moral ascription	281
VI.	Doctrine of the <i>Grundlegung</i> . Feelings as the main, and desires as subsidiary value-experiences. Valuations as being-feelings. Relation to knowledge-feelings, aesthetic feelings, and sense-feelings	289
VII.	The counter-feelings: joy-in-being and sorrow-in-non-being, sorrow-in-being and joy-in-non-being. Meinong holds that such counter-feelings ought rationally to be of equal intensity whatever they in fact are. This view of Meinong's has absurd consequences. 'Potentialization' of the concept of value	295
X. DI	GNITATIVES AND DESIDERATIVES	
	The notion of emotional presentation and its relation to the modern 'emotive' theory. The doctrine of emotional presentation an unexpected by-product of Meinong's doctrine of content. Reconsideration of this doctrine	303
II.	Emotional presentation may be self-presentation or other- presentation, whole-presentation or part-presentation: only emotional part-presentation can introduce us to peculiar ob- jects. Instances of such emotional part-presentation. Corre- sponding instances of desiderative part-presentation	307
III.	Dignitatives and desideratives and their relation to objectives and objecta	313
IV.	That dignitatives and desideratives are objects does not prove that they have being. That they have being can be known only by an evident judgement, not by an emotional experience. The evidence for the being of dignitatives and desideratives is <i>a priori</i> , but, since we only possess it feebly, may be eked out by a quasi-empirical approach	315
V.	Meinong's views regarding absolute dignitatives (dignities) and absolute desideratives (desiderata)	319
XI. AI	PPRAISAL OF MEINONG	
I.	Contemporary difficulties in being interested in the problems and answers of Meinong	322
II.	Revival of Plato's cave-image to assist in the appraisal of Meinong's philosophical contributions	328

	٠	
VV		

## CONTENTS

III. The main merit of Meinong is that he impartial empiricist and phenomeno world as we actually experience it, a logical assumptions or doctrines of or	logist: he describes the and not as distorted by
IV. Meinong is great in recognizing the non-factual, and the absurd are ess cribing the experienced world. He is a a necessary connexion between feature and interior phases of experience	ential elements in des- also great in recognizing
V. Meinong's realistic approach to all the unreason cannot however be sustained	
VI. 'Thinking' and its cognates are not recan they be said to express relation obtain when all their terms exist. The false are not constituents or terms of ror beliefs, nor in anything else, thousably into the description of our thousably into the world	ns, since relations only ne non-existent and the elations in our thoughts gh they enter indispen-
VII. Meinong's faults are those of the ele of his day. Merits of Meinong as 'understanding'. His resemblance to	a philosopher of the
NDEX	349