

Contents

I. A GENERAL SETTING FOR THE MIND–BODY PROBLEM	
1. Introduction	1
2. Identity	3
3. Ontology	11
4. Some Nonentities	23
5. Properties: Their Identification and Reduction	30
6. Why Consciousness seems Emergent	44
II. THE MIND–BODY PROBLEM	
1. The Possible Positions	49
2. Other Positions	54
3. Behaviourism	55
4. Matter	60
III. SUBSTANCE DUALISM	
1. Types of Dualistic Arguments	64
2. The Epistemological Argument	66
3. My Own Existence	68
4. Application of PL	70
5. The Elusiveness of the Self	75
6. Thinking Things?	78
7. Interaction	80
IV. MATERIALISM, 1	
1. Plausibility and Simplicity of Materialism	87
2. Why Materialists Argue as They Do	91
3. The Monadic Thesis, with Applications	92
4. Topic Neutralism, 1	101
5. Topic Neutralism, 2: Reference Fixing	113
Appendix: An Improvement in a Principle	125
6. Functionalism and Anomalous Monism	127

V. MATERIALISM, 2	
1. Privacy and Incorrigeability	137
2. Rorty's Replacement Thesis	148
3. Language and Conceptual Frameworks	152
4. Intensionality	156
VI. COMPUTERS, or, IS THERE INTELLIGENT LIFE ON EARTH?	
0. Introduction	185
1. Turing Machines	186
2. Implications of Machine Consciousness	190
3. Context and Flexibility	191
4. Chomsky and Language	194
5. Pattern Recognition and Context-sensitivity	202
6. How to Solve a Recognition Problem	209
7. Programming Creativity	212
8. Other Capacities	218
9. Forms of Life	220
Appendix: Gödel's Theorems	225
VII. FREE WILL	
1. Compatibilism: Initial Statement	227
2. A Problem About Changes in States of Knowledge	241
3. Counterexamples and Refinements	244
4. Strong and Weak Freedom	252
5. Why Freedom is Valued	255
6. Paradoxes of Prediction	258
7. The Existentialist Interpretation of L_{α^*}	266
INDEXES	271