

ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

xxiii. PREFACE.

CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

- 1- 2. These five moralists are chosen for discussion because of the eminence of each and the wide differences between them. The treatment primarily philosophical and not historical.
- 2- 4. Life and writings of Spinoza.
- 4- 7. Life and writings of Butler.
- 7- 9. Life and writings of Hume.
- 9-11. Life and writings of Kant.
- 12-14. Life and writings of Sidgwick.

CHAPTER II: SPINOZA

- 15-16. Reasons for ignoring Spinoza's *Third Kind of Knowledge* and doctrines which depend on it.
- 16-17. A human being is a complex system with a characteristic balance and an innate tendency to preserve it.
17. This system has both a physical and a psychical aspect.
- 17-18. An event, in its psychical aspect, is an idea ; in its physical aspect, it is the immediate object of this idea.
- 18-19. A sensation in one's mind is a confused but direct awareness of a modification of one's body.
- 19-20. It is confused because it is inevitably fragmentary.
20. There are ideas of all sensations, but the idea of a sensation may not be in the same mind as the sensation itself.
- 20-21. The *First Kind of Knowledge* consists of sensations and images connected by mere association.
- 21-22. The *Second Kind of Knowledge* is rational insight. It is based on the First Kind, but avoids the contingency of the latter.
22. Spinoza exaggerated the range of rational knowledge, and gave no satisfactory account of the transition to it.
- 22-23. Spinoza's theory of the *Vital Impulse* and its psychical and physical aspects.
23. *Volition* is the psychical aspect of Vital Impulse, accompanied by an awareness of itself.
23. "Indeterminism" is meaningless ; "freedom" means absence of external constraint.
24. Spinoza's theory that awareness of one's impulses is irrelevant to one's decisions.

- PAGE
25. It is true that conative dispositions must be assumed, and that these are not open to introspection.
- 25-29. But this is not all that he means. His doctrine can be interpreted in three different ways; and, on each interpretation, it is false.
29. *Emotion* is the direct but confused awareness of the heightening, maintenance, or lowering of one's own vitality. Hence there are three fundamental emotions, *Pleasure, Desire, and Pain*.
30. *Passive Emotions* depend on the First Kind of Knowledge, and their predominance constitutes *Human Bondage*.
31. *Active Emotions* depend on the Second or Third Kind of Knowledge. There is no Active Emotion of pain.
31. Certain Active and certain Passive Emotions are called by the same names.
- 31-32. *Human Freedom* consists in the predominance of clear ideas and Active Emotions.
- 32-33. The power of the Passive Emotions, and its causes.
- 33-35. Three methods of substituting Active for Passive Emotions.
35. Spinoza was both a Psychological and an Ethical Egoist.
36. Three *prima facie* objections to Psychological Egoism at the pre-rational level.
- 36-39. Spinoza does not mention the first. He tries to deal with the other two, but the attempt is a failure.
- 39-41. His defence of Psychological Egoism at the rational level.
42. He has not shown that apparently non-egoistic actions are in fact due to rational egoism; nor that deliberate sacrifice of oneself as a means to some end is impossible.
- 43-44. His distinction between competitive and non-competitive goods cannot, in the end, be maintained.
- 44-45. The terms "perfect" and "imperfect" apply strictly only to products of design, and we cannot ascribe designs to God.
- 45-46. A "good" member of a species means one which performs the specific functions more efficiently than the average member of it.
46. "Bad" is a merely privative term. It is not positive even in the sense in which "good" is.
- 46-47. There is a very restricted sense in which "better" can express a relation between members of different species.
- 47-48. There are no limits to the rights of human beings over animals.
48. An enlightened Egoist will avoid hatred in himself, and will seek to overcome it in others by love.
- 48-49. In a society of enlightened Egoists the "monkish virtues" would not be virtues, but they have a certain use in actual societies.
- 49-50. Society is essential at all levels; and the State is necessary so long as there are any men who are partly, but not wholly, rational.
51. Delicate position of the Free Man among those who are still in Bondage. Spinoza's tact, courage, and financial independence.
- 51-52. Pleasure and pain, for Spinoza, are the *ratio cognoscendi*, and not the *ratio essendi* of good and evil.

CHAPTER III: BUTLER

- | PAGE | |
|--------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 53. | Butler's affinity to Kant and his unlikeness to Spinoza. |
| 53-55. | Low ebb of religion and morality in England when Butler wrote. |
| 55-56. | The human mind is a hierarchical system, in which each principle and propensity has its proper place and strength. |
| 57. | Virtue consists in acting in accordance with Ideal Human Nature, and Vice in acting against it. |
| 58. | The concept of Ideal Human Nature compared with ideal concepts in mathematics and natural science. |
| 59. | An Ideal Limit may be indefinable; it generally has no contrary opposite; and the concept of it is reached by reflecting on imperfect instances arranged in a series. |
| 60. | Distinction between purely positive Ideals and those of Ethics. |
| 60-61. | The four kinds of active principle, viz., <i>Particular Propensities</i> , <i>Cool Self-love</i> , <i>Rational Benevolence</i> , and <i>Conscience</i> . |
| 62-63. | Conscience should be supreme; below it come Cool Self-love and Rational Benevolence; and below them the Particular Propensities. |
| 63-71. | The Particular Propensities cannot be reduced to Self-love. |
| 63-65. | Refutation of Hobbes's egoistic theory of Pity. |
| 65-66. | The view that the Particular Propensities are reducible to Self-love is made plausible by two confusions. |
| 66-67. | Pleasures which do, and those which do not, presuppose desires. |
| 67-68. | The <i>Object</i> , the <i>Exciting Cause</i> , the <i>Collateral Effects</i> , and the <i>Satisfaction</i> of an impulse. |
| 68-69. | Application of these distinctions to the question of the relation of Particular Propensities to Self-love and Benevolence. |
| 69-70. | Some Particular Propensities mainly concern Self-love; some, mainly Benevolence; some, both equally. |
| 70-71. | Sense in which Ambition and Hunger are "disinterested". Why this seems paradoxical. |
| 71-72. | Did Butler hold that there is a general principle of Benevolence, as there is a general principle of Self-love? |
| 72-73. | The two principles are, in many respects, co-ordinate. |
| 73. | But Conscience condemns excess of Benevolence less than excess of Self-love. |
| 73-74. | And no action can be wholly hostile to Self-love, whilst some are wholly hostile to Benevolence. |
| 74. | The conduct of an enlightened Egoist and an enlightened Altruist would be much the same. Deliberate pursuit of one's own happiness tends to defeat itself. |
| 74-75. | Confusion between happiness and the means to happiness makes it seem that Self-love and Benevolence must conflict. |
| 76-77. | Conscience, in its cognitive aspect, is the mind reflecting on ethical characteristics. |
| 77-78. | Actions are judged with reference to the nature of the agent. |
| 78. | In the Ideal Man Conscience would supply a motive stronger than any that might conflict with it. |
| 79. | A right action need not be dictated by Conscience, though it cannot conflict with Conscience. |

- PAGE
- 79-80. Butler occasionally speaks as if Self-love were co-ordinate with, or superior to, Conscience.
80. This seems to be an argumentative concession to a hypothetical opponent.
- 80-81. When Self-love and Conscience seem to conflict it is more prudent to follow Conscience. Reasons for doubting this.
81. Butler sometimes uses Utilitarian language, but he was not a Utilitarian.
- 81-82. God may be a Utilitarian, but this would not justify men in guiding their conduct solely by Utilitarian principles.
- 82-83. Merits and defects of Butler's theory.

CHAPTER IV : HUME

84. Comparison of Hume and Spinoza.
- 84-85. Hume defines "good" and "bad" in terms of general *Approval* and *Disapproval*.
- 85-86. His theory is relational and psychological, but not subjective.
86. But it reverses the view of Common-sense.
- 86-87. Those things, and those only, are good which are pleasant or conducive to pleasure in human beings.
- 87-88. *Non-causal* and *Causal Pleasantness*.
- 88-89. Definition of "immediately pleasant".
89. Hume should have substituted "believed to be" for "are" pleasant or conducive to pleasure. Hume was an *Empirical Hedonist*.
- 90-91. Approval and Disapproval depend on the *Moral Sentiment*; the direction which they take in human beings depends on the *Sentiment of Humanity*.
91. The Sentiment of Humanity is common to all men, and is concerned with the happiness or unhappiness of men as such.
- 91-92. In special circumstances it may be inhibited by special sentiments which the situation excites.
- 92-93. It seems doubtful whether it explains the direction taken by human Approval and Disapproval.
- 93-99. Our approval of *Justice* seems to be an exception to Hume's theory. Hume attempts to answer this.
94. He bases it on the utility of having invariable rules about property.
95. In cases where Justice would cease to be useful we cease to approve of it.
- 95-96. Justice is not based on a special instinct. Hume's argument for this is not conclusive.
- 96-97. The sense in which Justice is "natural", and the sense in which it is "artificial".
97. Hume's theory covers only that part of Justice which is concerned with the enforcement of an existing set of rules.
- 97-98. It is not clear that approval of Justice would cease where its utility ceases.
- 98-99. Nor that utility alone would account for the approval of Justice in primitive communities.

CONTENTS

xi

- PAGE
- 99-104. Hume's defence of his theory against Psychological Egoists.
- 99-100. Our approval of the virtues of enemies, of historical characters, and of characters in fiction cannot be egoistic.
- 100-104. How can the Psychological Egoist explain the appearance of disinterested Benevolence ?
- 100-101. Not by deliberate fraud.
- 101-104. Nor by unwitting self-deception. Four arguments to show this ; and criticisms of them.
- 104-115. *Reason and Sentiment* in ethical matters.
- 104-106. Reason consists in the powers of *Intuitive Induction, Ratiocination, and Formation of A Priori Concepts*.
106. Hume never defines "Reason", but tacitly identifies it with Ratiocination.
107. Hume holds that Reason is never sufficient to account for moral emotion and action, and that it is concerned only with matters of fact.
- 107-108. The first part of this doctrine is a truism.
108. But it has no tendency to prove the second part.
- 108-110. The *Phenomenalist*, the *Causal*, and the *A Priori* analysis of ethical judgments. Hume took the first of these.
- 110-111. His two arguments against Rationalism. Neither is conclusive.
- 111-114. His three arguments for his own view. All are inconclusive.
- 114-115. Hume has neither refuted his opponents nor proved his own case. But he may in fact be right.
115. If he were right all ethical disputes could, in theory, be settled by collection of psychological statistics. This seems incredible.

CHAPTER V: KANT

116. Radical difference between Kant's ethics and that of Spinoza and Hume.
- 117-121. Statement of Kant's theory.
117. Nothing is intrinsically good but a *Good Will*, which is a will that habitually chooses rightly. The rightness of a volition depends wholly on its motive.
- 117-118. *Action on Impulse* and *Action on Principle*. A right action must be done on some principle which the agent accepts.
118. Division of *Imperatives* into *Hypothetical* and *Categorical*.
119. *Action for Principle*. A right action must be done *for* a principle, and not merely *on* a principle.
- 119-120. The right action in a given situation is the same for all rational beings, and is independent of their special inclinations.
- 120-121. The *Moral Law* states the conditions which a principle must fulfil if it is to be a Categorical Imperative. The condition must refer to the form, and not to the content, of the principle.
- 121-123. Elucidations of the theory.
- 121-122. *Mixed Motives*. Ambiguity of this notion.
122. Kant never claimed self-evidence for any determinate principle of conduct.

- PAGE
- 122-123. The Moral Law is a criterion for testing, not a premise for deducing, principles of conduct which claim to be right.
- 123-131. Criticisms of the theory.
- 123-124. There are principles which are accepted as Categorical Imperatives by many people.
- 124-125. But it is not true that the right action in a given situation is always independent of the inclinations of the agent.
125. And, if it were, the principle on which the action is done need not be a Categorical Imperative.
- 126-127. For there may be ends which all rational beings can see to be desirable, though there are no ends whose desirability can be deduced from the mere concept of a rational being.
- 127-128. Even if there be Categorical Imperatives, no criterion for recognising them could be deduced from the concept of a rational being.
- 128-129. If there be such a criterion it must be discovered by inspection, comparison, and intuitive induction.
- 129-131. Kant's examples to illustrate the use of his criterion do not really illustrate it.
131. Its only use is to avoid personal bias; and it cannot be used blindly even for this.
- 131-139. Further developments of Kant's theory.
- 131-132. His other two forms of the criterion do not seem to be logically equivalent to the original form.
- 132-133. Limitations to the principle of always treating men as ends and never as means.
133. The principle of *Moral Autonomy*. Sense in which it is true.
134. *Summum Bonum* and *Bonum Consummatum*. Pleasure has no intrinsic value; but the presence of the deserved amount of pleasure adds to the value of wholes composed of virtuous persons.
- 135-139. Kant's theory of *Moral Obligation*.
- 135-136. The double nature of man is a fact; but Kant's theory of it is metaphysically impossible.
136. The *Good Will* and the *Holy Will*.
- 136-137. The theory that what I ought to will, as a Phenomenon, is what I necessarily do will, as a Noumenon, is ethically unsatisfactory.
- 137-138. Theory of a timeless choice by the *Noumenal Self* of its *Empirical Character*.
- 138-139. This is ethically more satisfactory than the first theory, but is equally impossible metaphysically.
139. The emotion of *Achtung*. Kant is dealing with genuine facts, even if his theory of them be unacceptable.
- 139-140. Kant's ethical argument for Immortality.
140. Its premises are inconsistent with each other, and one of them is true only in a rhetorical sense.
- 140-142. Kant's ethical argument for the existence of God.
- 141-142. It depends on confusing the *ought* in "ought to be" with the *ought* in "ought to do."
142. And it seems inconsistent with his argument for Immortality.

CHAPTER VI : SIDGWICK

- PAGE
- 143-144. Philosophic merits and literary defects of Sidgwick.
- 144-161. Synopsis of Sidgwick's theory.
145. (A) LOGICAL ANALYSIS OF ETHICAL TERMS. Notions of *Ought*, *Right*, and *Good*.
- 145-146. (B) EPISTEMOLOGICAL QUESTIONS. Are there *a priori* concepts and *a priori* judgments in Ethics ?
146. (C) PSYCHOLOGICAL QUESTIONS ABOUT MOTIVES. There is a desire to do what is right and reasonable, as such.
- 146-147. Distinction of *Psychological* and *Ethical Hedonism*. Refutation of the former.
147. (D) FREE-WILL AND DETERMINISM. Direct inspection pronounces for the former, but all else favours the latter. The question is much less important to Ethics than it has been thought to be.
- 148-149. (E) CLASSIFICATION OF THE METHODS OF ETHICS. *Intuitionism*, *Egoistic Hedonism*, and *Utilitarianism*.
- 149-157. (F) DETAILED DISCUSSION OF THE THREE METHODS.
- 150-152. (1) *Intuitionism*.
- 150-151. Criticism of the alleged moral intuitions of Common-sense.
- 151-152. Every method involves at least one intuition ; but all genuine ethical intuitions are highly abstract.
- 152-157. (2, 1) *Hedonism in general*.
- 152-153. (2, 11) *The Ethical Problem*. Nothing has intrinsic value but experiences, and their intrinsic value is wholly determined by their hedonic qualities.
153. (2, 12) *The Factual Problem*. The difficulties in making hedonic estimates for oneself and for others.
- 153-157. (2, 3) *Universalistic Hedonism*.
- 154-155. An abstract argument directed against (a) Non-Hedonists, and (b) Egoists.
- 155-156. A concrete argument based on comparing Utilitarian morality with that of Common-sense.
156. Our remote ancestors were unwitting Utilitarians.
- 156-157. There are divergences between Common-sense and Utilitarian morality ; but the Utilitarian will seldom be justified, on his own principles, in openly breaking or advising others to break the rules current in his society.
- 157-161. (G) RELATIONS BETWEEN THE THREE METHODS.
- 157-158. They are vaguely assumed in ordinary life to lead to consistent results. But they conflict in many cases.
158. Sidgwick accepts Hedonism, together with a few highly abstract intuitions about right distribution of happiness. His difficulties are in deciding between Egoistic and Universalistic Hedonism.
- 158-159. Each is founded on a principle which seems to him self-evident, and yet these principles are mutually inconsistent.
- 159-160. The two theories cannot be reconciled ; but it might be possible to show that the results of consistently acting on either of them would be the same.

PAGE

160. The attempt to prove this on purely psychological grounds, by reference to Sympathy, fails.
- 160-161. A metaphysical postulate is needed, which naturally takes a theistic form.
161. Sidgwick does not definitely assert that we are justified in making this postulate.
- 161-256. Elucidations and criticisms of Sidgwick's theory.
- 161-177. (A) LOGICAL ANALYSIS OF ETHICAL TERMS.
- 161-171. (I) *Ought* and *Right*.
161. (1, 1) *Ought-to-do* and *Ought-to-be*.
- 162-164. (1, 2) *Deontological, teleological, and logical* application of "Ought".
- 162-163. Everyone admits the third; some only the second and third; some all three.
163. The logical application is a particular case of the deontological; and, in this application, the sense is "ought-to-do".
- 164-166. (1, 3) The relations of *Ought* and *Right*.
164. *Ought-to-do* implies both the Rightness of the action and the presence of opposing motives.
- 164-165. Rightness is a relational term, since it involves the notion of *fittingness* or *appropriateness* to a situation.
165. A thing ought to be if an agent who had it in his power to produce it ought to produce it.
166. It is right that the desire to do what is right should conquer opposing motives. In such conflicts we have the experience of *Moral Obligation*.
- 166-171. (1, 4) Can *Right* be analysed into non-ethical constituents?
166. (a) Can my judgment that X is right mean that I feel approval at X?
- 167-168. Sidgwick's argument to refute this is not conclusive.
168. (b) Can it mean that I not only feel approval myself but also sympathetically represent the approvals felt by others? Sidgwick denies this.
169. (c) Can it mean that public opinion will approve of me if I do X and disapprove of me if I omit X?
- 169-170. Sidgwick rejects this for various reasons. His distinction between genuinely moral and *quasi-moral* judgments and emotions seems sound; but it is hard to distinguish the two in many cases.
170. (d) Can it mean that God will reward me if I do X and punish me if I omit X? Sidgwick rejects this.
- 170-171. Sidgwick is probably correct in concluding that *Right* is a simple notion, but he has not conclusively proved this.
171. The logical simplicity of *Right* neither entails nor excludes the psychological primitiveness of the concept of *Right*.
- 171-177. (2) *Good*.
- 171-174. (2, 1) Can Goodness be defined in terms of Pleasantness?
172. A good picture is one that gives pleasure, not to everyone, but to a person of *good taste*.
- 172-173. And the expert may get much less pleasure from a good picture than persons of crude taste get from a bad one.

CONTENTS

xv

PAGE	
173.	If "good" meant pleasant, Hedonism would be a truism instead of a disputable theory.
173-174.	But might one not use a word correctly without being aware of the true analysis of the term which it denotes? If so, Sidgwick's refutation is inconclusive.
174-177. (2, 2)	Can Goodness be defined in terms of Desire?
174-175.	We must distinguish a <i>purely positive</i> , a <i>positively ideal</i> , and an <i>ethically ideal</i> meaning of the term "desirable".
175.	Sidgwick proposes a complicated definition of "my good on the whole", which involves desirability only in the 'positively ideal sense.
175-176.	But, in the end, he seems to conclude that "good" cannot be defined without reference to desirability in the ethically ideal sense of "fitness to be desired".
176-177.	Is it clear that even this is a definition? Might not "good" be indefinable, and the proposition that what is good is a fitting object of desire be synthetic?
177-179. (B)	EPISTEMOLOGICAL QUESTIONS.
177-178.	Since ethical concepts are <i>a priori</i> and there are <i>a priori</i> ethical judgments Reason is essential to moral cognition.
178-179.	But analogy would suggest that something akin to sensation is also necessary. This may be moral emotion.
179-192. (C)	PSYCHOLOGICAL QUESTIONS ABOUT MOTIVES AND VOLITION.
179-180. (1)	<i>Reason as Motive</i> . There is a desire to do what is right as such, and this could exist only in a rational being.
180-192. (2)	<i>Psychological Hedonism</i> .
180-184. (2, 1)	Relation of Psychological to Ethical Hedonism.
181-183. (2, 11)	Relation to Egoistic Ethical Hedonism.
181-182.	In its strictest sense Psychological Hedonism would exclude every ethical theory except Egoistic Ethical Hedonism.
182.	But, since an agent could not help aiming at his own greatest happiness, it could not be said that he <i>ought</i> to do so.
182-183.	In the less rigid sense of Psychological Hedonism an agent could consciously fail to seek his own <i>greatest</i> happiness.
183-184. (2, 12)	Relation to Universalistic Ethical Hedonism.
183.	The two theories are incompatible.
183-184.	Yet Mill, by committing two fallacies, claimed to deduce the ethical from the psychological theory.
184-191. (2, 2)	Is Psychological Hedonism true?
184-185.	There are real connexions between Pleasure and Pain, on the one hand, and Desire and Aversion, on the other.
185-186.	<i>Categorial</i> and <i>Non-Categorial</i> Characteristics. Restatement of Psychological Hedonism in terms of this distinction.
186-187.	The only positive argument for Psychological Hedonism is one of Mill's, which rests on a confusion between "pleasing" and "being pleasant".
187-188.	The fact that all fulfilment of desire is pleasant does not imply that all desire is for pleasure.
188.	Locke's form of Psychological Hedonism.
188-189.	Desire is an unrestful, but not therefore a painful, state.
189.	One may feel uneasy at the absence of other things than pleasure

- PAGE
- 189-191. Last struggles of the Psychological Hedonist.
- 191-192. (2, 3) Further facts about the relations of Pleasure-Pain and Desire-Aversion. Pleasures of Pursuit. The "Paradox of Hedonism".
192. Application of the above to Optimism and Pessimism. "The means justifies the end."
- 192-205. (D) FREE-WILL AND DETERMINISM.
- 192-193. Statement of the general problem. Sidgwick confines himself to a special case of it.
- 193-194. The problem cannot be properly treated except in connexion with a complete system of metaphysics.
194. Sidgwick could not help believing that, at the moment when he had to decide between two alternatives, one of which he believed to be right and the other to be wrong, he could always choose the former.
- 194-195. This does not involve "freaks of unmotivated volition".
- 195-196. It is compatible with the fact that habitual wrong choice in the past makes wrong choice more likely in the future.
196. Both Determinism and Indeterminism can provide a man with a plausible excuse for doing what he knows to be wrong. But neither excuse is valid.
- 196-198. On either theory much the same ends will be desirable.
- 198-205. Bearing of the rival theories on *Merit*, *Remorse*, and *Punishment*.
- 198-199. The Determinist can talk of "good" and "bad" men, at least in the sense in which these adjectives can be applied to machines.
- 199-200. The additional credit which is given to a man who does right as the result of a moral struggle is explicable on the Determinist theory, so far as it is a fact.
200. *Determinism of Mental Events* and *Determinism of Substances*. Either can be held without the other.
201. Those who hold that Merit would vanish on a Determinist view are assuming Determinism of Substances.
- 201-202. *Joint Partial Responsibility* and *Remote Total Responsibility*. The former does, and the latter does not, reduce the merit or demerit of an agent.
202. A Determinist could hold that men are intrinsically good or bad.
203. It seems uncertain whether Remorse involves an Indeterminist view of oneself.
- 203-204. The Determinist can express praise or blame for the same kind of reasons as would justify him in oiling machinery.
204. Sidgwick holds that the Determinist can justify any form of punishment which is not purely retributive; and he doubts whether anyone can justify the latter.
- 204-205. It must be justified, if at all, on the *Principle of Organic Unities*. And this is open to the Determinist.
- 206-208. (E) CLASSIFICATION OF THE METHODS OF ETHICS.
206. Sidgwick's method of classification uses both epistemic and ontological features, and results in cross-divisions. Suggested primary division into *Deontological* and *Teleological*.
- 206-207. Both kinds can be sub-divided into *Monistic* and *Pluralistic*.

CONTENTS

xvii

- PAGE
207. Both these kinds of Teleological theory can be sub-divided into *Egoistic* and *Non-Egoistic*.
- 207-208. Sidgwick is predominantly a Monistic Teleologist who cannot decide between the Egoistic and the Non-Egoistic form of the theory. But he accepts a few highly abstract Deontological principles about the right distribution of happiness.
- 208-240. (F) DETAILED DISCUSSION OF THE THREE METHODS.
- 208-227. (I) *Intuitionism*.
- 208-216. (I, I) General account of Intuitionism.
- 208-209. The Intuitionist does not ignore the intended consequences of actions. How then does he differ from the Teleologist?
- 209-211. Comparison of the Intuitionist's and the Teleologist's attitudes towards a lie.
211. The Deontologist is not concerned with the *goodness* or *badness* of the consequences, whilst the Teleologist is concerned with *no other* feature in the consequences.
- 211-212. The Teleologist must take account of all the intended consequences, whilst many Deontologists hold that only a small selection of them need be considered.
- 212-213. This restriction is essential if it is claimed that a lie, *e.g.*, can be seen to be wrong in *all* circumstances.
213. For the Teleologist all judgments of the form "So-and-so is right (or wrong)" involve empirical judgments about consequences.
- 213-214. But he will also need at least one *a priori* judgment of the form "Anything that had such and such a non-ethical characteristic would necessarily be intrinsically good".
214. Sidgwick's distinction between *Dogmatic* and *Philosophic* Intuitionists corresponds to our distinction between Pluralistic and Monistic Deontologists.
- 214-215. Both hold that some judgments of the form "So-and-so is right (or wrong)" are *a priori*.
- 215-216. There might be Deontologists who do not claim to be able to make any such judgments. Perhaps they correspond to Sidgwick's *Æsthetic* Intuitionists.
- 216-227. (I, 2) Sidgwick's position regarding Intuitionism.
- 216-217. Sidgwick's criticisms of the Dogmatic Intuitionism of common-sense morality.
217. He concludes that we are forced to take a mainly Teleological view, eked out with a few highly abstract intuitions about the right distribution of good and evil.
- 218-223. Sketch of a modified form of Intuitionism which would avoid Sidgwick's criticisms.
218. Analysis of the notion of acting in a given situation.
219. The *Fittingness* of an action to the total course of events as modified by it.
- 219-220. *Resultant Fittingness* and *Component Fittingnesses*. There is no general rule for compounding the latter into the former.
220. The *Utility* of an action.
- 220-221. The consequences of an action are relevant both to its Resultant Fittingness and to its Utility, though not in the same way.

PAGE

- 221-222. The Rightness or Wrongness of an action in a given situation is a function of its Resultant Fittingness and its Utility.
- 222-223. The Dogmatic Intuitionist first identifies Rightness with Fittingness, and then confines his attention to Immediate Fittingness.
- 223-227. Sidgwick's deontological intuitions.
223. Statement of the first three of them.
- 223-224. The first two are very trivial. What kinds of likeness or unlikeness between two people are ethically relevant, and what kinds are not ?
- 224-225. It seems doubtful whether the third is unconditionally true.
225. The fourth principle is about the irrelevance of mere difference of date at which a pleasure is to be enjoyed.
- 225-226. Is the common view that pain followed by pleasure is, other things being equal, preferable to pleasure followed by pain, inconsistent with this ?
- 226-227. The two remaining principles are concerned with Egoism and Universalism. Their discussion is deferred.
227. General features of Sidgwick's intuitions.
- 227-240. (2) *Hedonism*.
- 227-239. (2, 1) Hedonism in general.
- 227-238. (2, 11) The ethical problem.
228. Statement of the Hedonistic view of Intrinsic Goodness.
- 228-233. Psychological discussion of Pleasure and Pain.
228. Mental events may be divided into those which are, and those which are not, directed to objects. The latter are *Feelings*.
- 228-229. The former consist of *Cognitions*, *Conations*, and *Emotions*; but it is plausible to suppose that Conations and Emotions are merely Cognitions having certain psychical qualities.
229. The quality of *Hedonic Tone*, with its two determinate forms *Pleasantness* and *Unpleasantness*.
230. It can characterise Feelings, Conations, and Emotions; but not perhaps pure Cognitions, if such there be. *A Pleasure* is any kind of experience which has the quality of Pleasantness.
- 230-231. Any experience which has hedonic quality will also have some non-hedonic quality.
- 231-233. Mill's doctrine of Pleasures and Pains of different quality.
231. It is obvious that Pleasures differ in their non-hedonic qualities and relational properties.
- 231-232. The *Pure Hedonist* holds that no characteristic of an experience has any bearing on its value except its hedonic quality and the causal property of *Fecundity*.
- 232-233. Could there be different determinate forms of the quality of pleasantness? If so, pleasures could differ in quality in a second sense.
233. Sidgwick is a *Pure Quantitative Hedonist*; Mill was a *Pure*, but not *Purely Quantitative*, Hedonist.
- 233-237. Arguments against Pure Quantitative Hedonism.
234. Malice is bad, in spite of and because of its pleasantness, even though it be impotent.

CONTENTS

xix

- | PAGE | |
|----------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 234-235. | The badness of malice depends on the combination of its pleasant hedonic tone with an object which is unfitted to be cognised with pleasure. |
| 235. | The Hedonist can produce no instance of an experience which has only hedonic qualities. |
| 236-237. | The utmost that the Hedonist could prove is that hedonic tone <i>is necessary</i> to make an experience intrinsically valuable, and that there is <i>no one</i> non-hedonic characteristic which is necessary. It does not follow that the presence of <i>one or other</i> of a certain set of non-hedonic characteristics is <i>not also</i> necessary. |
| 237-238. | Might not a pleasant experience simply be one that is liked for its non-hedonic qualities, and a painful experience be one that is disliked for its non-hedonic qualities ? |
| 238-239. | (2, 12) The factual problem. |
| 239. | However great may be the difficulties in Utilitarian calculations, they are small compared with those which would exist for a more adequate theory of ethics. |
| 239-240. | (2, 2) <i>Egoistic Hedonism</i> , and (2, 3) <i>Universalistic Hedonism</i> . There might be a non-hedonistic form of Egoism. |
| 240-256. | (G) THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE THREE METHODS. |
| 240-242. | <i>Egoistic</i> , <i>Altruistic</i> , and <i>Universalistic Hedonism</i> . The second is the contrary opposite of the first. |
| 241. | Common-sense regards Egoism as grossly immoral and Altruism as Quixotic. Nor is it clear about Universalism. |
| 242. | All three theories presuppose the falsehood of both Psychological Egoism and Psychological Altruism. Egoism alone avoids the necessity of summing the happiness of several men. |
| 242-246. | Egoism as an ethical theory. |
| 243. | If Egoism be properly stated it cannot be convicted of internal inconsistency or of arbitrariness. |
| 243-244. | A suggested compromise. Might it not be fitting to desire the occurrence of a good state of mind to <i>some</i> degree no matter where it occurred, but to desire <i>more intensely</i> that it should occur in oneself than in any other mind ? |
| 244. | An Egoistic Ethical Hedonist cannot consistently take a purely teleological view of Right and Wrong. |
| 244-245. | The Egoist would reject the second of the two principles from which Sidgwick deduces the Principle of Rational Benevolence. |
| 245-246. | Pure Egoism seems plainly false, but Universalism does not seem plainly true. |
| 246-253. | Universalistic Hedonism. |
| 246-248. | What is meant by the <i>Total Nett Happiness</i> of an individual ? |
| 248. | The summation in this case does correspond to the actual adjunction of successive phases in a man's experience. |
| 248-249. | What is meant by the <i>Total Nett Happiness</i> of a group ? |
| 249. | It is better to talk of the happiness <i>in</i> a group than the happiness <i>of</i> a group. It is doubtful whether summation here represents any real adjunction. |
| 249-250. | The total happiness in a group might be increased by increasing its numbers and diminishing the average happiness. This seems plainly immoral. |

- PAGE
250. Either the way in which a given amount of happiness is distributed throughout a group is ethically irrelevant, or some principle is needed to distinguish right from wrong ways of distribution.
- 250-251. Granted that A must not be favoured over B unless there be some ethically relevant difference between them, what kind of differences are ethically relevant in distribution ?
251. The only characteristic which a pure Utilitarian could admit to be relevant in judging the goodness of a distribution is its fecundity.
- 252-253. There is goodness *of* a community, as well as goodness *in* it; though there is happiness only *in* it, and not *of* it.
- 253-256. Is it legitimate to postulate Theism in order to reconcile the claims of Egoism and Universalism ?
253. No metaphysical postulate could render two ethical intuitions which conflicted mutually consistent. At most it would make it practically indifferent whether we acted on one or on the other.
- 254-255. The postulates of science are theoretical, Sidgwick's postulate is practical.
255. It might make the conscientious man more comfortable and more efficient, provided he could forget that it was only a postulate made for that purpose.
- 255-256. And, even so, if he acts on principle at all, he will never know whether he is acting on the right or the wrong principle.

CHAPTER VII: CONCLUSION

- 257-264. (1) ANALYSIS OF ETHICAL CHARACTERISTICS.
258. Attitude of the moralists studied in this book to the *Naturalistic Analysis* of ethical concepts.
- 259-264. (1, 1) *Naturalistic Theories*.
259. Various possible types of Naturalistic Theory.
- 259-263. (1, 13) *Psychological Naturalism*.
- 259-260. This may be either *Public* or *Private*.
260. A Naturalistic Theory need not be a *Subjective* Theory, and Public Psychological Naturalism is not in fact subjective.
- 260-261. Distinction between *Mental Quality* Theories and *Mental Attitude* Theories: "Publicity" has a different meaning in the two types of theory.
- 261-262. The forms of Public Psychological Naturalism may be classified according to the extent of the group of experients assumed in the definition of ethical concepts.
262. And also according to whether the group is supposed to be actual or merely ideal.
- 262-263. *Factual* and *Ideal* Naturalism. The Naturalist tends to pass into the latter when the former is criticised, and is then liable to fall into inconsistency.
263. *Relational* and *Non-Relational* Theories.
- 263-264. Connexions between this classification and the division of theories into Naturalistic and Non-Naturalistic.

- PAGE
- 264-273. (2) EPISTEMOLOGICAL QUESTIONS.
265. Definition of "Reason". It involves three cognitive powers.
- 265-266. No ethical theory denies that Reasoning plays a part in the formation of some ethical judgments. Theories which deny that Reason plays any other part are *Non-Rationalistic*.
266. All Naturalistic theories are *Non-Rationalistic*.
- 266-267. When account is taken of the possibility of a *priori* concepts and of a *priori* judgments in Ethics there are three possible types of Rationalistic theory.
267. Sidgwick and Kant accepted some a *priori* concepts and some a *priori* judgments in Ethics.
- 267-270. The function of *Feeling* or *Emotion* in ethical cognition.
- 267-268. In Psychological Naturalism they are an essential part of the content of ethical judgments. In the other forms of Naturalism they are at most signs of the presence of something else which forms the content of the ethical judgment.
268. In Non-Naturalistic theories they are no part of the content of ethical judgments, but they may be necessary conditions for the formation of ethical concepts.
- 268-269. If ethical concepts be empirical they may be abstracted from instances which are presented by the emotions of Approbation and Disapprobation. This is not plausible.
- 269-270. If ethical concepts be a *priori* it is plausible to suppose that emotions of Approbation and Disapprobation furnish the occasions necessary for Reason to recognise ethical characteristics.
- 270-272. How do we arrive at universal ethical judgments ?
- 270-271. They are of two kinds, *Pure* and *Mixed*.
271. If the Mixed Judgments be empirical they must be reached by problematic induction from observed instances.
- 271-272. If they be a *priori* they are probably reached by intuitive induction from observed instances.
272. Any theory which asserts a universal connexion between an ethical and a non-ethical characteristic can take three forms, viz., *Analytic*, *Synthetic A Priori*, and *Empirical*.
- 272-273. If Naturalism be false the fundamental concepts and the fundamental universal judgments of Ethics are almost certainly a *priori*.
- 273-276. (3) QUESTIONS ABOUT VOLITION AND MOTIVES.
- 273-274. Theories about motives are *Egoistic* or *Non-Egoistic*, and the former are *Hedonistic* or *Non-Hedonistic*.
- 274-275. The recognition by Reason that a proposed course of action is right or wrong does stir the Will to do or to avoid it. But this cannot be inferred from the fact that Reason plays an essential part in moral cognition.
275. Seven questions about the desire to do what is right as such. The last four bring in the question of Free-Will.
276. (4) QUESTIONS ABOUT EMOTIONS AND SENTIMENTS. Is there any specific emotion connected with the recognition of right and wrong, and is it essential that it should be stirred if there is to be moral action ?
- 276-281. (5) HOW FAR CAN ETHICS BE REDUCED TO A SYSTEM ?

- PAGE
- 276-277. Interconnexions of ethical characteristics. Concepts of *Obligation* and concepts of *Value*. Analogies with non-ethical concepts.
- 277-279. Alternative theories about the relations between the two kinds of ethical concepts.
- 279-280. Is there any non-ethical characteristic which is common but not peculiar, or peculiar but not common, or common and peculiar to all intrinsically good things ?
280. If the third alternative be accepted we have a *Monistic Theory of Value*.
- 280-281. There are three similar alternatives about things that are right. The third, if accepted, involves a *Monistic Theory of Obligation*.
- 281-284. Summary of tentative conclusions under eight heads.
284. The danger of over-simplification in ethical matters.
- 284-285. The study of Ethics may make us wiser, but we must not expect it to make us in any other respect better.
286. INDEX