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- 3. and this social order may itself, from another point of view, be condemned as unjust; that is, as tried by the standard of Ideal Justice. What then is this Standard? We seem to find various degrees and forms of it.
- 4. One view of Ideal Law states Freedom as its absolute End: but the attempt to construct a system of law on this principle involves us in insuperable difficulties.
- 5. Nor does the realisation of Freedom satisfy our common conception of Ideal Justice. The principle of this is rather 'that Desert should be requited.'
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BOOK IV

UTILITARIANISM

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1. The ethical theory called Utilitarianism, or Universalism, is to be carefully distinguished from Egoism and also from any psychological theory as to the origin of the Moral Sentiments.
2. The notion of 'Greatest Happiness' has been determined chap. i. ; but the extent and manner of its application further defined. Are we to include all Sentient Beings? Total or Average Happiness that we seek to make? We also require a supplementary Principle for the Happiness: the principle of Equality is *prima facie*

CHAPTER II

THE PROOF OF UTILITARIANISM

Common Sense demands a Proof of the first Principle of more clearly than in the case of Egoism and Intuition: a proof, addressed to the Egoistic Hedonist, was in Book iii. chap. xiii. § 3: it exhibited the utilitarian Principle as a clear and certain moral Intuition also important to examine its relation to other reasons.

CHAPTER III

THE RELATION OF UTILITARIANISM TO THE COMMON SENSE

1. Taking as our basis Hume's exhibition of the Virtues and qualities of character, we can trace a complex coincidence of Utilitarianism and Common Sense. It is not necessary to even help the argument—to show this coincidence perfect and exact.
2. We may observe, first, that Dispositions may often be generally felicitous when the special acts that have them are infelicitous. Again, the maxims of morality found to contain an explicit or implicit reference to the good are perceived as already determinate. Passing over the more definite among common notions of Duty:

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3. Generally, a Utilitarian in recommending, by example or precept deviation from an established rule of conduct, desires his imitation to be generally imitated. But in some cases he neither expects nor desires such imitation; though cases of this kind are rare and difficult to determine.
4. There are no similar difficulties in the way of modifying the Idea of Moral Excellence—as distinguished from the dictates of Moral Duty—in order to render it more perfectly felicitous.

CONCLUDING CHAPTER

THE MUTUAL RELATIONS OF THE THREE METHODS

1. It is not difficult to combine the Intuitional and Utilitarian method into one; but can we reconcile Egoistic and Universalistic Hedonism?
2. In so far as the latter coincides with Common Sense, we have seen in Book ii. chap. v. that no complete reconciliation is possible on the basis of experience.
3. Nor does a fuller consideration of Sympathy, as a specially Utilitarian sanction, lead us to modify this conclusion; in spite of the importance that is undoubtedly to be attached to sympathetic pleasures.
4. The Religious Sanction, if we can show that it is actually attached to the Utilitarian Code, is of course adequate;
5. but its existence cannot be demonstrated by ethical arguments alone. Still, without this or some similar assumption, a fundamental contradiction in Ethics cannot be avoided.

APPENDIX ON KANT'S CONCEPTION OF FREE WILL

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