

CONTENTS

FOREWORD	ix
I PYRRHO'S SCEPTICISM ACCORDING TO SEXTUS EMPIRICUS	I
1. INTRODUCTION	1
2. SHORT ACCOUNT OF SEXTUS'S PYRRHONISM	2
3. THE SCEPTICAL WAYS OF ANNOUNCEMENT	7
4. THE DOGMATIC WAYS OF ANNOUNCEMENT	12
5. NEUTRALITY TOWARDS SUBJECTIVIST PHENOMENALISM	15
6. THE SCEPTIC'S REFERENCE TO THE EXISTENCE OF OPPOSITE VIEWS	21
7. THE MATURE SCEPTIC, A MODERATELY KEEN SEEKER AND DOUBTER?	25
8. THE SCEPTIC, A PHILOSOPHER?	28
9. DEFINING SCEPTICISM	33
II THE PSYCHOLOGICAL POSSIBILITY OF SCEPTICISM	36
1. INTRODUCTION	36
2. IS SCEPTICISM MORE LOGICALLY THAN PSYCHOLOGICALLY IMPECCABLE?	37
3. DO THE SCEPTIC'S ACTIONS BETRAY HIS DOGMATISM?	39
4. CAN THE SCEPTIC BELIEVE?	47
5. MUST THE SCEPTIC BE A DOUBTER?	53
6. IS THE SCEPTIC UNPERTURBED BY MODERN SCIENCE?	54
7. IS THE SCEPTIC SENSITIVE TO THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN REAL AND APPARENT?	55
8. GENERAL OUTLOOKS GENERATE SCEPTICISM	57
9. CAN WE ASSUME THAT SEXTUS AND HIS LESS ARTICULATE FRIENDS FULFIL THE REQUIREMENTS?	58
III SCEPTICISM AND POSITIVE MENTAL HEALTH	61
1. INTRODUCTION	61
2. CONFRONTATION WITH SIX CRITERIA OF POSITIVE MENTAL HEALTH	61

CONTENTS

3. ALLEGED SCEPTICISM OF ST. AUGUSTINE AND OTHERS	67
4. MODERATE OR FRAGMENTARY SCEPTICISM OF THE UNPHILOSOPHICAL	69
5. ENCOURAGING A SCEPTICAL BENT OF MIND: CAN IT EVER BE RIGHT?	70
IV CONCEPTUAL COMPLEMENTARITY OF EVIDENCE AND TRUTH REQUIREMENTS	
1. INTRODUCTION	75
2. RESTRICTIONS AND QUALIFICATIONS	77
3. SHIFT FROM PLAIN ANNOUNCEMENT OF KNOWLEDGE TO JUSTIFYING CLAIM TO SAY ONE KNOWS	78
4. REQUIREMENTS OF 'KNOWING' INVOLVING THREE QUESTIONS. CORRESPONDING QUESTIONNAIRES	82
5. THE 'THIRD-PERSON' AND 'FIRST-PERSON' QUESTIONNAIRES	84
6. CONCLUSION ON 'REACHING' KNOWLEDGE	92
7. CONCEPTS OF KNOWING WITHOUT A SEPARATELY SATISFIED TRUTH REQUIREMENT	93
8. SUGGESTION NOT TO USE KNOWLEDGE EXPRESSIONS UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES	98
9. USE OF 'KNOW' AND DEFINITENESS OF INTENTION	102
10. CONCLUSION ON THE COMPLEMENTARITY OF TRUTH AND EVIDENCE	108
V DIALECTICS OF MODERN EPISTEMOLOGICAL SCEPTICISM	
1. INTRODUCTION	110
2. STANDARDS RELATIVE TO STAGE OF DIALOGUE	113
3. MAXIMUM REQUIREMENTS	116
4. MAXIMUM STRENGTHENING OF REQUIREMENTS IN THE FACE OF MISTAKES	119
5. MAXIMUM AND ABNORMAL REPERCUSSIONS	121
6. 'I KNOW NOTHING'. GENERAL LINGUISTIC COUNTER- ARGUMENT	125
7. CIRCULARITY OF THE SCEPTIC'S ARGUMENT	126
8. THE CONCLUSIVENESS OF CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE. SOCIAL AND LINGUISTIC RIGHTNESS AND TRUTH	127
9. EXAMPLES OF THERE BEING SOMETHING WE KNOW OR CAN KNOW	130
10. EXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE FUSING WITH THE EVIDENCED	135
11. INCORRIGIBILITY AND FALLIBILITY	136

CONTENTS

12. CORRIGIBILITY AS A REQUIREMENT OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE	138
13. CAN THE INCORRIGIBILITY REQUIREMENT EVER BE SATISFIED?	140
14. INCORRIGIBILITY OF TRUTH	147
15. CRITICAL INSPECTION OF ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF INCORRIGIBILITY AS UNATTAINABLE	148
16. PENULTIMATE CONCLUSION ON MODERN SCEPTICISM	152
17. ULTIMATE CONCLUSION ON MODERN SCEPTICISM	156
BIBLIOGRAPHY	158
INDEX	163