## CONTENTS

1 9 14 16 18
14 16
16
16
18
-0
23
27
29
32
33
34
36
14
15
16
18
19
51
55
55
57
50
52
ō5
0
2
7
•
4555666777

## CONTENTS

VI. TRANSWORLD IDENTITY OR WORLDBOUND INDIVIDUALS?	
1. The Question	88
2. Socrates in $\alpha$ and Socrates in W	89
3. The Problem of Transworld Identity	92
A. The Problem Stated	92
B. A Temporal Analogy	94
c. The Problem Resolved	96
D. Essence and Transworld Identity E. Does Ramsification Destroy Information?	97 99
4. Objections to TWI	101
5. Counterpart Theory	101
6. Semantic Inadequacies of Counterpart Theory	102
A. Socrates and Xenophon	108
B. Socrates and Socrates-identity	110
7. Metaphysical Inadequacies of Counterpart Theory	114
VII. POSSIBLE BUT UNACTUAL OBJECTS: THE CLASSICAL ARGUMENT	
1. The Question	121
2. Modal Logic and Possible Objects	123
3. How Shall we Take the Semantics?	125
4. Pure and Applied Semantics	126
5. Applied Semantics and Possible Objects	128
6. Are There Nonexistent Objects?	131
7. The Classical Argument	13,3
8. Proper Names and Negative Existentials: Russell	137
9. Proper Names and Negative Existentials: Searle	139
10. Proper Names and Negative Existentials: the Historical Chain	
View	143
11. Some Varieties of Singular Existentials	144
VIII. POSSIBLE BUT UNACTUAL OBJECTS: ON WHAT THERE ISN'T	
1. Predicative and Impredicative Singular Propositions	149
2. The Classical Argument Fails	151
3. Creatures of Fiction	153
4. Names: Their Function in Fiction	1 <b>59</b>
IX. GOD, EVIL, AND THE METAPHYSICS OF FREEDOM	
1. The Problem	164
2. The Free Will Defence	165

viii

3.5

	CONTENTS	ix
3.	The Objection	167
	Which Worlds Could God Have Created?	169
5.	Counterfactuals	174
6.	Leibniz's Lapse	180
7.	Transworld Depravity	184
	The Free Will Defence Triumphant	189
	God's Existence and the Amount of Moral Evil	190
10.	God's Existence and Natural Evil	191
11.	The Probabilistic Argument from Evil	193
X. Go	DD AND NECESSITY	
1.	The Anselmian Statement	197
2.	The Argument Restated	198
3.	The Argument Examined	202
4.	A Mistaken Modal Version	205
5.	The Argument Without Possible Objects	209
6.	The Hartshorne–Malcolm Version	212
7.	A Victorious Modal Version	213
8.	Final Objections and Reflections	217
APPE	NDIX: Quine's Objection to Quantified Modal Logic	
1.	The Objection Initially Stated	222
2.	Sizeability is not a Property	224
3.	The Objection Restated	228
4.	The Objection Examined	229
	A. The Hintikka Response	231
	B. The Smullyan Reply	232
	Proper Terms and Aristotelian Essentialism	233
6.	Modal Logic and Essentialism	235
7.	Quine's Charge and Professor Marcus	238
8.	Quine's Charge and Professor Parsons	243
9.	Essentialism and Applied Semantics	248
INDE	X	253