

CONTENTS

PREFACE

page v

I. THE VARIETIES OF GOODNESS

1. The idea of the conceptual autonomy of morals—a Kantian tradition in ethics. A philosophic understanding of morality must be based on a comprehensive study of the good in all its varieties 1
2. The idea of a sharp distinction between *is* and *ought* and between fact and value—a Humean tradition in ethics. Normative ethics and meta-ethics. Doubts as to whether the two can be sharply distinguished 2
3. Our inquiry is conceptual. Remarks on the nature of conceptual investigations. Moral words in search of a meaning. The moral philosopher as a moulder of concepts. The importance of ethics to our orientation in the world as moral agents 4
4. Division of ethically relevant concepts into three main groups, *viz.* value-concepts, normative concepts, and anthropological (psychological) concepts. Concepts between the groups. The narrow and the broad approach to ethics. The broad approach and the idea of a Philosophical Anthropology. The broad approach and a General Theory of Norms and Values 6
5. The Varieties of Goodness. Illustration of the multiplicity of uses of the word 'good' by means of examples. Distinction of some principal forms of goodness 8
6. The forms of goodness are not species of a generic good. Note on the concept of form 12
7. The multiform nature of goodness is not due to an ambiguity of the word or a vagueness of the concept. The variety of forms of the good not a variety of analogical meanings. Is goodness a family-concept? The meaning-pattern of 'good' as a problem for philosophical semantics 13
8. Affinities between the forms of goodness. So-called moral goodness not an independent form of the good 17

II. INSTRUMENTAL AND TECHNICAL GOODNESS

1. Preliminary explanation of instrumental and technical goodness. The instrumentally or technically good thing is often, but not necessarily, *good of its kind* 19

CONTENTS

- | | |
|---|----|
| 2. Instrumental goodness is primarily goodness <i>for a purpose</i> . Instrumental goodness of its kind presupposes an essential connexion between kind and purpose. Functional and morphological characteristics of kinds. The question of unity of the kind | 20 |
| 3. In the realm of instrumental goodness the opposite of 'good' is 'poor'. Difference between 'poor' and 'bad'. There is no instrumental badness | 22 |
| 4. 'Good' and 'poor' connote contradictories rather than contraries. Poorness a privation | 23 |
| 5. Judgments of instrumental goodness or betterness are objectively true or false. The subjective setting of any such judgment. The notion of a good-making property. Vagueness and instrumental goodness | 24 |
| 6. Sentences expressing judgments of instrumental goodness have a descriptive content or sense. Why they should not be called 'descriptive sentences'. Distinction between the sense of a sentence and its use | 30 |
| 7. Instrumental goodness and commending. Why does goodness appeal? | 30 |
| 8. Instrumental goodness and preferential choice. Distinction between the real and the apparent good. A man necessarily prefers, with a view to a given purpose, the thing which he judges better for that purpose | 31 |
| 9. Technical goodness is primarily goodness <i>at something</i> . Technical goodness of its kind presupposes an essential connexion between kind and activity. Technical goodness is acquired and not innate | 32 |
| 10. In the realm of technical goodness the opposite of 'good' is called 'poor' or 'bad'. The opposition is between contradictories rather than contraries. Technical badness is a privative notion | 34 |
| 11. Tests of technical goodness. Competition and achievement tests. Tests by symptoms and by criteria. The technical goodness of professionals is secondary to instrumental goodness. Note on the creative arts. Goodness and greatness | 35 |
| 12. Technical goodness, commending, and praising. Technical goodness and keenness on activity. A man necessarily wants to practise an art on which he is keen as well as possible | 39 |

III. UTILITARIAN AND MEDICAL GOODNESS. THE BENEFICIAL AND THE HARMFUL. HEALTH AND ILLNESS

1. Utilitarian goodness. The phrases 'be good for' and 'do good to', 'good to be' and 'good to have'. The beneficial

CONTENTS

a sub-category of the useful. The beneficial presupposes the notion of the good of a being	41
2. Relations between instrumental and utilitarian goodness. Instrumental goodness as a degree of usefulness	43
3. The opposites of the useful and the beneficial. The broad and the narrow sense of 'harmful'. Two senses of 'evil'	45
4. Remarks on the logic of causal efficacy in the sphere of utilitarian goodness. The meanings of 'favourable' and 'adverse'	47
5. Are judgments of utilitarian goodness objective? The axiological and the causal components of judgments of the beneficial and the harmful	48
6. Which kind of being has a good? Good and life	50
7. Medical goodness—the goodness of organs and faculties. Relations to instrumental and technical goodness. Essential functions of a being. The concept of normalcy	51
8. The tripartite division well—weak—ill and the bipartite division good—bad. Illness as basic notion. Weakness as potential illness. 'Good' means 'all right'. Note on <i>aitia</i>	54
9. Pain and frustration logically constitutive of badness of organs. Badness and sub-normal performance	56
10. Goodness of faculties. The social aspect of mental illness	58
11. Are judgments of medical goodness objective?	60
12. Health, illness, and the good of a being. The ethical significance of medical analogies (Plato)	61

IV. THE HEDONIC GOOD

1. Pleasure insufficiently discussed in literature. Distinction between passive and active pleasure and the pleasure of satisfaction	63
2. Passive pleasure. The good-tasting apple as example. Primary and secondary hedonic judgments	65
3. Criticism of the view that pleasantness is a sensible quality	67
4. Pleasure and its contraries. The concept of pain	69
5. Analysis of secondary hedonic judgments. An analogy to the emotive theory in ethics. Distinction between third and first person hedonic judgments. The first person judgments express valuations and lack truth-value. The third person judgments are <i>about</i> valuations. They are true or false—but no value-judgments	71
6. The logical form of primary hedonic judgments. How is mention of a valuating subject to be worked into the overt formulation of the value-judgment? The liking-relation	75
7. Active pleasure. Liking to do and wanting to do	77
8. Discussion of Psychological Hedonism. The doctrine misinterprets the necessary connexion between pleasure and satisfaction of desire as being a necessary connexion between desire and pleasure as its object	79

CONTENTS

9. Can a man desire the unpleasant?	84
10. Remarks on Ethical Hedonism. Pleasure is not the sole good, but all forms of the good may have an intrinsic relationship to pleasure	84
V. THE GOOD OF MAN	
1. Welfare the good of man. Distinction between welfare and happiness. Happiness the consummation of welfare	86
2. Happiness, welfare, and ends of action. Discussion of the position of Aristotle. Refutation of Psychological Eudaimonism. A man can pursue his own happiness as ultimate end, and the happiness of others as an intermediate or an ultimate end of his action. Welfare only 'obliquely' an end of action. Welfare as ultimate end and beings as 'ends in themselves'	88
3. Ideals of happiness. Happiness and passive pleasure. Criticism of Epicurean ideals. Happiness and contentedness. Criticism of ascetic ideals. Happiness and active pleasure	92
4. The conditions of happiness. Happiness as conditioned by luck, internal disposition, and action	94
5. The mutability and permanence of happiness. The analogical pairs: pleasant-unpleasant, glad-sad, happy-unhappy	96
6. Analogy between eudaimonic and hedonic judgments. To be happy is to like one's circumstances of life	97
7. First person judgments of happiness express valuations, third person judgments are true or false statements about the way men value their circumstances of life. Insincere first person judgments. Ultimately the subject is judge in his own case	99
8. The causal component involved in judgments of welfare. Consequences and causal prerequisites of changes, which affect the good of man	101
9. Things wanted and unwanted in themselves—an analogue to the concept of intrinsic value	103
10. Ends of action and things wanted in themselves both fall under the category 'goods'. How they are mutually related	104
11. A good and its price. The constituents of a man's good determined. Things beneficial and harmful defined as the nuclei of the positive and negative constituents of a man's good. The concept of need	105
12. Distinction between the apparent and the real good of a man. Judgments of welfare depend upon knowledge of causal connexions. The limitations of man's capacity of judging correctly in matters relating to his welfare	108
13. The problem of the 'objectivity' of judgments concerning that which is good or bad for a man	110

CONTENTS

14. The notion of regret. Repeatable and non-repeatable choices, which are relevant to the good of man. The choice of a life. Note on <i>akrasia</i>	112
VI. GOOD AND ACTION	
1. Technical goodness and 'good' as an attribute of act- individuals	114
2. Instrumental goodness and acts. The notion of a 'way of doing' something. The connexion between way of doing and thing done is intrinsic	115
3. Utilitarian goodness and acts. The connexion between an act as means and an achievement as end is extrinsic	115
4. The beneficial and the harmful as attributes of acts. The notion of <i>doing good</i> (bad, evil, harm) to some being	117
5. The moral goodness and badness of acts is not an independ- ent form of the good, but has to be accounted for in terms of the beneficial and the harmful. A sense in which moral goodness (badness) is 'absolute' and 'objective'— the beneficial (harmful) again is 'relative' and 'subjective'	119
6. On the possibility of judging of the overall beneficial or harmful nature of an act from the point of view of the good (welfare) of a community of men	120
7. Criticism of a suggested definition of moral goodness and badness in terms of the beneficial and harmful nature of action. The moral quality of an act essentially depends upon the agent's intention in acting and his foreseeing of good and harm to others	121
8. Intention. The relation between the intention in acting and the foreseeing of consequences. Foreseen conse- quences of action are not necessarily intended results of action. Distinction between the intentional and the not unintentional	123
9. 'Good' as an attribute of intentions. 'Good intention' and 'intention to do good'. The notion of the intended good (bad). Distinction between the factual and the axiological object of intention. The utilitarian value of good inten- tions for the promotion of good	125
10. A suggested definition of morally good and bad intention in acting and of morally good and bad acts	128
11. The concept of unavoidable bad. Discussion of the condi- tions, under which an act, from which some bad is fore- seen to follow, is not a morally bad act	130
12. The good man. Instrumental, technical, and utilitarian goodness of men. Benevolence and malevolence as attri- butes of character. The good man and the virtuous man	133
VII. VIRTUE	
1. Virtue—a neglected topic in modern ethics	136

CONTENTS

2. Note on the words <i>arete</i> , <i>virtus</i> , and 'virtue'. The logical inhomogeneity of the concept. Distinction between the concept of virtue and the concept of a virtue. Here we are interested only in the second	137
3. A virtue is neither an innate nor an acquired skill in any particular activity. Comparison between a virtue and a technical excellence or the goodness of a faculty	139
4. Acts in accordance with a virtue do not form an act-category. The genus of a virtue is neither that of disposition nor that of habit	141
5. The genus of virtues is state of character. Comment on Aristotle's division into moral and intellectual virtues. Note on the concept of character	143
6. Virtue is concerned with the choice of a right course of action in a particular situation, when the good of some being is at stake	145
7. Virtuous choice the outcome of a contest between 'reason' and 'passion'. The virtuous man has learnt to conquer the obscuring effects of passion upon his practical judgment. Right choice in accordance with virtue is not necessarily the choice of a so-called virtuous act	146
8. The problem of the unity of the virtues. The various virtues as so many forms of self-control. Note on <i>sophrosyne</i>	148
9. How does one learn a virtue? In order to learn a virtue one must come to realize its usefulness. Virtue protects us from harm	149
10. Divisions of the virtues. Ascetic virtues. Self-regarding and other-regarding virtues. A man will of necessity practise as much self-regarding virtue as he is capable of displaying; the extent to which he will practise other-regarding virtues depends on contingencies	152

VIII. 'GOOD' AND 'MUST'

1. Is there an intrinsic connexion between values and norms? The 'axiologist' and the 'deontologist' position. On the necessity of discussing the problem within the frame of a 'general theory' of norms and of values	155
2. The three aspects of norms as commands, as rules, and as practical necessities. Their 'linguistic counterparts': imperative, deontic, and anankastic sentences	157
3. Commands. Commands as efforts, on the part of a norm-authority, to make norm-subjects do or forbear things. Promulgation and sanction essential aspects of norms as commands. Heteronomous and autonomous norms (commands)	158
4. Technical norms—Kant's hypothetical imperatives. Technical norms viewed as contracted forms of Practical Syllogisms. Note on the variety of Practical Syllogisms	160

CONTENTS

5. Means and ends. Necessary and productive means to an end. The probabilistic nature of means-end relationships	163
6. Practical syllogisms and the explanation of action 'from without'	166
7. Practical syllogisms and the explanation of action 'from within'. Practical necessitation. Note on 'reason' and 'passion' (Hume). Answer to the question, whether practical syllogisms are logically conclusive arguments	168
8. Practical syllogisms and autonomous norms. Analogies between norms as practical necessities and norms as commands	171
9. Heteronomous norms and practical necessities. The notion of a well-grounded norm. The necessity of obeying	174
10. Practical necessities and the intrinsic connexion between norms and values	176

IX. DUTY

1. A norm, which is well-grounded relative to the good of some being, imposes a <i>duty</i> . Division of duties into autonomous and heteronomous, self-regarding and other-regarding, positive and negative duties. Negative other-regarding duties and <i>rights</i>	178
2. Autonomous self-regarding duties. Two senses, in which a man can be said to care for his own good. Deliberation about ends. Self-protective self-prohibitions	179
3. Autonomous other-regarding duties. Their relation to the other-regarding virtues. Love as an ultimate interest in the good of another being	182
4. The problem of Egoism. Egoistic and altruistic action. The fallacy of psychological egoism. Comparison between egoism, eudaimonism, and hedonism. Is altruistic interest less natural to man than self-interest?	183
5. Heteronomous self-regarding duties	186
6. The notions of moral authority, moral command, and moral education. The relation of parents and children as example. The reasons and the justification of moral commanding	187
7. Heteronomous other-regarding duties	190
8. The possibility of commanding not founded on a recognized authority or right to command, but on superior strength of the commander over the commanded. Discussion of the concept of strength. Men are by nature approximate equals. Natural inequalities between men; adults and children as example. The twofold importance of the fact that men can co-operate. Co-operation can overrule natural and create artificial inequalities. The institutionalization of normative power	191

CONTENTS

X. JUSTICE	
1. Co-operation. What makes men co-operate? Autonomously necessitated co-operation for a common good	197
2. Exchange of goods and services. Mutual advantage. The Golden Rule. How can respect of my neighbour's good be my duty?	199
3. A basic inequality of goods in a community of men. 'It is better never to suffer harm than sometimes to do harm'. The notions of share, due, and parasitic action	202
4. Revenge as 'natural punishment' of evil-doing. How men's self-interested pursuit of a common good may engender a practical necessity of adopting a practice, which is to the mutual advantage of them all	204
5. Love of man. 'Pathological love' contrasted with 'love of thy neighbour as thyself'	205
6. Survey of the general features of our derivation of the duty to abstain from evil. The Principle of Justice. Justice the corner-stone of morality. How action in accordance with the Principle of Justice may become moral duty. The inner and the outer way. Action from a moral motive and action inspired by a Christian love of man; the two are essentially the same	206
7. Moral duties exist only within a moral community. The moral community determined by similarity of wants and needs and powers of men. The fiction of the super-man. Justice and mercy	211
8. The utilitarian foundation of justice and morality. The two are necessarily of public utility, but their contraries may contingently be of private utility. Moral action is not autonomous self-regarding duty	214
INDEX	217