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The Principle of Determining Correspondence does entail that there are exclusive laws about characteristics whose concepts are empirical . . 405–406

But it does not entail that there are laws which no human being can see to be necessary . . . *page* 406–407
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An external particular can be classified by the grade of its highest-grade internal part 413–414
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CHAPTER XXIII

THE DISCRIMINATION OF PRIMARY PARTS

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Some or all of the primary parts might be distinguished by original qualities, or by the peculiar relation in which each stands to itself or to at least one other particular or to a certain class of particulars 422
It is not certain that every primary part is a member of some group in which there is a non-trivial exclusive common quality 422–423

CHAPTER XXIV

DETERMINING CORRESPONDENCE AND THE STRUCTURE OF THE UNIVERSE

The Principle of Determining Correspondence is compatible with at least six alternative suppositions about the structure of the universe . . . 424

1. The First Supposition 424–429
Statement of five assumptions, of which the fourth is a more determinate form of the third and the third is a more determinate form of the second . . 424–425
The first Supposition is that assumptions (i), (iv), and (v) are fulfilled 425

Three consequences about the structure of the universe follow . . . . . *page* 425–427

On this Supposition the universe would have the greatest possible unity which it could derive from determining correspondence. It would be a "Self-reflecting Unity" 427

1·1. *Self-reflecting Unities* 427–429

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3. The Third Supposition 431–432

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4. The Fourth Supposition 432–433

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5. The Fifth Supposition 433

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