Epistemic Injustice

Power and the Ethics of Knowing

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Contents

	Introduction	1
1.	Testimonial Injustice	9
	1.1 Power	9
	1.2 Identity Power	14
	1.3 The Central Case of Testimonial Injustice	17
2.	Prejudice in the Credibility Economy	30
	2.1 Stereotypes and Prejudicial Stereotypes	30
	2.2 Testimonial Injustice without Prejudice?	41
	2.3 The Wrong of Testimonial Injustice	43
3.	Towards a Virtue Epistemological Account of Testimony	60
	3.1 Sketching the Dialectical Position	60
	3.2 The Responsible Hearer?	67
	3.3 Virtuous Perception: Moral and Epistemic	72
	3.4 Training Sensibility	81
4.	The Virtue of Testimonial Justice	86
	4.1 Correcting for Prejudice	86
	4.2 History, Blame, and Moral Disappointment	98
5.	The Genealogy of Testimonial Justice	109
	5.1 A Third Fundamental Virtue of Truth	109
	5.2 A Hybrid Virtue: Intellectual-Ethical	120
6.	Original Significances: The Wrong Revisited	129
	6.1 Two Kinds of Silence	129
	6.2 The Very Idea of a Knower	142

Contents
,

7. Hermeneutical Injustice	147
7.1 The Central Case of Hermeneutical Injustice	147
7.2 Hermeneutical Marginalization	152
7.3 The Wrong of Hermeneutical Injustice	161
7.4 The Virtue of Hermeneutical Justice	169
Conclusion	176
Bibliography Index	178