Thin Objects

An Abstractionist Account

Øystein Linnebo

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Contents

Preface xi

Part I. Essentials

1. In Search of Thin Objects 3
   - 1.1 Introduction 3
   - 1.2 Coherentist Minimalism 5
   - 1.3 Abstractionist Minimalism 7
   - 1.4 The Appeal of Thin Objects 9
   - 1.5 Sufficiency and Mutual Sufficiency 11
   - 1.6 Philosophical Constraints 13
   - 1.7 Two Metaphysical "Pictures" 17
2. Thin Objects via Criteria of Identity 21
   - 2.1 My Strategy in a Nutshell 21
   - 2.2 A Fregean Concept of Object 23
   - 2.3 Reference to Physical Bodies 26
   - 2.4 Reconceptualization 30
   - 2.5 Reference by Abstraction 33
   - 2.6 Some Objections and Challenges 37
     - 2.6.1 The bad company problem 38
     - 2.6.2 Semantics and metasemantics 38
     - 2.6.3 A vicious regress? 39
     - 2.6.4 A clash with Kripke on reference? 40
     - 2.6.5 Internalism about reference 41
   - 2.7 A Candidate for the Job 42
   - 2.8 Thick versus Thin 45
   - Appendix 2.A Some Conceptions of Criteria of Identity 46
   - Appendix 2.B A Negative Free Logic 48
   - Appendix 2.C Abstraction on a Partial Equivalence 49
3. Dynamic Abstraction 51
   - 3.1 Introduction 51
   - 3.2 Neo-Fregean Abstraction 53
   - 3.3 How to Expand the Domain 55
   - 3.4 Static and Dynamic Abstraction Compared 60
   - 3.5 Iterated Abstraction 61
   - 3.6 Absolute Generality Retrieved 64
   - 3.7 Extensional vs. Intensional Domains 66

Appendix 3.A Further Questions 70
3.A.1 The higher-order needs of semantics 70
3.A.2 Abstraction on intensional entities 70
3.A.3 The need for a bimodal logic 71
3.A.4 The correct propositional logic 73
Appendix 3.B Proof of the Mirroring Theorem 74

Part II. Comparisons

4. Abstraction and the Question of Symmetry 77
4.1 Introduction 77
4.2 Identity of Content 79
4.3 Rayo on "Just is"-Statements 81
4.4 Abstraction and Worldly Asymmetry 83

5. Unbearable Lightness of Being 87
5.1 Ultra-Thin Conceptions of Objecthood 87
5.2 Logically Acceptable Translations 89
5.3 Semantically Idle Singular Terms 90
5.4 Inexplicable Reference 92
Appendix 5.A Proofs and Another Proposition 94

6. Predicative vs. Impredicative Abstraction 95
6.1 The Quest for Innocent Counterparts 95
6.2 Two Forms of Impredicativity 96
6.3 Predicative Abstraction 98
6.3.1 Two-sorted languages 98
6.3.2 Defining the translation 100
6.3.3 The input theory 100
6.3.4 The output theory 102
6.4 Impredicative Abstraction 103
Appendix 6.A Proofs 106

7. The Context Principle 107
7.1 Introduction 107
7.2 How Are the Numbers "Given to Us"? 108
7.3 The Context Principle in the *Grundlagen* 110
7.4 The "Reproduction" of Meaning 114
7.5 The Context Principle in the *Grundgesetze* 117
7.6 Developing Frege's Explanatory Strategy 123
7.6.1 An ultra-thin conception of reference 123
7.6.2 Semantically constrained content recarving 124
7.6.3 Towards a metasemantic interpretation 127
7.7 Conclusion 129
Appendix 7.A Hale and Fine on Reference by Recarving 129

Part III. Details

8. Reference by Abstraction 135
8.1 Introduction 135
8.2 The Linguistic Data 137
8.3 Two Competing Interpretations 140
8.4 Why the Non-reductionist Interpretation is Preferable 143
8.4.1 The principle of charity 143
8.4.2 The principle of compositionality 144
8.4.3 Cognitive constraints on an interpretation 146
8.5 Why the Non-reductionist Interpretation is Available 148
8.6 Thin Objects 151
Appendix 8.A The Assertibility Conditions 153
Appendix 8.B Comparing the Two Interpretations 155
Appendix 8.C Internally Representable Abstraction 156
Appendix 8.D Defining a Sufficiency Operator 157

9. The Julius Caesar Problem 159
9.1 Introduction 159
9.2 What is the Caesar Problem? 160
9.3 Many-sorted Languages 162
9.4 Sortals and Categories 163
9.5 The Uniqueness Thesis 166
9.6 Hale and Wright's *Grundgedanke* 167
9.7 Abstraction and the Merging of Sorts 169
Appendix 9.A The Assertibility Conditions 171
Appendix 9.B A Non-reductionist Interpretation 173
Appendix 9.C Defining a Sufficiency Operator 174

10. The Natural Numbers 176
10.1 Introduction 176
10.2 The Individuation of the Natural Numbers 176
10.3 Against the Cardinal Conception 178
10.3.1 The objection from special numbers 179
10.3.2 The objection from the philosophy of language 180
10.3.3 The objection from lack of directness 181
10.4 Alleged Advantages of the Cardinal Conception 182
10.5 Developing the Ordinal Conception 183
10.6 Justifying the Axioms of Arithmetic 185

11. The Question of Platonism 189
11.1 Platonism in Mathematics 189
11.2 Thin Objects and Indefinite Extensibility 191
11.3 Shallow Nature 192
11.4 The Significance of Shallow Nature 195
11.5 How Beliefs are Responsive to Their Truth 197
11.6 The Epistemology of Mathematics 201

12. Dynamic Set Theory 205
12.1 Introduction 205
12.2 Choosing a Modal Logic 206
12.3 Plural Logic with Modality 208
12.4 The Nature of Sets 211
12.4.1 The extensionality of sets 211
12.4.2 The priority of elements to their set 212
12.4.3 The extensional definiteness of subsethood 213
12.5 Recovering the Axioms of ZF 214
12.5.1 From conditions to sets 214
12.5.2 Basic modal set theory 216
12.5.3 Full modal set theory 217
Appendix 12.A Proofs of Formal Results 219
Appendix 12.B A Harmless Restriction 222

Bibliography 223
Index 233