Free Will as an Open Scientific Problem

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Contents

Acknowl	ledgments	ix

1 - 4	-
Introduction	- 1

1.1	Formulating	the	Problem	of	Free	Will	
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- 1.2 Some Remarks on Libertarianism 15
- 1.3 Synopsis of the Book 18

2 Why the Compatibilism Issue and the Conceptual-Analysis Issue Are Metaphysically Irrelevant 25

- 2.1 Introduction 25
- 2.2 What Determines Whether an Answer to the What-Is-Free-Will Question Is Correct? 28
- 2.3 Why the What-Is-Free-Will Question Is Irrelevant to the Do-We-Have-Free-Will Question, Assuming the OL View Is Correct 30
- 2.4 Why the What-Is-Free-Will Question Is Irrelevant to the Do-We-Have-Free-Will Question, Even if the OL View *Isn't* Correct 35
- 2.5 Why the Compatibilism Question Reduces to the What-Is-Free-Will Question 45
- 2.6 Where We Stand and Where We're Going Next 53
- 2.7 An Aside: Some Remarks on the What-Is-Free-Will Question, the Compatibilism Question, and the Moral Responsibility Question 55

3 Why the Libertarian Question Reduces to the Issue of Indeterminacy 65

- 3.1 Introduction 65
- 3.2 Preliminaries 71
- 3.3 The Argument 83
- 3.4 Non-torn Decisions 120
- 3.5 Where We Stand 130

4 Why There Are No Good Arguments for or against Determinism (or Any Other Thesis That Would Establish or Refute Libertarianism) 131

- 4.1 Introduction 131
- 4.2 An A Priori Argument for Determinism (and, Hence, against TDW-Indeterminism)? 135
- 4.3 An A Priori Argument for Libertarianism (and, Hence, in Favor of TDW-Indeterminism)? 137
- 4.4 Empirical Arguments? 141
- 4.5 Where We Stand 165

Notes 171 References 185 Index 195