

The Limits of Realism

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OXFORD
UNIVERSITY PRESS

Contents

Introduction	I
Part A. External Realism	
1 The picture of external realism	7
1.1. Credo in Independence	7
1.2. Credo in Correspondence	8
1.3. Credo in Cartesianism	10
1.4. Modelling the Credo	11
2 The model-theoretic arguments	14
2.1. Indeterminacy arguments	14
2.2. Infallibilism arguments	17
2.3. Correspondence versus more generic truthmaking	18
3 Attempts to constrain reference	20
3.1. The Causal Constraint	20
3.2. The Eliteness Constraint	21
3.3. The Fullness Constraint	22
3.4. The Modality Constraint	23
4 The just-more-theory manoeuvre	27
4.1. Putnam's notorious manoeuvre	27
4.2. Accusations of question-begging	29
4.3. Metaphysics and magic	30
5 Empiricism and empirical content	32
5.1. Ideal theories and empirical content	32
5.2. A constructed world	35
5.3. A split vocabulary	39
5.4. A notional world	42
5.5. Early modern empiricism	44

6	Sceptical veils of various fabrics	46
6.1.	Empiricism and the Cartesianism Principle	46
6.2.	A veil of senses	48
6.3.	A veil of phenomena	49
6.4.	A veil of observables	50
6.5.	A veil of flux	51
7	From Cartesian to Kantian angst	53
7.1.	The Douven–Putnam argument	54
7.2.	Cartesian scepticism and Kantian scepticism	56
7.3.	Sliding from Cartesian to Kantian scepticism	57
7.4.	The <i>reductio</i> of external realism	59
7.5.	The limits of argumentation	61
Part B. The Tenacity of Cartesian Angst		
8	How the serpent entered Eden	65
8.1.	Independence revisited	65
8.2.	Correspondence revisited	67
8.3.	Cartesianism revisited	70
8.4.	The God’s Eye point of view and Moorean contradictions	71
9	Nonrealism	74
9.1.	Three alternatives to external realism	74
9.2.	The theory of understanding	76
9.3.	Nonrealism and a bracketed basis	77
9.4.	Nonrealism is external subjective idealism	79
10	Natural realism	82
10.1.	An outline of natural realism	82
10.2.	McDowell and Kantian angst	84
10.3.	Curing Cartesian angst to cure Kantian angst	87
10.4.	The natural realist’s invocation of naïve perception	88
10.5.	The generality of the model-theoretic arguments	90
10.6.	Renewed Cartesian angst about ordinary objects	92
11	Justificationism	96
11.1.	The gap between truth and actual justification	96
11.2.	Idealized justification and counterfactuals	98

11.3. Fitch-like unjustifiable truths	100
11.4. Empirical unjustifiable truths	103
11.5. A failed a priori argument against unjustifiable truths	106
11.6. The difficulties in tying truth to idealized justification	108
11.7. Renewed Cartesian angst, again	110
Part C. Dissecting Brains in Vats	
12 Putnam's brain-in-vat argument	115
12.1. The internal and external poles of realism	115
12.2. Putnam's BIV argument	117
12.3. The language of BIVs	118
12.4. Internal scepticism and magic	121
12.5. Disquotation in my language	123
12.6. The nature of brains	127
13 The resilience of the brain-in-vat argument	130
13.1. Rejecting a picture without creating a new one	130
13.2. Dissolving Cartesian angst without philosophical pictures	132
13.3. Sober scepticism and generic delusion	135
13.4. Dead-sober scepticism and ineffable delusion	137
13.5. Exorcism and philosophical therapy	139
14 Davidson's Cogito	141
14.1. Davidson's anti-sceptical argument	141
14.2. Coherence versus correspondence	143
14.3. Bubble scepticism	144
14.4. Metaphysical scepticism	146
15 Vat variations	149
15.1. Scepticism about space	149
15.2. Scepticism about the past	152
15.3. Scepticism about the future	154
15.4. Vats in space	156
15.5. Vats in time	157
15.6. Chaos unleashed	159
16 Mitigated aporia	161
16.1. Clashing intuitions and trolley problems	161
16.2. Selecting preferred intuitions	163

16.3. Navigating intricate intuitions	164
16.4. Surrendering totally to aporia	167
16.5. Connections with other anti-sceptical arguments	168
16.6. Virtues in vats	169
16.7. Letting go	175
16.8. Internal and external as a distinction rather than a dichotomy	176

Part D. Realism within Limits

17 Semantic externalism	181
17.1. Two principles of Putnam's semantic externalism	182
17.2. Brown on recognitional capacities	184
17.3. Continuity of reference over time	186
17.4. Temporal and modal deference	190
17.5. Messy semantic externalism	192
17.6. Kinds beyond all recognition?	193
18 Conceptual relativism	197
18.1. The conceptual relativist manifesto	197
18.2. Rudy and Stan on mereology	199
18.3. The behind-the-schemes argument	201
18.4. The syntax-first thesis and idealism	206
18.5. The demise of conceptual relativism	208
19 Conceptual cosmopolitanism	209
19.1. Hirsch on shallow debates	209
19.2. Cosmopolitans and their many languages	212
19.3. The cosmopolitan and the hardcore realist	214
19.4. Conceptual cosmopolitanism	216
19.5. The slippery slopes of metaphysics	217
Coda	221
Appendices	
I Model theory primer	225
I.1. Structures and permutations	225
I.2. First-order satisfaction	231

I.3. Second-order satisfaction	236
I.4. Löwenheim–Skolem results	238
II Fitch-style reasoning	241
<i>Bibliography</i>	245
<i>Index</i>	259