

The Given

Experience and its Content

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Contents

Introduction	1
1. Intentionality, Phenomenology, Consciousness, and Content	7
1.1 Intentionality, Phenomenology, and Consciousness	7
1.1.1 Intentionality	7
1.1.2 Phenomenology	8
1.1.3 Consciousness is a phenomenological phenomenon	8
1.1.4 Kinds of phenomenology	14
1.2 Intentionality and Content	16
1.2.1 The reductive naturalization project	17
1.2.2 The separation of intentionality and phenomenology	21
1.2.3 The traditional notion of content	23
1.3 Conclusion	29
2. A Brentanian Theory of Content	31
2.1 What Is Given in Experience	31
2.1.1 Phenomenological givenness	31
2.1.2 Categorization of content	33
2.1.3 What (exactly) is phenomenologically given?	37
2.1.4 Awareness of awareness	41
2.1.5 All content is representational content	46
3. Awareness of Awareness	49
3.1 Accounts of Awareness of Awareness	50
3.1.1 Higher-order views	50
3.1.2 Same-order representational views	56
3.1.3 Same-order non-representational views	62
3.2 Summary of Chapters 1–3	65
4. P. F. Strawson's Datum	68
4.1 The Transparency Thesis	70
4.1.1 What is the transparency thesis?	70
4.1.2 Transparency, Standard representationalism, and Disjunctivism	73
4.2 The Datum	75
4.2.1 Distinguishing between our perceivings and the objects of our perceivings	75
4.2.2 The datum and awareness of awareness	77

4.2.3	Disjunctivism, Standard representationalism, and the datum	77
4.2.4	The datum and the unconscious	82
4.2.5	Conclusion	84
5.	Brentanianism, Standard Representationalism, and Fregean Representationalism	85
5.1	General Representationalism	85
5.1.1	Three theories	85
5.2	Standard Representationalism and Fregeanism	88
5.2.1	Standard representationalism	88
5.2.2	Objections to Standard representationalism	90
5.2.3	Fregeanism	91
5.2.4	An objection to Fregeanism	92
5.3	Back to Brentanianism	94
5.3.1	Another look at Brentanianism	94
5.3.2	Veridicality: 'Eden'	100
5.3.3	Veridicality: 'The relativity of our "reallys"'	103
5.3.4	Inverted earth and inverted spectrum	109
6.	Perception of Physical Objects: The Phenomenological Particularity Fact	114
6.1	The Phenomenological Particularity Fact	117
6.1.1	The problem of phenomenological particularity	117
6.1.2	Generalists about phenomenological content	119
6.1.3	A generalist attempt to account for phenomenological particularity	122
6.1.4	Particularists about phenomenological content	125
6.1.5	Martin's account of phenomenological particularity	127
6.2	Object-positing	136
6.2.1	Object-positing and cognitive phenomenology	136
6.2.2	Object-positing and reference	139
7.	Perception of Physical Objects: The Access Problem	142
7.1	The Access Problem	142
7.1.1	The 'particular-way' condition	142
7.1.2	Broad conceptions of sensory phenomenology	147
7.2	Russell's Principle	148
7.2.1	Discriminating knowledge: an internal proposal	148
7.3	The Matching View	150
7.3.1	Perceptual identification: seeing, hearing, and smelling	150
7.3.2	A closer look at seeing	153
7.4	Evans and Demonstrative Identification	155
7.4.1	Evans's focus on tracking and locating	155
7.4.2	Against Evans	159

7.5 The Limits of Error: How Wrong Can One Be?	161
7.5.1 A hierarchy of properties	161
7.6 Objections and Responses	165
7.6.1 Thoughts about the shed	165
7.6.2 Objection 1	166
7.6.3 Objection 2	167
7.6.4 Objection 3	170
7.7 Not a Hallucination	170
7.7.1 The importance of counterfactuals	170
8. Cognitive Phenomenology: What Is Given in Conscious Thought	173
8.1 What Cognitive Phenomenology Is and Isn't	177
8.1.1 Cognitive phenomenology, perceptual phenomenology, and sensory phenomenology	177
8.2 Conscious Thought and Unconscious Thought	181
8.2.1 Distinguishing conscious thought from unconscious thought	181
8.3 Access-consciousness and Cognitive Accessibility	183
8.3.1 Block's notion of access-consciousness	183
8.3.2 Access-consciousness (cognitive accessibility) is not sufficient for conscious thought	186
8.4 Against Cognitive Phenomenology: The Sensory Phenomenology Proposal	192
8.4.1 The simple sensory proposal	192
8.4.2 The conscious content principle	197
8.4.3 Inner speech and the conscious content principle	198
8.4.4 Causation and the conscious content principle	200
8.5 The Givenness of Conscious Thought: Cognitive-phenomenological Content, Internal Representational Content, and External Representational Content	204
8.5.1 How the kinds of content are related	204
8.5.2 Cognitive-phenomenological content and external representational content	206
8.5.3 Cognitive-phenomenological content and internal representational content	207
8.5.4 Cognitive-phenomenological content and basic concepts	212
9. Evaluative Phenomenology: What Is Given in Conscious Emotion	216
9.1 Representation of Emotion-Value Properties and Evaluative Phenomenology	219
9.1.1 Representing 'sadness', 'joyousness', and 'tragicness'	219
9.1.2 Evaluative phenomenology is <i>sui generis</i>	222

9.2 Awareness of Awareness and Evaluative Phenomenology	226
9.2.1 Evaluative awareness	226
9.2.2 Evaluative phenomenology and emotion-value properties	228
9.2.3 A distinctive experience of value	230
9.3 Fine-grained Evaluative Phenomenology	231
9.3.1 Evaluative phenomenology as fine-grained as value properties	231
Concluding Remarks	235
<i>Bibliography</i>	237
<i>Index</i>	247