

# Contents

Introduction	I
<b>PART ONE: Historical Preliminaries</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>Chapter 1: FREGE</b>	<b>7</b>
1.1 Introductory	7
1.2 Meaning ( <i>Bedeutung</i> )	8
1.3 Empty singular terms: preliminary remarks	10
1.4 Sense: preliminary remarks	14
1.5 Sense and thought	18
1.6 Empty singular terms: sense without Meaning?	22
1.7 Empty singular terms: sense without referent	30
1.8 Interpretational semantics and truth theories	33
1.9 Conclusions	38
<b>Chapter 2: RUSSELL</b>	<b>42</b>
2.1 Introductory: Russell's criterion	42
2.2 Radical reference-failure	44
2.3 Russellian singular terms and descriptive names	46
2.4 Definite descriptions	51
2.5 'Rigid designation' and Fregean sense	60
<b>Chapter 3: RECENT WORK</b>	<b>64</b>
3.1 Going beyond Russell: singular thoughts	64
3.2 Russellian sayings: the two strategies	67
3.3 Kripke: singular thought without discriminating knowledge?	73
3.4 The Photograph Model	76
Appendix	80

<b>PART TWO: Thought</b>	<b>87</b>
<b>Chapter 4: RUSSELL'S PRINCIPLE</b>	<b>89</b>
4.1 Its meaning and importance	89
4.2 Verificationism and ideal verificationism	93
4.3 The Generality Constraint	100
4.4 The fundamental level of thought	105
4.5 Comparison with verificationism	112
4.6 The counter-examples	114
<b>Chapter 5: INFORMATION, BELIEF, AND THOUGHT</b>	<b>121</b>
5.1 Information-based thoughts: introductory	121
5.2 The informational system	122
5.3 Interpretation and psychological attributions	129
5.4 The risk of ill-groundedness	132
5.5 Preview	135
Appendix	138
<b>Chapter 6: DEMONSTRATIVE IDENTIFICATION</b>	<b>143</b>
6.1 Demonstrative identification and perception	143
6.2 Information-links are not sufficient	145
6.3 Egocentric spatial thinking: 'here'	151
6.4 Demonstrative identification of material objects	170
6.5 Some consequences	176
6.6 Immunity to error through misidentification	179
Appendix	192
<b>Chapter 7: SELF-IDENTIFICATION</b>	<b>205</b>
7.1 Introductory	205
7.2 Immunity to error through misidentification	215
7.3 Bodily self-ascription	220
7.4 Mental self-ascription	224
7.5 Memory	225
7.6 The possibility of reference-failure	249
7.7 Conclusions	255
Appendix	258
<b>Chapter 8: RECOGNITION-BASED IDENTIFICATION</b>	<b>267</b>
8.1 Introductory	267

8.2 Recognition and the informational system	274
8.3 Recognitional capacities and space	278
8.4 Recognition and recall	284
8.5 Recognition by description?	289
8.6 Mixed Ideas	296
Appendix	299
PART THREE: Language	
Chapter 9: COMMUNICATION AND INFORMATION	305
9.1 Introductory	305
9.2 How communication is effected	309
9.3 The information-invoking use of definite descriptions	320
9.4 Information-invoking singular terms are Russellian	326
9.5 Supplementary arguments	332
9.6 Understanding without an object?	338
Appendix	341
Chapter 10: EXISTENTIAL STATEMENTS	343
10.1 The problem, and constraints on a solution	343
10.2 Games of make-believe	353
10.3 Discourse 'about the novel' (etc.)	363
10.4 Singular negative existential statements	369
Chapter 11: PROPER NAMES	373
11.1 The contrast with 'one-off' devices	373
11.2 Proper-name-using practices	376
11.3 The determination of the reference of a proper name	382
11.4 The late phase of a practice	391
11.5 Understanding proper names	398
Appendix	405
Bibliography	407
Index	415