## Contents

	List	of abbreviations	ix
	Intro	oduction	1
ΡA Rι	RT I Isseli	I	9
1	Russ	ell's first theory of denoting	11
2	I II IV V The of de	The elements 11 The mathematical context 13 Denoting, definition and identity 16 Three essential elements 17 Post-PoM developments 20 collapse of the first theory and the discovery of the theory escriptions	22
	I II III	Introduction: the obscure passage in 'On Denoting' 22 The argument: the 'substantial' round 24 (i) C2 is a different entity from C1 25 (ii) C1 cannot be a constituent of C2 26 (iii) 'But this cannot be an explanation', I 28 (iv) The third charge 32 The argument: the 'symbolic' round 33 (i) The twin phenomena 34 (ii) Use and mention 37	

3

IV	'But this cannot be an explanation', II 38
	(i) The burden of proof 38
	(ii) A survey of theoretical possibilities 38
	(iii) C2 as a description of C1 39
	(iv) Denoting and other logical relations 41
V	The transition 42
VI	The discovery of the theory of descriptions 45
The <b>p</b>	lace of 'On Denoting' in Russell's development
Ι	'On Denoting' and Russell's ontological development: some preliminaries 53
Π	Russell's case against Meinong 58
III	Russell's ontology in PoM reconsidered 61
IV	Methodological developments: 'every word must have some meaning' 66
V	Contextual definition 68
VI	The notion of an incomplete symbol 69
VII	The role of language 73
VIII	Some positive remarks 76

52

79

## PART II Frege

4	Fron	n Begriffsschrift to sense and reference	81
	Ι	Introduction 81	
	Π	The problem 82	
	III	Frege's solution in Bs. 90	
	IV	'Sinn und Bedeutung': the collapse of the first theory 94	
	V	'Sinn und Bedeutung': the new solution 101	
5	Further considerations regarding sense and reference		106
	Ι	The priority of the distinction for proper names 106	
	Π	Sense and indirect speech 109	
	III	Sense as a route and empty senses 112	
	IV	Sense determines reference, I: the question of relativization	117
	V	Sense determines reference, II: the conceptual model 121	
	VI	The application of Russell's argument in OD to Frege's distinction 127	

PART III Russell and Frege			133
6	Russ	ell and Frege compared	135
	Ι	Introduction: the strategy 135	
	Π	The PoM theory of denoting and the theory of sense and reference: some preliminaries 137	
	III	The common ground: propositionalism, sensism and the implied metaphysical model 139	
	IV	The differences, and further similarities, in relation to the metaphysical model 144	
	V	An apparent gap in Frege's argument 148	
	VI	Can all expressions have sense? 151	
	VII	The taxonomic difference: a diagnosis of Frege's position 155	
	VIII	Frege's suppressed premise: are all names on a par? 157	
	IX	The theory of descriptions versus sense and reference: an adjustment on the Russellian side 164	
	X	Frege's description operator and the theory of descriptions 169	
	XI	The progression towards transparency 173	
7	The Russell–Frege enterprise and natural language		179
	Ι	Introduction 179	
	Π	Ordinary names and logically proper names 180	
	III	What morals can we draw from illustration? 182	
	IV	The revisionary nature of the Russell–Frege enterprise 187	
	V	Logic as metaphysics 191	
	VI	The latency of the metaphysical facet 197	
	VII	Concluding remarks: the nature of the enterprise 199	
	Appe	ndix A	203
	The text of the obscure passage from 'On Denoting' 203		
	Appe	ndix B	206
	n		

Russell's example in the latter half of paragraph (D) of the obscure passage 206

## Appendix C

Some	e recent discussions of the obscure passage 208
Ι	Searle, Blackburn and Code, and Hylton 208
Π	Pakaluk 210
III	Kremer 213
IV	Noonan 219

Bibliography Index 223

227