

CONTENTS

PREFACE, vii

INTRODUCTION, 1

I

THE NATURE OF ACTION, 4	<i>Actions, Doings, and Doing-Related Events, 4</i>
	<i>Desire and Action, 6 The Theory of Agency, 10</i>
	<i>The Contextual Theory, 12</i>
	<i>The Volitional Theory, 15</i>
	<i>Volitions, Attempts, and Mental Events, 16</i>
	<i>Volitions as Functionally Characterized, 18</i>
	<i>Event or Process? 22 The Location of Volitions, 23</i>
	<i>Conclusion, 25</i>

2

ACTIONS AND EVENTS, 27	<i>Two Problems, 27 Identity, 28</i>
	<i>Seven Arguments, 29 The Prolific Theory, 30</i>
	<i>Generation, 31 A Moderate Theory, 33</i>
	<i>Dissatisfactions, 35 The Austere Theory, 36</i>
	<i>Volitions and Actions, 38</i>

3

ABILITY, 42

- Ability, Possibility, and Luck, 43*
Developing a Conditional Analysis, 44
An Objection to Conditional Analyses, 48
Repertoires, 50 Ability Now to Act Later, 53

4

INTENTION, 57

- Acting Intentionally and Intending, 59*
Acting Intentionally, 60
"Knowingly" versus "Intentionally," 62
"Aiming At," 64 "Because He Believed . . . , 67
Is Knowledge Necessary to Acting Intentionally? 69
Theories of Intending, 72
Knowledge of One's Future Actions, 74
Intending and Doing, 77 Intentional Omissions, 81

5

EXPLANATIONS OF ACTIONS, 83

- Explaining Actions and Explaining Events, 84*
Reasons-Explanations as Causal, 86
Deterministic and Nondeterministic Explanations, 90
Reasons-Explanations as Simply Nondeterministic, 93
Reasons-Explanations as Interpretive, 96
Purely Interpretive Explanations, 98
Teleological Explanations, 102 Conclusion, 106

6

AUTONOMY AND RESPONSIBILITY, 107

- The Standard Positions, 109*
Arguments for Incompatibilism, 110
Autonomy and Freedom, 112
Autonomy and Time, 119
Autonomy, Manipulation, and Determinism, 120
The Attractions of Indeterminism, 123
Responsibility, 133

BIBLIOGRAPHY, 142

INDEX, 148