

# ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS

## CHAPTER I

	PAGE
ETHICS AS THE SCIENCE OF MORAL IDEAS . . . . .	I
<i>The Nature of Ethics</i>	
PAR. 1. Ethics is the science of moral ideas. This summary description may be expanded by reference to the traditional problems of ethics . . . . .	I
2. It is generally accepted that the main subject of ethics is human conduct with respect to its goodness or badness, rightness or wrongness . . . . .	1
3. And that we identify 'moral' standards with 'supreme' standards of action . . . . .	2
4. Our primary concern, therefore, is the supreme standards or principles of right and wrong . . . . .	4
<i>The Study of Ethics</i>	
5. Ethics may be studied to discover principles for practical application or for theoretical satisfaction . . . . .	5
6. Indifference to either of these aims is dangerous. Excessive preoccupation with practical aims risks confusing impartial investigation of standards with partial advocacy of some particular standard as a pretended 'defence of morality' . . . . .	6
7. But if we ignore the practical aim of ethics, we may concentrate on trifling disputes . . . . .	7
8. It is safest to take, as immediate aim, the purely theoretical understanding of moral ideas, remembering that the justification of our work is its potential value to humanity . . . . .	8
<i>Ethics as a Science</i>	
9. In formulating more precisely the fundamental problem of ethics, the traditional approach affords no clear guidance. Is our question, 'What standard ought we to use in moral judgement?' or 'What standard do we in fact use?' Reflection shows that the second of these questions is the only proper one. . . . .	9
10. Following its answer, many other questions may be raised; but none of these concerns a standard which ought to be used . . . . .	11
11. Whether this primary question can be treated scientifically depends on whether moral ideas generally can be studied scientifically. . . . .	12
12. Scientific method works with 'observable' data, employing observation, hypothesis, deductive development of hypothesis, verification by fresh observation, establishment of theory . . . . .	13
13. Since, for our main problem, moral judgements are our data, we can apply scientific method only if those data are 'observable' . . . . .	15
14. The kind of 'observability' required for science, though more readily accepted with regard to physical facts, can belong to psychological facts, including moral and other value judgements; and ethics can employ scientific method. . . . .	16

PAR.	PAGE
15. Ethics is an empirical rather than a mathematical science . . . . .	18
16. The conception of moral and other judgements as 'data' (about which we reason) is to be distinguished from their use as 'premisses' (from which we reason) . . . . .	19
17. Kant, in some respects following the method here advocated, neglects this distinction . . . . .	20

### *The Data of Ethics*

18. Evidence for the nature of moral ideas and their implied principles is found: firstly, by introspection. The utility of this method, though limited, is real . . . . .	22
19. Secondly, by the method of Piaget in his study of the child mind. Properly used, this method is very valuable . . . . .	24
20. Thirdly, by the examination of social law and institutions—the method mainly used in the present inquiry. . . . .	27
21. This third method affords evidence as to the nature of common moral ideas; for, though 'legal' and 'moral' are not identical, their contents are largely the same, since . . . . .	27
22. Moral ideas of the 'fair' and 'just' continually influence the development of law through judicial decision, legislation, approved custom, and private agreement . . . . .	28
23. And an established system of rights and duties gives initial content to the individual moral consciousness. . . . .	31
24. Social law and institutions may, therefore, be taken as the primary field of research, while the first and second methods will be appropriate for detailed study of the individual mind . . . . .	31
25. Conclusion . . . . .	32

## CHAPTER II

CUSTOMARY MORALITY AND THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY . . . . .	34
---	----

### *Primitive Moral Ideas*

26. Reflection, while an important factor in the development of moral ideas, must have some 'primitive convictions' upon which it operates. How do these originate? . . . . .	34
27. They come to the individual from the community, and are accepted at first uncritically because of a tendency to imitate behaviour in an established order and to accept recognized authority. . . . .	35
28. Evidence for this comes from at least three sources: firstly, the study of the child mind in its most receptive stage, as shown by early memories . . . . .	35
29. And by Piaget, who holds that, for the very young, the moral guide is the directive of an adult authority . . . . .	37
30. This is illustrated by their attitude to rules of games. . . . .	38
31. And to truth-telling and lying . . . . .	39
32. Secondly, the study of primitive societies, where the emphasis is on tradition and authoritative precedent . . . . .	40

# ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS

xi

PAR.	PAGE
33. Thirdly, the study of civilized institutions, which show that our initial tendency is to accept custom or an authoritative ruling as the guide to duty. . . . .	41
34. This first phase of the moral consciousness may be called customary morality; and our first attempts at moral theory generally identify the supreme standard of conduct with the command of some supreme authority . . . . .	43
<i>The Principle of Authority</i>	
35. Any moral theory must satisfy two tests: firstly, self-consistency; and secondly, consistency with our moral ideas in general. In its simplest form the Authoritarian theory fails in this second test . . . . .	44
36. For, while the attitude of young children is primarily respect for authority, this is gradually superseded by a critical attitude to authoritative command . . . . .	45
37. It is doubtful whether even young children think of authority as 'making' actions right; for they seem to attribute a kind of 'perfection' to the authorities they respect . . . . .	46
38. Further, contemporary sociologists tend to hold that, in primitive societies, respect for authority depends upon a rudimentary apprehension of ends and principles by the members of the community generally . . . . .	47
39. We reach the same conclusion in the further study of civilized institutions; for it is clear that courts of justice look beyond authorities to principles . . . . .	49
40. Lower courts may be criticized by higher courts for emphasizing ends and principles at the expense of established rules . . . . .	51
41. This does not mean, however, that rules take precedence of principles; but that the specific function of courts is to apply principles embodied in existing rules . . . . .	52
42. Looking to principles is an essential part of the administration of justice; and this means that legal 'authority' is subordinate to some other standard or principle . . . . .	53
43. The foregoing considerations do not, it is true, refute the Authoritarian theory, allegedly based on the religious consciousness, which holds that principles are themselves the commands of God . . . . .	55
44. But the theory is not consistent even with the religious consciousness, for this consciousness tends to attribute 'righteousness' to God as an essential attribute; and what is an essential attribute of a person's nature cannot be a creation of his own will . . . . .	55
45. Any attempt to restate the theory to meet the foregoing criticism is open to objection on logical grounds . . . . .	57
46. The Authoritarian theory confuses the conceptions of 'guide to' and 'standard of' action, a distinction which, normally unimportant for practical life, is of great importance for moral theory . . . . .	57
47. Customary morality is not reflectively aware of the ends and principles determining its development; but since these do in fact operate, authority cannot be the ultimate standard of the distinction between right and wrong . . . . .	59

## CHAPTER III

	PAGE
THE MORALITY OF SOCIAL JUSTICE: RIGHTS, DUTIES, AND OBLIGATIONS . . . . .	61
PAR.	
48. When the moral consciousness becomes aware of its own guiding principles we have the morality of social justice, in which the conceptions of 'good' and 'social order' are fundamental. The next two chapters will treat of these conceptions . . . . .	61
49. The present chapter will analyse the ideas of 'right', 'duty', and 'obligation', in which the notion of justice expresses itself, showing that rights refer to interests, duties and obligations being consequent upon rights . . . . .	62
<i>Promissory and Contractual Obligations</i>	
50. In law an agreement is presumed to create an obligation; the obligation being, apparently, to respect the interests of the persons concerned . . . . .	63
51. This explanation is supported by analysis of the nature of a 'promise' . . . . .	64
52. This general presumption of 'bindingness' may be challenged; but it is clear that the protection of interests is also the aim when promises are 'void' or 'voidable' . . . . .	65
53. The same aim is clearly operative when voidable promises are enforced . . . . .	67
54. And in the remedies granted for breach of contract . . . . .	68
55. And in the methods by which obligations may be 'extinguished'. In short, the whole system of rules governing promissory obligations is based on care for the interests of persons. . . . .	69
<i>Interests and Rights</i>	
56. Do all duties and obligations carry a reference to interests? Duties are usually described in relation to rights. We begin, therefore, with the analysis of rights, which fall into two classes: 'real rights' (corresponding technically to duties) and 'personal rights' (corresponding to obligations). . . . .	70
57. The pre-legal 'nucleus' of a right is a field of voluntary action. It is pre-legal in the sense that it is protected, not created, by law when law establishes rights. . . . .	71
58. This field is one of freedom to pursue or not to pursue some particular interest ('interest' meaning 'object of conation') . . . . .	71
59. And it may be called a 'sphere of autonomy' . . . . .	72
60. When a 'sphere of autonomy' is protected by law it is a 'right'. Jurists disagree about the definition of 'right' . . . . .	73
61. But, looking to particular examples, we see that rights fall into two classes: those held against the world in general (requiring non-interference), and those held against some particular person (generally requiring positive service) . . . . .	75
62. This is the distinction between 'real' and 'personal' rights; and both are called 'rights' because of their relation to the interests of persons . . . . .	76
63. A 'right' is defined as 'a sphere of autonomy to which are annexed legal demands upon the behaviour of other conative beings' . . . . .	78

PAR.	<i>Duties and Obligations and their Relation to Rights</i>	PAGE
64.	Both in civil and in criminal law the vast majority of duties and obligations are obviously correlative to rights. Hence a duty or obligation may be provisionally defined as 'what is demanded in the constitution of a right' . . . . .	78
65.	Supposed exceptions are: (a) public duties, (b) duties to animals, (c) duties of artificial persons, (d) certain criminal wrongs. But (a) there is no real difficulty about the conception of rights correlative to public duties . . . . .	80
66.	With regard to (b), if we have really no duties to animals the problem vanishes; but the reasonable view is that we do have such duties . . . . .	82
67.	Assuming duties to animals, it may be asserted that they have no rights, for the ability to 'claim' or enforce a right is essential to the conception of a right . . . . .	82
68.	But an examination of some admitted rights shows that the owning and the power to claim or enforce are quite distinct . . . . .	83
69.	Examining the position of animals under modern law, we see that they possess rights in the sense defined . . . . .	85
70.	The apparent difficulty about (c) is that artificial persons are not conative beings possessing interests. But the legal recognition of artificial persons is only a convenient way of grouping rights and duties of real persons in particular systems of transactions . . . . .	86
71.	With regard to (d), crimes apparently infringing no rights, four call for discussion: firstly, crimes not actually infringing any person's rights. Examination shows that such crimes endanger public or private rights . . . . .	88
72.	Secondly, suicide. The condemnation of suicide has been on the ground that we are assumed to be God's subjects or chattels, infringing His proprietary rights if we destroy ourselves . . . . .	90
73.	Duties imposed for the protection of real or presumed interests may be enforced after the interest has disappeared. This applies especially to criminal law, where liability depends not on proof of actual injury but on action generally accepted as tending to injure. When this tendency is no longer accepted, the act will sooner or later be removed from the list of crimes . . . . .	91
74.	Thirdly, the crime of incest, which is admittedly difficult to explain. But this is merely an unexplained and not a contradictory case confronting our theory . . . . .	92
75.	General conclusions regarding the relations of interest, right, duty, and obligation; and the significance of this legal theory for the conception of moral justice . . . . .	95

## CHAPTER IV

THE MORALITY OF SOCIAL JUSTICE: THE IDEA OF THE GOOD . . . . .	96
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*The Meaning of 'Good'*

76. On what principle are interests protected as rights? Utilitarians answer: 'They are protected so far as their objects are seen to be really or truly good' . . . . .	96
--	----

PAR.	PAGE
77. What does 'good' mean? In ethics we are concerned with value judgements only so far as they have some relation to the moral consciousness. Here it is adopted as a working hypothesis that value judgements carry a subjective reference, and we proceed to test this hypothesis . . . . .	96
78. Setting out a number of value judgements in their contexts . . . . .	98
79. We note a definite subjective reference, some of the judgements reinforcing this by the distinction between 'good for you' and 'good for me' . . . . .	101
80. This distinction, incompatible with the 'intrinsic' theory of value, is compatible with a value judgement's being either true or false . . . . .	102
81. Also supporting the subjective reference is the fact that desire or aversion is sometimes taken as presumptive evidence that a thing is good or bad for the person concerned . . . . .	104
82. This is only accepted as presumptive not conclusive evidence . . . . .	105
83. But it is assumed that we cannot speak of a thing as good for a person without attempting to interpret his main conative tendencies normally expressed through his actual desires . . . . .	106
84. The value judgement is 'a judgement referring to the objective relations in which the thing valued stands to something else, the latter being desired by a subject-of-ends' . . . . .	107
85. This is clear with regard to 'good-as-means' judgements. But if (as is usually supposed) the 'good-as-means' value judgement always implies a 'good-as-end' judgement, it may be argued that this latter is a judgement of 'intrinsic' goodness to which the above definition cannot apply . . . . .	107
86. The 'good-as-means' judgement, however, does not necessarily imply the evaluation of an end but only the pursuit of an end. This is clear from some of our examples . . . . .	109
87. And from the conception of a bona fide 'good-as-means' judgement in the realm of law . . . . .	109
88. Since the 'good-as-means' judgement does not necessarily imply a 'good-as-end' one, it does not imply any 'unprovable' valuation; and the most reasonable view is that the 'good-as-end' judgement refers to the objective relations of an end in a system of ends of the same subject . . . . .	112
89. The following supplementary points may be noted: firstly, the difficulty of distinguishing between 'means-' and 'end-' judgements is due partly to their interconnexion in practical life; and, secondly, partly also to our being concerned with the same kind of objective relation in both cases. In the 'means' valuation the thing valued is not, while in the 'end' valuation it is, antecedently desired . . . . .	113
90. Thirdly, there is little if anything in our valuations to suggest the conception of a supreme, absolute end—a conception presumably due to the assumption that the 'good' is the source of obligation . . . . .	114
91. Fourthly, there is, however, the subjective unity of the valuing subject; and the conception of 'good' is therefore a personal conception, 'common good' meaning the collection or system of ends common to all personal systems. Nothing here said should be taken to mean that the total system of ends is itself evaluated, or that 'personal' is to be identified with 'selfish' . . . . .	115

ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS

xv

PAR.	PAGE
92. Fifthly, it is important for moral theory to distinguish, within total 'personal good', the following types of ends: neutral, self-regarding, other-regarding, and mixed ends . . . . .	117
93. Summary of foregoing theory of value judgement . . . . .	119
<i>Relation of the Conception of 'Good' to the Conception of 'Obligation'</i>	
94. It appears that the content of all duties implies the idea of the good; but there is the question whether it is also the ground of the formal notion of duty . . . . .	121
95. The idea of personal good, being concerned with the relations of the ends of the same subject, cannot be the ground of duty which is concerned with the relations of subjects or persons . . . . .	121
96. If the 'common good' were the ground of duty, two consequences would follow: firstly, 'rights' would be logically consequent upon 'duties'; and we have seen that the true relation is the reverse of this . . . . .	122
97. Secondly, we should expect other-regarding ends to have priority of legal protection; but, in fact, the order of priority appears to be: self-regarding, neutral, mixed, other-regarding ends. This is illustrated in a particular case which brings out the following points . . . . .	124
98. When the interests of persons conflict, some interests are protected as rights, but a residue of pure 'spheres of autonomy' remains open to competitive endeavour . . . . .	125
99. Legally, an individual may frustrate the interests of others within this competitive field without normally incurring liability whatever his motive may have been; but if he acts as a member of a combination his motives will be taken into account . . . . .	126
100. In the latter case the only motive having a presumptive claim to protection—apart from special circumstances giving rise to obligations of trust—is a self-regarding motive . . . . .	126
101. The law thus appears to prefer selfishness to pure unselfishness in our motives . . . . .	127
102. This apparent cynicism has been deprecated; but the cynicism is only apparent. Not only are there 'balancing' assumptions in the law imposing stern obligations of an other-regarding nature . . . . .	129
103. But also, in applying the 'test of self-interest', the law is not really acquiescing in a low view of human nature. It is demanding respect for the liberty of other persons in the pursuit of their own good . . . . .	130
104. Hence, the principle underlying legal protection of interests is not the idea of common good but of an order of personal relations based on liberty and equality. While the particular content of duties implies the idea of the good, the explanation of the formal conception of duty is to be sought elsewhere . . . . .	131

CHAPTER V

THE MORALITY OF SOCIAL JUSTICE: THE PRINCIPLE OF JUSTICE . . . . .	133
105. The idea of Justice on its formal side is based on the two notions of liberty and equality, along with a third notion which may be called merit . . . . .	133

PAR.	<i>Equality</i>	PAGE
106.	What is demanded in a 'just order' is not only equality before the law but also equality of treatment by the law. Equity is proportionate equality	134
107.	The application of the principle of equality often confuses different forms of 'distributive' and 'corrective' justice. This chapter is concerned with distributive justice	135
108.	Our initial tendency is to apply the principle of equality in a crude form. This is shown by Piaget's analysis of children's ideas of justice	136
109.	It is also evident in the adult mind's first approach to problems of practical justice	138
110.	Crude expressions of equality have caused some to reject the principle itself; but their own criticisms show that they themselves assume its validity	139
111.	How the principle operates when discriminatingly applied may be seen in legislation	140
112.	For example, in the debate on the 1918 Representation of the People Bill	140
113.	Here the conceptions of 'equality', 'universality', and 'logicality' were assumed as criteria of 'justice'	142
114.	Even speakers who professed to reject such criteria were obviously assuming them	143
115.	Most disclaimers with regard to equality concerned the proposed extension of the franchise to women. Of the two most interesting arguments the first distinguishes 'right' (interest) from 'capacity'	144
116.	But, on the speaker's own showing, while in a question of 'capacity' equality does not apply directly, its indirect application is implied, and in a question of 'right' its direct application is admitted	145
117.	The second argument confuses questions of right and capacity, is pre-occupied by questions of obligation, and gives a special turn to the meaning of 'equality'. In short, there is no case—apart from confusion of issues or terminology—where equality is not assumed as fundamental to a 'just order'	147
<i>Liberty</i>		
118.	Equality is not the whole idea of justice; for it is assumed that a just order will not only observe the same 'ratio' for all persons but will also select a certain particular ratio	149
119.	There are two methods (corresponding to the difference between 'interest' and 'capacity') of selecting the ratio; and the first is the one principally envisaged in the claims to justice already noted	150
120.	The conception here is of maximum liberty for the individual to express his 'conatus'; and this is the root of the claim that 'all men are free and equal by nature'	151
121.	When interests conflict, this principle is applied to give priority of protection to the self-regarding interests of each person concerned	152
122.	When individuals conflict in pursuit of self-regarding interests, the principle appears to indicate equality of opportunity in pursuit of each person's most important interests; importance being judged by what is most intensely and persistently desired. This is intelligible in view of the relation of value judgements to conative tendencies	153



## ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS

xvii

PAR.	<i>Merit</i>	PAGE
123.	The notion of 'merit' is included in the idea of justice because 'personal rights' and 'obligations' (in the technical sense) arise in a community of interdependent members . . . . .	154
124.	'Community' implies an historical view of society, and therefore the conception of trusteeship and performance of function within a whole. . . . .	156
125.	Secondary or enabling rights generally depend upon obligations. Such rights follow from the conception of 'merit'; and it is through undue emphasis upon them that we frequently misunderstand the essential relation between rights and duties . . . . .	157
126.	The recognition of merit does not supersede but does complicate the recognition of liberty and equality . . . . .	157
127.	In an equitable distribution of rights, liberty is assumed to be more important than merit; and this seems to be the meaning of the conception of 'moral equality' . . . . .	158
128.	The priority of liberty over merit is also indicated in the assumption that, though 'obligations' exceed 'duties' in number and effort required, in any conflict between the two it is the obligation which must give way to the duty . . . . .	160
129.	Summary of conclusions on the principle of Justice . . . . .	161
130.	Summary of the theory of the Morality of Social Justice . . . . .	161

### CHAPTER VI

#### IDEAL MORALITY . . . . . 162

131.	The present chapter attempts not to explore but only to indicate the nature of 'ideal morality' and its relation to 'justice' . . . . .	162
------	---	-----

#### *Morality Transcending the Notion of Duty*

132.	Popular maxims suggest that there is a morality transcending justice; but, if so, this must be a morality beyond obligation, since rights and duties fall wholly within the field of justice . . . . .	162
133.	Bosanquet holds that there is a form of morality beyond the 'world of claims and counter-claims' finding expression in the religious consciousness. Are there any facts of moral experience to support his doctrine? . . . . .	163
134.	Some expressions of the religious consciousness certainly stress an ideal of self-dedication which appears to abandon the standpoint of justice; and the difference between the two 'moralities' is that one is concerned with claims and counter-claims and the other with an ideal of service . . . . .	164
135.	Having recognized its essential characteristics, we see that 'ideal morality' is not confined to the religious consciousness in the ordinary sense. It finds expression in communist policy . . . . .	167
136.	And is a necessary element in all ideals of public service . . . . .	168

#### *The Relation of Ideal Morality to Social Justice*

137.	Analysing further the attitude in 'ideal morality', we ask: firstly, why call it 'ideal'? It is so called to distinguish it from the morality of obligation; for the language of obligation is appropriate only to situations involving recognition of rights . . . . .	170
------	---	-----

PAR.	PAGE
138. Secondly, why call it ideal 'morality'? In explaining this point, we reject Bosanquet's view that this 'higher' morality not only transcends but also stands in contradiction to the principle of justice . . . . .	171
139. To win final approval any form of idealism must fulfil three conditions: firstly, there must be genuine devotion to other-regarding ends. Secondly, these ends must be conceived in terms of benefit to other persons . . . . .	171
140. Thirdly, the attitude must be consistent with respect for the recipients and all other persons involved as subjects-of-ends; i.e. consistent with our duties and obligations to them . . . . .	172
141. Hence ideal morality, while ignoring the rights of the agent himself, does not contravene the principles of justice in the sense of ignoring the rights of others. Moral idealism is distinguished from fanaticism in that the former respects the 'moral equality' of others . . . . .	173
142. On the other hand, while a just order might theoretically exist without moral idealism, this is not practically possible in any closely integrated society . . . . .	174
143. Summary and conclusion . . . . .	176

## CHAPTER VII

MORAL STANDARDS AND HUMAN NATURE . . . . .	178
144. The aim of the preceding chapters has been to discover the standards implied in moral judgement. Are these standards merely accidental, or are they in any sense necessary? . . . . .	178
145. While we cannot intelligently ask whether we 'ought' to use these standards of judgement, it is proper to ask whether they 'follow from our nature'. Apparently they do, since all moral experience implies the idea of the 'good' and the idea of an 'order' of personal relations; and these two ideas are grounded in our faculties of Desire and Reason . . . . .	178
<i>The 'Faculty of Desire'</i>	
146. All value judgements, from the point of view of their content, may be regarded as grounded in our desiring nature . . . . .	180
147. Even the 'social order' is, like the natural order, valued because it enables us to form policies in the pursuit of ends. The main difference between the two orders is that the latter is based on 'conformity to law' and the former on 'conformity to the conception of law' . . . . .	180
148. But while our expectations regarding human conduct are partly founded on voluntary conformity to law, voluntary action itself is conditioned by relatively permanent conative tendencies. Hence any standard of human conduct must carry some reference to our desiring nature . . . . .	182
<i>The 'Faculty of Reason'</i>	
149. But, looking at moral and other value judgements from the point of view of their form, the idea of 'order' acquires primary importance. The idea of 'order' can itself determine us to action; and this idea is dependent on Reason . . . . .	184
150. Even in obeying 'hypothetical imperatives' the act of choice is determined not by desire but by reason as the faculty of apprehending universal laws . . . . .	185

## ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS

xix

PAR.	PAGE
151. In 'categorical imperatives' the idea of order is the limiting principle restricting pursuit of personal good; for reason becomes the master rather than the servant of our ends once we come into relation with other subjects-of-ends . . . . .	186
152. The fact that categorical imperatives exist for the moral consciousness was obscurely recognized even by Bentham and Mill . . . . .	187
153. But the most satisfactory explanation of this fact is Kant's view of our rational nature as the faculty for apprehending universals and determining to action in accordance therewith . . . . .	188
154. Admittedly, this theory leaves much unexplained; but the terms 'desire' and 'reason' indicate, however crudely, the two aspects of our nature from which our moral standards ultimately arise . . . . .	190
155. Since these standards follow from our nature, they are not merely accidental and liable to be superseded by others . . . . .	191
156. The foregoing theory may perhaps imply an inevitable tendency of conduct to follow standards; but such possible implications are not here discussed . . . . .	192

### CHAPTER VIII

RESPONSIBILITY . . . . .	194
157. Arguments advanced in previous chapters may suggest 'determinism', and therefore raise the problem of 'responsibility'. If human action is intelligible, it is caused; but, if it is caused, can we be responsible? . . . . .	194
<i>The Intelligibility of Human Behaviour</i>	
158. 'Intelligibility' implies: firstly, the postulate of 'Causality'—every event has a cause. Causality refers not to substances but to modes; and to explain any event is to establish an unalterable relation between it and some other event as its cause . . . . .	194
159. Secondly (following necessarily from the postulate of Causality), the postulate of 'Conservation'—every event has an effect. The two postulates envisage an unending series in which there is neither first cause nor last effect . . . . .	196
160. Thirdly, these two postulates imply that of 'Reciprocity'—the interaction of substances in a 'closed system' . . . . .	198
161. Thus 'intelligibility' implies a world or system of members responding to each other, each in accordance with its own nature; and 'explanation' is the correlation of an occurrence in one member with an occurrence in another . . . . .	198
162. This does not involve the conception of determination by 'necessary laws' external to things themselves; for laws of nature are but formulas expressing regularities of behaviour manifesting the inherent natures of things . . . . .	199
163. Nor does intelligibility imply that all causal connexion is mechanical. It may be teleological. Mechanical causation concerns the response of a mass to a mere event in something else; while teleological causation concerns an integrated system responding to another system; and this latter implies some degree of consciousness, since anticipation of future events is involved . . . . .	199
164. Summary of the doctrine of intelligibility . . . . .	201

PAR.	<i>The Conception of Responsibility</i>	PAGE
165.	Whether this doctrine is compatible with responsibility may be seen by examining the assumptions of penal liability. Punishment is a form of corrective justice, and is best studied as systematically applied in criminal procedure . . . . .	202
166.	Corrective justice—designed to protect an existing order of distributive justice against attack—takes three main forms: Reparation, repairing breaches actually made; Punishment and Reformation, designed to deter from such breaches . . . . .	203
167.	All three forms assume: firstly, the physical responsibility of the agent; and, secondly, his teleological responsibility in the sense that the wrong must have been the result of his aiming at something (not necessarily the actual effect produced) . . . . .	204
168.	From this point conditions of liability diverge; and an account of the divergence requires a preliminary distinction between: (a) Intentional transgression, (b) Recklessness or gross negligence, (c) Thoughtlessness or simple negligence, and (d) Innocent mistake of fact . . . . .	205
169.	Generally speaking, while (c) entails liability for reparation, (a) or (b) is necessary for liability to either punishment or reformation. The dividing line is drawn here because (a) and (b) show deliberate indifference to public order, while (c) and (d) do not. Punishment, then, strikes at weakness in the 'order' (rational) motive as distinguished from the 'good' (desiring) motive. . . . .	207
170.	Liability to punishment assumes the person to be normally capable of determination by both motives, and also normal circumstances in the sense that the law could have been obeyed consistently with satisfaction of fundamental conative tendencies. . . . .	208
171.	This conception of responsibility is quite compatible with intelligibility and implies no 'indeterminism' . . . . .	208
172.	Consideration of aims and methods of punishment supports this conclusion. The aim is to deter; the method is to induce anticipation of painful consequences, and this assumes the agent's 'responsible' action to be teleologically caused, for it is in the adjustment of conditions that the 'good' motive will operate . . . . .	209
173.	No actual system of punishment corresponds completely to the foregoing description, for incompatible beliefs are embedded in all systems. But certain main tendencies are discernible, and these are the ones here stressed . . . . .	211
174.	Clarification of the aims and methods of punishment brings to light its limited value. Since it strikes at those who are weak in 'order' motives, its application to those who break rules on 'conscientious principles' is of questionable utility . . . . .	211
175.	And, at the other extreme, it is ineffective for persons having abnormally weak 'order' motives or an abnormal system of personal good; the effective deterrent here being reformation. Punishment is chiefly of value for those who are neither great saints nor great sinners . . . . .	212
176.	To conclude: It is assumed that human conduct is throughout intelligible and teleologically caused; and that the two main types of motive are the 'order' and the 'good' motive, varying in relative	

## ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS

xxi

PAR.	PAGE
strength from person to person. Punishment is specially concerned with influencing men through their 'good' motives. Hence the responsibility implied in punishment is quite compatible with intelligibility . . .	214
177. To the suggestion that indeterminism is implied in the assumption that a person can choose to follow either an 'order' motive or a 'good' motive, the answer is that no such assumption is apparent in the conception of responsibility associated with penal liability; but, of course, there may or may not be other grounds—psychological or metaphysical—for maintaining an indeterminist theory . . . . .	216

## APPENDIX

THE CONCEPTION OF INTRINSIC VALUE . . . . .	219
INDEX . . . . .	227