

# *Contents*

<b>1. A Prospective Introduction</b>	<b>1</b>
1.1. The Ascendancy of the Received View	1
1.2. Troubles with the Received View	4
1.3. The Persistence of the Received View: The Relationalist Conception	5
1.4. A Measurement-Theoretic Account of the Attitudes	8
1.5. The Empirical Structure of the Attitudes: The Attitudes as Intentional Aptitudes	11
1.6. Some Questions about the Proposed Account	14
1.7. A Final Advertisement	15
I. THE RECEIVED VIEW AND ITS TROUBLES	
<b>2. The Received View</b>	<b>19</b>
2.1. The Basic Tenets	19
2.2. Three Entailments	24
2.3. Historical Origins and Development	26
2.4. Recap	35
<b>3. Troubles with the Received View</b>	<b>36</b>
3.1. The Empirical Status of the Received View	36
3.2. Thinkers as Representation-Using Systems	38
3.3. Explicit Representation	44
3.4. Why Behavioral Evidence Doesn't Suffice	51
3.5. The Argument from Linguistic Knowledge	55
3.5.1. Psycholinguistics: A Test Case for Claims of Empirical Support	55
3.5.2. Speakers as Representation-Using Systems	56
3.5.3. Bresnan and Kaplan's Strong Competence Hypothesis	57
3.5.4. The Right View According to Fodor	60
3.5.5. The Computational Realization of Grammars	63

3.6. The Argument from Central Processing: Theories of Human Reasoning	69
3.6.1. Knowledge of Language: Explaining Away the Potential Counterexamples	69
3.6.2. Central Processes	70
3.6.3. Theories of Deductive Reasoning	71
3.6.4. Mental Logic Theories of Deductive Reasoning	74
3.6.5. Do Mental Logic Theories Provide Any Support for the Received View?	78
3.6.6. A Concluding Remark	84
3.7. Explaining Away Apparent Counterexamples: Fodor's Way	84
3.8. The Abductive Argument for the Received View: The Striking Parallelism	90
3.9. The Persistence of the Received View	92
3.10. A Weaker, Non-Reductive Construal of Propositional Attitudes	94
<b>4. Are Propositional Attitudes Relations?</b>	97
4.1. The Received View's Relational Conception of the Attitudes	97
4.2. The Relational Logical Form of Belief Sentences	99
4.3. Problems with the Relational Conception of Belief	102
4.4. Semantic vs. Psychological 'Objects' of Belief	110
4.5. Reading Back Logical Form: The Problem for Relationalists	115
4.6. The Psychological Import of Logical Form: A Measurement-Theoretic Way of Thinking about the Issue	117
<b>II. A MEASUREMENT-THEORETIC ACCOUNT OF PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDES AND THEIR ATTRIBUTION</b>	
<b>5. Foundations of a Measurement-Theoretic Account of the Attitudes</b>	123
5.1. The Basic Idea	123
5.2. The Historical Development of Measurement Theory	128
5.3. Homomorphisms and Other Structural Relations	133
5.4. Representation, Abstraction, Idealization, and Representational Artifacts	138

5.5. A Second-Order Intensional Version of Measurement Theory	140
5.6. Measurement Theory and Measure Predicates	144
5.7. The Knowledge Afforded by Measurement Theory	147
<b>6. The Basic Measurement-Theoretic Account</b>	<b>150</b>
6.1. Why Propositional Attitude Predicates Might Be Measure Predicates	150
6.2. Measuring Propositional Attitudes	155
6.3. Goals and Strategy	159
6.4. The Structure of Natural Language Representations of Propositional Attitudes	161
6.4.1. The Representational Domain	161
6.4.2. Properties and Relations of Representatives of Propositional Attitudes	169
6.4.3. Recap	172
6.5. The Empirical Structure of the Attitudes: What Are Natural Language Representations of the Attitudes Images of?	173
6.5.1. Inferring the Empirical Structure of the Attitudes	173
6.5.2. Propositional Attitude Attributions and their Use	175
6.5.3. Propositional Attitudes, their Behavioral Manifestations, and IUFs	176
6.5.4. The Empirical Structure of the Attitudes	184
6.5.5. Recap	195
6.6. Informal Sketch of a Representation Theorem	195
6.7. The Uniqueness Problem: When Have We Attributed the Same Propositional Attitude?	201
6.8. Recap	210
<b>7. Elaboration and Explication of the Proposed Measurement-Theoretic Account</b>	<b>213</b>
7.1. The Explanatory Adequacy of the Account	214
7.1.1. What Having a Propositional Attitude Amounts to	215
7.1.2. The ‘Essential’ Properties of Propositional Attitudes	216
7.1.3. Why We Have the Particular Predication Scheme that We Do	223
7.1.4. Role of Attitude Attributions in Common-sense Causal Explanations	227

7.1.5. Puzzles about Propositional Attitude Attributions	230
7.1.6. Iterated Propositional Attitude Attributions	235
7.2. The Intrinsic Nature of the Attitudes	237
7.3. Propositional Attitudes in Empirical Computational Cognitive Science: A Minimalist Account of the Computational Entailments of Propositional Attitude Attributions	242
7.4. Further Implications of the Proposed Account	249
7.4.1. Intentional Realism and the Naturalization Project	249
7.4.2. Intentional Content Essentialism	251
7.4.3. Propositional Attitude-Based Semantics Programmes	253
7.4.4. Schiffer's and Fodor's Translational Semantics Programme	253
7.5. Summary Remarks	255
<i>References</i>	257
<i>Index</i>	265